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ABSTRACT
In the two decades between 1954 and 1974» the State of 
Louisiana progressed from a closed, white-dominated society 
to an open, multi-racial society with legal safeguards in 
place to assure equal protection and equal opportunity for 
all residents regardless of race or color. Prior to I960, 
the vast majority of blacks were unable to vote, serve on 
juries, buy homes in decent neighborhoods, use publicly- 
owned facilities or frequent hotels, restaurants and other 
public accommodations. In addition to these humiliations, 
they were required to utilize inadequate "separate but 
equal" public parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, schools, 
waiting areas and correctional facilities until the mid- 
1960's.
Most of the state's segregated institutions were deseg­
regated between 1964 and 1969. The major desegregation 
battle was fought in public elementary and secondary 
schools. As the 1960's came to a close, the foundations had 
been laid for the creation of unitary school systems, deseg­
regation of correctional facilities and prohibition of 
racial discrimination in housing and employment.
With the dawn of the 1970's, a more conservative mood 
swept the nation, but a more progressive decade began in 
Louisiana. Although the enigma of a dual system of higher
ix
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education continued to escape resolution and discrimination 
continued in employment and housing, the political arena was 
brighter for blacks. They were voting in large numbers and 
thus were able to secure the election of local and state 
candidates who were less hostile to black aspirations. In 
1971, a coalition of black and Cajun votes was able to elect 
a liberal, populist governor. Once the new administration 
assumed office in 1972, existing segregation statutes were 
repealed, and in the following year, a new constitution was 
written with guarantees of equality and equal protection for 
all citizens of the state.
By 1974, de jure segregation was dead and blacks had 
the means to assure that its demise was permanent. Although 
the thornier issue of de facto segregation remained 
unresolved, there was hope and promise that it, too, would 
be eradicated one day.
x
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Like other Southern states, Louisiana was reluctant to 
relinquish its antiquated system of racial segregation prior 
to 1954. The legal or de jure means by which the state 
enforced its more than a century-old custom of separating 
white and black Louisianians resulted in blacks being 
accorded less than second-class citizenship. Virtually all 
elements of political, economic and social life were segre­
gated, first by custom and then by law. After 1954, the 
intense resistance of state and local government officials 
to federal assaults on legal segregation left Washington 
with no other recourse than to impose comprehensive demands 
upon the state, in order to compel Louisiana's white citi­
zens to comply with the mandates of the United States 
Const itution.
The purpose of this study is to review and analyze the 
dismantling of de jure segregation within the State of 
Louisiana between 1954 and 1974. In order to clarify the 
situation that existed in Louisiana at the time of the first 
Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, the history of 
racial discrimination by statutory means is first summarized 
from the post-Reconstruction era to the mid-twentieth
1
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2century. The major portion of the study next addresses the 
numerous legal artifices devised by state segregationists to 
resist increasing federal pressure to eliminate all vestiges 
of de jure racial segregation in Louisiana. Note is taken 
of the de facto basis upon which segregation and discrimi­
nation also existed by custom, but which was more difficult 
to erase. By 1974, most active resistance to desegregation 
in Louisiana had disappeared, although lingering vestiges of 
the old system remained in evidence. Therefore, it was 
necessary occasionally to extend the study past 1974, for 
the sake of continuity and completeness.
Immediately following the Civil War, the defeated South 
briefly and unrealistically resumed many of its antebellum 
practices, attempting to negate the results of Union vic­
tory. However, the imposition of Radical Reconstruction in 
1868, brought forth an attempt to create a fair and equi­
table political system in which freed black slaves would 
become citizens and receive equal treatment before the law. 
Most white Democrats intensely resisted Radical rule, and it 
was apparent that the reality of civil equality for blacks 
might be ephemeral, and might not survive the Radical state 
regime. With the end of Radical Reconstruction in Louisiana 
in 1877, black gains were placed in jeopardy when the 
"Redeemers" or "Bourbons" replaced the former Republican 
regime. Most visible signs of black social equality with 
whites were quickly erased, although the state's Democratic 
leaders refrained from overt acts of legal discrimination
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3that might provoke reactions from the federal government. 
However, as national public opinion and federal courts pro­
gressively showed less concern about black equality, and as 
the courts dismantled both constitutional and statutory 
guarantees of black equality, the state's leaders took their 
cue and codified what had already existed in custom and 
practice in a de facto system of racial segregation. By 
1954, the state's racially segregated system was firmly 
entrenched by law and had entered all facets of life.
The first Brown case had a major impact on the segre­
gated systems of the Southern states. Although it was orig­
inally applied only to public school systems, Brown later 
became a symbol and standard for the federal government in 
its determination to abolish de jure segregation "root and 
branch." The decision at the time did not stir the people 
of Louisiana to immediate action and concern, because there 
was no visible sign of its immediate application to local 
conditions. However, the implications of its decision were 
not lost on strict adherents to the status quo, and their 
strength and numbers rose gradually to lead the fight 
against desegregation with every means at their disposal, 
legal or otherwise.
During the 1950's, the South witnessed a major intru­
sion into its local affairs by federal courts to enforce the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The courts, 
for example, came to oppose racially discriminatory voter
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
registration procedures, and the systematic exclusion of 
blacks from state juries in Louisiana. In addition, the 
courts provided blacks a modest victory in higher education 
and interstate transit during the early 1950's. By the mid­
dle of the decade, however, Louisiana's leaders began to dig 
in their heels and adopted a defensive strategy of "legis­
late and litigate," to keep the federal judiciary at bay and 
to postpone indefinitely the possibility of massive integra­
tion. By the end of the decade, obsession with the race 
issue had permeated Louisiana white society, and came to 
dominate the next two gubernatorial elections of 1959-60 and
1963-64. As the 1950's came to a close, many of the state's 
white leaders and ordinary citizens braced for an all-out 
battle to defend racial segregation, regardless of the 
consequences.
Efforts by state segregation leaders to halt action by 
the federal courts reached their zenith during the battle to 
desegregate New Orleans public schools in I960. The defeat 
of Louisiana segregationists in that encounter resulted in a 
permanent rent in the fabric of school segregation, and they 
were never again able to command such support or attention 
from the majority of the people of the state. Thereafter, 
the fight to retain segregation was conducted at the local 
level as desegregation spread gradually from one locality to 
another.
During the early 1960's, peaceful demonstrations spread 
across the South as black college students, stirred by a
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5sense of racial pride and outrage at injustice, helped to 
awaken anger and concern among people elsewhere in the 
nation. When the Southern states, including Louisiana, 
responded to these nonviolent protests with arbitrary force 
and enactment of measures to stifle peaceful expression of 
protest, pressure was brought to bear on the executive and 
legislative branches to take remedial action. At the same 
time, federal courts launched additional assaults on the de 
jure system of racial segregation and assisted the demon­
strators by striking down numerous state and federal court 
decisions which had supported arrests conducted under arbi­
trary and discriminatory state laws. The courts also 
expanded their views on the selection of an impartial jury, 
but.were hesitant to interfere in trial procedures unless a 
clear case of discrimination could be proven by the defend­
ant .
The eradication of de jure segregation was given a tre­
mendous boost in the mid-1960's by comprehensive federal 
legislation and aggressive executive and judicial actions. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed private acts of dis­
crimination in public accommodations, as well as in all pro­
grams receiving federal funds, while the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 restored the right of Southern blacks to register 
and vote. At the same time, federal courts began to force 
each public school system in Louisiana to begin at least 
limited desegregation of its educational institutions under 
a freedom of choice plan, and completed the process of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6desegregating the state's colleges and universities. By 
1965, however, blacks demonstrated impatience with the slow 
progress toward total desegregation and became increasingly 
militant in their protests against racial injustice. Scat­
tered areas within the state became the scenes of ugly dem­
onstrations between whites and blacks, and state officials 
began to perceive a noticeable change in the federal courts 
thereafter, when life and property were placed in jeopardy.
Federal efforts in behalf of blacks peaked in the late 
1960's as Congress and the courts culminated their respec­
tive efforts in protecting civil rights and assisting blacks 
as equals within American society. Congress registered its 
opposition to housing discrimination in 1968, while the 
Johnson Administration energetically enforced federal laws 
protecting black rights. However, the victory of Richard 
Nixon that year, in a campaign denouncing federal "excesses" 
in behalf of civil rights, was an ill omen for continued 
federal vigor in this field.
During the Nixon Administration, 1969-74, the executive 
branch adopted a "go slow" policy toward further desegrega­
tion. In effect, it attempted to freeze black gains in the 
South, unless there was substantial evidence of blatant 
racial discrimination through de jure means. However, the 
federal courts remained vigilant, ordering the immediate end 
of all dual education systems in 1969. As the Supreme Court 
became afterward less aggressive in its views on civil 
rights, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became more so,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
taking an active role in the desegregation process. By the 
end of 1970, the remainder of the dual public school systems 
were brought to an end in Louisiana, and except for a few 
scattered pockets of resistance, de jure segregation had 
been terminated in elections, education, public facilities, 
transit, public accommodations, family relations, employment 
and housing.
With most of the legal obstacles to blacks removed by 
1970, the concern of the federal government shifted to elim­
inating lingering effects of de jure segregation, as well as 
examining de facto situations to determine if they did not 
indeed result from the previous systematic legal program of 
racial discrimination. The federal government also shifted 
attention from segregation in the South to segregation in 
the northern and western parts of the nation, and on the use 
of busing as a means of achieving a more equitable racial 
balance in segregated school systems. As a result, the 
Southern states were once again permitted to conduct their 
own affairs, unless substantial evidence was offered to sub­
stantiate an allegation of lingering racial discrimination.
By 1972, the mood in Louisiana had undergone a profound 
change. Blacks were able to register and vote in large num­
bers, and were able to influence the outcomes of several 
elections. Their support helped elect black candidates, or 
at least forced white candidates to court their vote pub­
licly. After an election, black aspirations could no longer 
be ignored, resulting in the provision of real benefits for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8blacks as citizens in their own right, and not as incidental
recipients of assistance provided to needy whites. A new
day dawned in Louisiana as black votes helped elect Edwin
«
Edwards, an open-minded, neo-populist gubernatorial candi­
date from Cajun South Louisiana. Edwards publicly courted 
black votes and received them. After taking office in 1972, 
he actively supported measures proposed by the black dele­
gation to the state legislature, including the repeal of a 
host of segregationist legislation that remained on the 
statute books. Although de facto segregation and isolated 
acts of private discrimination continued to exist, the state 
witnessed a new attitude of openness and its first real 
promise of racial harmony and equality by 1974.
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Chapter II 
DESEGREGATION AND STATE LAW 
Introduction
Between 1954 and 1974, black demonstrations against 
segregated public transportation and "white only" jury 
selection focused the attention of both federal courts and 
black organizations on discrimination and state law in 
Louisiana. Demonstrations began in the state with protests 
that arose over segregated transit in the latter half of the 
1950's, expanded in the early 1960's with voter registration 
drives and lunch counter sit-ins, and then spread in the 
mid-1960's to include picketing of downtown businesses and 
protests against general racial discrimination in various 
parts of the state. Throughout this time, the white 
hierarchy was adamant about maintaining the status quo and 
used an array of laws that were designed to prevent any 
challenges to the system of segregation. Here, the federal 
courts played another major role in voiding state and local 
efforts to stifle black aspirations for equal treatment 
under the law.
The jury selection system was another target area of 
blacks to assure due process in the courts of the state.
9
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Although federal laws had existed since the late 1800's to 
safeguard black rights to equal treatment before the courts, 
the state found ways to extend the segregated system to jury 
service. Despite the fact that the state supreme court 
expressly forbade systematic exclusion of blacks from jury 
service before the turn of the century, rarely did a black 
citizen serve on any jury panel, civil or criminal, prior to 
I960. The United States Supreme Court was reluctant to 
interfere with state and local court procedures, and often 
accepted assurances of jury commissioners that they had per­
formed their duties without racial prejudice. Had it more 
closely monitored the jury selection process across the 
state, the court would have uncovered gross disparities 
between what Louisiana professed and what the state actually 
did.
Demonstrations
The first black demonstrations in Louisiana were the 
result of events that occurred in other parts of the South. 
In the 1950's, there were attempts, often sanctioned by the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), to bring about an end to segregated public trans­
portation in Louisiana cities that had local public transit 
systems. By the early 1960's, the Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE) became active in the nonviolent sit-in 
demonstrations conducted at private businesses that prac­
tices racial discrimination, as well as in demonstrations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in support of the right of blacks to register to vote and 
use public facilities. In the mid-1960's, the focus of 
black protest became more militant, resulting in blacks 
shoving less patience in waiting for desegregation and dis­
crimination to end gradually. Unfortunately, the militancy 
resulted in a harder line being taken by the federal govern­
ment just as barriers to equal rights for blacks were crum­
bling. By the early 1970's, in an attempt to insure that 
law and order was adhered to and respected, Congress and the 
federal courts retreated substantially from their tolerant 
views regarding protests in the sixties.
Among the first demonstrations to erupt in the state 
were those involving state and local transit systems.
During the 1950's, demonstrators in Baton Rouge, New Orleans 
and Shreveport expressed their opposition to segregated 
seating on public conveyances. When the federal courts 
voided the state's segregated transit law in 1958, blacks 
challenged white waiting rooms and restaurants within termi­
nals. By I960, sit-ins had become a reality across the 
South.
In the spring of I960, the first major sit-in in the 
state occurred in Baton Rouge. Several black college stu­
dents from nearby Southern University staged a sit-in at 
lunch counters in the Greyhound Bus Terminal, a drug store 
and a local department store. Although they sat quietly 
without placards of any kind and simply requested service, 
twelve of them were arrested for disturbing the peace. In
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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state district court, they were told that their mere 
presence at the lunch counters had breached the peace, and 
were summarily found guilty and fined $100 each, or sen­
tenced to ninety days in jail.* In addition, the students 
were expelled from Southern University. Following denial of 
their appeals by the state supreme court, they turned to the 
federal courts. In late 1961, the Supreme Court reversed 
their convictions in State v. Garner, deciding that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the charge of 
disturbing the peace. The court also found that the statute 
upon which the convictions were based was "overbroad" in its 
language.^
Less than a month after the Baton Rouge sit-ins, one present 
and three former college students were arrested when they 
attempted to use a white-only library in Shreveport. They 
were arrested by waiting city police, who had been alerted 
in advance by an informer, and charged with vagrancy and 
disturbing the peace, despite their peaceful behavior.3
These events stirred major concern among solons meeting 
in the Regular Session of the Louisiana State Legislature in 
the spring and early summer of I960. Overreacting, they 
adopted a host of legislation to bolster existing state laws
*State of Louisiana v. Briscoe, State of Louisiana v.
Hoston, State of Louisiana v. Garner, 6 Race Relations Law 
Reporter (hereafter cited as RRLR), 168 (I960).
^Garner v. State, 82 S. Ct. 248 (1961).
Willie Burton, On the Black Side of Shreveport 
(1983) 103.
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that dealt with law and order. Among the issues addressed 
were perjury, aggravated battery, disturbing the peace, 
resisting an officer, criminal mischief, trespass, solici­
tation, and obstructing public passages. Upon adjourning, 
legislators felt assured that they had adequately prepared 
law enforcement officials with the tools necessary to combat 
any assault upon the status quo by any future demonstra­
tions . 4
Hardly had the legislature recessed before a new wave 
of sit-ins struck Shreveport and New Orleans. In August, 
four black college students were arrested in Shreveport 
after asking officials of a local department store why they 
had fired all black cafeteria workers, requesting that qual­
ified blacks be hired for meaningful positions, asking that 
discriminatory signs on water fountains be removed, and for 
asking that discrimination no longer be practiced at the 
store's lunch counter. When they refused requests by 
department store officials to leave, they were arrested.5
In September and October of I960, New Orleans stores 
became the targets of demonstrators. During the course of 
the sit-ins, the mayor and police chief made public state­
ments condemning the demonstrations and declaring that they 
would use the full force of the law to bring them to an
^State of Louisiana, Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular 
Session (Baton Rouge, I960), no. 68, no. 69, no. 76, no. 76, 
no. 77, no. 78, no. 80.
c
Burton, On the Black Side, 103.
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immediate end. Subsequently, one white and three black 
protesters were arrested while staging a sit-in at a white- 
only lunch counter in a downtown store. They were prose­
cuted on a charge of criminal mischief and were convicted. 
The protesters appealed on the grounds that the store man­
ager and the city police were enforcing an unconstitutional 
"custom of the state" in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, the state supreme court upheld the 
convictions since the criminal mischief statute made no 
reference to race, and because of the nature under which the 
law had been applied in this case.^ In 1963, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the convictions, taking full 
note of statements made by the mayor and police chief, whose 
clear intent had been to maintain segregated service in 
dining facilities, and whose methods had not been entirely 
motivated by the need to preserve the peace in a possibly 
volatile situation.7
Another breach of the peace case arose out of the 
arrest of several blacks who attempted to use the facilities 
of a segregated parish library in Clinton, Louisiana. When 
the defendants refused to leave, they were arrested. In 
1966, the case reached the Supreme Court, which ruled that 
the defendants had not intended to provoke a breach of the 
peace, and that the evidence demonstrated that they had
^State v. Goldfinch, La., 132 So.2d 860 (1961).
^Lombard v. State, 83 S.Ct. 1122 (1963).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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acted In a quiet, orderly and polite manner while in the 
library. The tribunal held that they had a right to be in 
the library and had simply expressed their constitutional 
rights of free speech, assembly and petition for redress of 
grievances. Since the basis for the state's prosecution of 
the protesters was their race, their convictions denied them 
the equal protection of the laws.®
In still another case, the Supreme Court reversed the 
breach of the peace convictions of blacks who had entered a 
white waiting room in a Shreveport bus terminal, and then 
had refused to leave when requested to do so by local 
authorities. Four black citizens intending to stage a 
"Freedom Ride" to Jackson, Mississippi, were arrested at the 
Continental Trailways Bus Terminal, where approximately 
forty city and parish lawmen were waiting for them. In
addition to their arrests, the two persons who had brought
them to the terminal were also arrested.9 Citing Garner v.
State, the Supreme Court reversed their convictions on the 
grounds that the presence of blacks in a white waiting room 
was insufficient evidence to establish guilt for the charge 
of breach of the peace.
The major demonstration case in the early 1960's which 
focused the attention of federal courts on state devices to
8Brown v. State, 86 S.Ct. 719 (1966).
^Burton, On the Black Side. 106-107.
*^Taylor v. Louisiana, 82 S.Ct. 1188 (1962).
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limit blacks protesting against racial discrimination was 
Cox v. State of Louisiana. The case included all of the 
elements used by the state to prevent mass demonstrations of 
any kind, particularly those involving race. Pitted against 
one another were anxious law enforcement and municipal 
officials with a determined yet orderly crowd of black 
demonstrators in front of them and an increasingly hostile 
and growing number of whites behind them, arrayed before the 
parish courthouse in downtown Baton Rouge in 1961.
The demonstration began with a CORE-directed action 
against downtown businesses that were maintaining "white 
only" lunch counters. On December 14, 1961, a group, pri­
marily composed of students from Southern University, car­
ried signs protesting segregation and urging a boycott of 
certain stores during the lucrative buying spree leading up 
to Christmas. City police responded by arresting twenty- 
three of the protesters. That night, Ronnie Moore, student 
president of the local CORE chapter, called for a mass dem­
onstration to protest the arrests and the "evil of discrim­
ination. " H
On the following day, approximately 2000 blacks, mainly 
college students, assembled on the Southern University cam­
pus five miles north of Baton Rouge. Learning that the bus 
drivers who were supposed to bring them to the city had been 
arrested, most of the protesters decided to march in an
**Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Dec. 15, 1961.
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orderly fashion to the downtown area. When Moore was 
arrested for violation of an antinoise ordinance while using 
a bullhorn to urge on the marchers, Reverend B. Elton Cox, a 
field secretary of CORE and advisor on the general protest 
movement, assumed the leadership of the march.^
Arriving in Baton Rouge before noon, the demonstrators 
assembled at the old State Capitol Building approximately 
two and one-half blocks from the parish courthouse where the 
twenty-three picketers arrested the previous day were being 
held. From there, the group marched to the courthouse.
Upon the arrival of Cox at the head of the group, the chief 
of police consulted with him in the presence of the sheriff 
and the mayor. Cox informed the authorities of the purpose, 
content and duration of the demonstration, and was told by 
the police chief that his group could assemble across the 
street from the courthouse, approximately 101 feet away, and 
no further. The demonstrators then proceeded to fill the 
sidewalk for an entire block, while the police cordoned off 
the street directly in front of them. There was no public 
access along the pathway, and entrances to buildings across 
from the courthouse were effectively blocked.*3
During the demonstration, the crowd sang a few songs 
and cheered when they heard loud responses from inmates on 
the third floor of the courthouse, which made law
12Ibid., Dec. 16, 1961.
*^Ibid.; Cox v. State of Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th 
Cir. 1965).
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enforcement officials even more uneasy. Adding to the ten­
sion was the gathering of around two hundred fifty whites on 
the sidewalk along the front of the courthouse, directly 
across from the black demonstrators. Subsequent testimony 
and a film taken by a local television crew showed that the 
black protesters were loud but in control, while the whites 
present were becoming increasingly agitated as the blacks 
sang, cheered and waved signs protesting racial discrimina­
tion.
The climax of the demonstration came when Reverend Cox 
addressed the group, condemning segregation and the illegal 
arrest of the picketers. He then instructed the group to 
break for lunch and to stage a sit-in at four downtown busi­
nesses with dining facilities that still refused to serve 
blacks. In the event that they were again denied service, 
they were to sit quietly for one hour and then leave. At 
this point, Sheriff Bryan Clemmons assumed that Cox's speech 
had been "inflammatory" and had disturbed the peace, then 
took it upon himself to order the crowd to disperse immedi­
ately. Most of the personal accounts of what happened next 
agree that Cox instructed the group not to move. Thus far, 
the mood of the students had not been hostile, aggressive, 
unfriendly or riotous. The sheriff later testified that he 
had felt that the situation was getting out of hand. As 
about eighty city police and parish deputies began to push
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the black demonstrators back and fired tear gas at them,
pandemonium broke out and the protesters fled in disarray.
Fifty persons were arrested during the melee and Reverend
Cox was arrested later in the day on charges of obstruction
of public passageways, obstruction of justice, breach of the
peace and criminal conspiracy.*5
Cox was subsequently tried in state district court and
found guilty of all but the criminal conspiracy charge.
When he and two other CORE members criticized the district
attorney and the judge for the way in which the case had
been handled, they were indicted by the East Baton Rouge
Parish grand jury for defamation.^ On appeal to the state
supreme court, the sentence on obstruction of justice was
set aside, but the convictions on obstruction of public
passageways and breach of the peace were affirmed in June of
1963. During the state court proceedings, a ruling was
handed down that the right of free speech was not absolute,
and that a state could regulate its exercise by general and
nondiscriminatory legislation.*7 statute regulating the
obstruction of public passageways provided that:
No person shall wilfully obstruct the free, con­
venient and normal use of any public sidewalk, 
street, highway, bridge, alley, road, or other 
passageway of any public building, structure, 
water craft or ferry, by impeding, hindering,
l6Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965). 
^Cox v. Louisiana, La., 148 So.2d 600 (1963).
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stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage 
theron or therein.
However, legitimate labor organizations and certain approved 
labor methods to secure higher pay and better working condi­
tions were exempted from the l a w . 18 Another statute defined 
disturbing the peace as occurring when someone intended to 
provoke a breach of the peace by crowds or congregating with 
others:
. . .  in or upon a shore protection structure . . . 
or on a public street or public highway, or upon a 
public sidewalk, or any other public place or build- 
or in any hotel, motel, store, restaurant, lunch 
counter, cafeteria, sandwich shop, motion picture 
theater, drive in, beauty parlor, swimming pool 
area, or any sports or recreational area or place, 
or any place of business engaged in selling or serv­
ing members of the public, or in or around any free 
entrance to any such place of business or public 
building, or any building owned by another . . .
Those persons who failed or refused to disperse or move on 
when ordered to do so by a law enforcer of the state, parish 
or municipality would be subject to a r r e s t . 19
Cox filed two separate appeals with the United States 
Supreme Court, one involving his conviction on charges of 
disturbing the peace and obstruction of public passageways, 
and another involving the validity of a state statute pro­
hibiting picketing near a courthouse. Arguments were held 
before the court on separate days, and the justices decided
18Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 80. 
19Ibid., no. 69.
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to issue two separate opinions in each case in January of 
1965.
In the first case, the Supreme Court held that Cox's 
rights of free speech and free assembly had been infringed 
upon because the breach of the peace statute allowed persons 
to be punished merely for peacefully expressing contrary 
views on segregation, and it granted local officials "unfet­
tered discretion" in regulating the use of streets for 
peaceful parades and meetings. The court held that the por­
tion of Cox’s speech advocating sit-ins was constitutionally 
protected, and that cheering, clapping and singing to pro­
test segregation, discrimination and the arrest of fellow 
students was not a breach of the peace.2®
The court recognized that a state or municipality had 
the right to regulate the use of city streets and other 
facilities in order to assure public safety and convenience, 
and that everyone could not address a group at any time or 
public place. Government authorities had a duty and respon­
sibility "to keep streets open and available for movement," 
but a statute that was so "vague and indefinite" as to allow 
for the punishment of peaceful expression of the rights of 
free speech and assembly was unconstitutional.2*
20Cox v. Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965).
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According to the justices, one of the functions of free 
speech "is to invite dispute," even to the point of inciting 
people to anger. In this incidence, fear by local author­
ities that violence might erupt due to the opinions being 
expressed by Cox did not justify curtailment of his basic 
rights of free expression. In addition, a government 
authority could not require persons desiring to disseminate 
ideas to present them to law enforcement officials for their 
consideration and arbitrary discretion to approve or reject 
them. Therefore, Cox's convictions were r e v e r s e d . ^ 2
In the second Cox v. State of Louisiana case, the 
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of picketing near a 
courthouse. The state statute in question was almost iden­
tical to a federal law passed by Congress in 1950, and 
provided that:
Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, 
obstructing, or impeding the administration of 
justice, or with the intent of influencing any 
judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the
discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or
near a building housing a court of the State of 
Louisiana . . . shall be fined not more than five 
thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both.
The Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to pass a law
in order to protect "its judicial system from pressures
which picketing near a court house may create." However,
Cox could not be convicted for any offense relating to this 
statute since he had received tacit permission from the
22lbid.
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chief of police, in the presence of the sheriff and mayor of 
Baton Rouge, to conduct a demonstration across the street 
from the parish courthouse and had complied with that agree­
ment. Although local officials later regretted their deci­
sion to allow the demonstration to proceed, they could not 
rescind this prior grant of permission and arrest the demon­
strators for their actions in picketing near a courthouse. 
The Supreme Court then declared that laws and regulations 
governing freedom of speech and assembly should be drawn so 
as to give the public fair warning of what was illegal, but 
should not be so broad as to stifle protected f r e e d o m s . 3^
This case did not end here, though, because the state 
district attorney for East Baton Rouge Parish promptly 
charged Cox with "attempting to obstruct justice." After 
failing to have the case removed to the federal district 
court, the defendant applied for and received a stay order 
from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the grounds that 
the state was seeking to prosecute him for "attempting" to 
do what the Supreme Court had ruled was not a violation of 
the law. 24
In another case arising out of the CORE-directed demon­
stration in Baton Rouge in 1961, the issue of unlawful 
assembly was raised. In Clemmons v. CORE, local officials 
asked the federal courts for an injunction against the black
2^Cox v. Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 475 (1965).
24Cox v. Louisiana, 1348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965).
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civil rights organization for sponsoring anti-segregation 
demonstrations on the grounds that such gatherings had 
obstructed public streets and resulted in numerous viola­
tions of state criminal statutes in the past. The court 
permanently enjoined the defendants on discovering that 
CORE had not secured a permit to conduct the march of 
December 15, 1961, and that the group of approximately two 
thousand persons had ignored the plaintiffs' order to dis­
perse. The federal judge declared that the defendants' 
rights of free speech and assembly were subordinated to the 
state's interest in public safety when there was a "clear 
and present danger" to that safety. Later, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the lower court decision because the plain­
tiffs had failed to show a federal cause of action. Local 
officials had not shown that CORE and the demonstrators had 
intentionally conspired to deprive them and other members of 
the community of their federally protected rights under the 
law. Therefore, the district court was ordered to dissolve 
the injunction and to dismiss the complaint. 5^
Because the federal courts had neutralized the effec­
tiveness of several of Louisiana's law and order statutes, 
the state legislature in 1963 passed additional laws to 
strengthen its resolve and position as civil rights organi­
zations announced plans to traverse the South on behalf of
2S
Clemmons v. CORE, 201 F.Supp. 737 (E.D. La. 1962),
323 F .2d 54 (5th Cir. 1963).
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blacks who were too intimidated to stand up for their civil 
rights. Among the laws enacted were new trespass, dis­
turbing the peace, criminal mischief, resisting an officer 
and solicitation measures.^
In the mid-1960's, CORE sponsored various demonstra­
tions in several Louisiana cities in order to focus atten­
tion on the plight of blacks. A case in the town of Clinton 
involved the arrest of a white CORE task worker who accom­
panied two black residents in their attempt to register to 
vote in East Feliciana Parish in August of 1963. Although 
sitting quietly, he was arrested for disturbing the peace, 
and the district judge set a cash bond of $2000, despite the 
fact that the maximum penalty for conviction was $1000 and 
one year in jail. On August 20, the town of Clinton and 
East Feliciana Parish sought an injunction in state court 
against CORE because its civil -rights activities encouraged 
others to violate state laws and threatened plaintiffs with 
violence and irreparable injury. After the state court 
issued a temporary restraining order against it, CORE sought 
unsuccessfully to have the case transferred to federal dis­
trict court. On further appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court 
in 1963, CORE received a stay order, but the state district 
judge, John R. Rarick, ignored it and extended his restrain­
ing order to muffle CORE. Attempts by black leaders in the
26Acts of Louisiana, 1963, Regular Session, no. 91, no. 
93, no. 9?, no. 96, no. 99.
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parish to settle racial problems peacefully with the mayor 
of Clinton failed in September, so CORE organized a boycott 
of town merchants the following month. Thirty persons, 
mostly blacks, were subsequently arrested for disturbing the 
peace and defamation. In December, the East Feliciana 
Parish grand jury indicted twelve blacks who had signed a 
letter to the mayor the previous September asking him to 
form a race relations committee to help solve problems. The 
case was never brought to trial, and after the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fifth Circuit Court dis­
missed CORE'S earlier appeal because the issue had become 
moot.27
Another CORE case involved demonstrations in the town 
of Plaquemine in Iberville Parish. On August 13, 1963, the 
town became the scene of a CORE-directed protest meeting at 
a Baptist Church, where national CORE director James Farmer 
was scheduled to speak. The meeting was broken up by law 
enforcement officers using horses, electric cattle prods, 
and tear gas, resulting in the arrests of hundreds of blacks 
who had come to hear the speech. As in Clinton, local 
officials sought and received a restraining order. However, 
this time, the order was issued by a federal district court, 
on the grounds that such action would prevent possible 
injury to large numbers of persons. Because the judge was
27Leon Friedman (ed.), Southern Justice (New York; 
Pantheon Books, 1965) 119-20; 9 RRLR 1131-32; Clinton v. 
CORE, 341 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 196577“
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out of state and could not be reached to grant a hearing on 
a motion by CORE to dissolve the order, CORE appealed to the 
Fifth Circuit Court, which lifted the restraining order. 
Shortly thereafter, the district judge returned, issued a 
new temporary restraining order and denied CORE'S request to 
dissolve the new decree. In mid-September, he issued a new 
restraining order, then lifted it on the following day to 
allow the case to be tried in state courts before federal 
action was taken on it. In October, a state district court 
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from 
further actions in promoting or engaging in demonstrations 
in the town or parish.
In September of 1963, members of the black community in 
Shreveport sought a permit for a memorial march through the 
downtown area as a show of sympathy for the deaths of four 
black children resulting from the recent bombing of a church 
in Birmingham, Alabama. When the request was denied, the 
group decided to hold the march anyway and to proceed to a 
memorial service at a nearby church. Nearly two hundred law 
enforcement officers prevented the march from taking place, 
and proceeded to surround and intimidate the several hundred 
blacks who had congregated at the church. Incidents there 
resulted in numerous injuries to some of the demonstrators 
at the hands of the police as the crowd was dispersed. On
28Friedman, Southern Justice, 118; Town of Plaquemines 
and Parish of Iberville v. CORE, 8 RRLR 862-73 (1963).
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the following day, students at a black high school organized 
an impromptu march of their own, and were met by helmeted 
policemen "with clubs, shotguns, and pistols . . . slinging, 
beating, bruising, kicking, and pushing every black in sight 
and reach."29
A more peaceful situation occurred in Vest Monroe in 
the following summer, when two white voter registration 
workers affiliated with CORE were arrested for disturbing 
the peace because of their assistance in registering local 
black residents. Since the voter registration book was open 
for only three days, the chief of police decided to enforce 
a city ordinance which prohibited whites and blacks from 
walking together on the town's sidewalks for five days. His 
clear intent was to prevent the formation of integrated 
teams of registration workers and to serve as a show of 
arbitrary police power to local blacks who might have inten­
tions on becoming involved in civil rights activities.30
One of the most serious civil rights demonstrations to 
take place in the state occurred in Bogalusa in 1965.
Racial trouble began in January when local blacks tested 
their rights to use public accommodations in the city, and 
Ku Klux Klan threats forced the cancellation of a speech by 
Brooks Hays, an Arkansas Congressman known for his straight­
forward views on the impracticality of segregation. In
^Quoted in Burton, On the Black Side. 101-02.
Friedman, Southern Justice, 60-61.
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February, state police were called in when racial tensions 
escalated after two CORE workers claimed to have been 
attacked by a mob of white men. In the following month,
CORE announced that it would use Bogalusa as a "summer 
project," and blacks began picketing local stores that 
continued to practice racial discrimination. Tensions 
between blacks and whites in the city resulted in fighting 
between rival pickets on the town's main street during the 
last two days of May, and led to the brutal murder of one 
black deputy sheriff and the wounding of a n o t h e r . 31
During the summer of 1965, both blacks and whites armed 
themselves as scattered incidents continued to inflame 
residents of the surrounding area in both Louisiana and 
Mississippi, luring white supremacist groups to the racial 
battlefield that Bogalusa had become. At this point, 
Governor John J. McKeithen sent in the state police armed 
with rifles and submachine guns to set up roadblocks to 
deter additional outsiders from descending upon Bogalusa. 
Also, the federal courts became concerned about the hostile 
actions taken by various white supremacist groups operating 
in the city and by the lack of leadership provided by 
Bogalusa officials. The federal district court issued a 
preliminary injunction against the chief of police and cer­
tain other local officials, specifically enjoining them from
^*Diane Smith, "School Integration in Washington 
Parish, Louisiana: 1954-1972" (Master's thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1972) 37-49; Baton Rouge State Times,
Apr. 22, June 1, 1965.
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failing to protect demonstrators from assaults and harass- 
ments while peacefully demonstrating in protest of racial 
discrimination. When the court discovered that the chief of 
police and the commissioner of public safety had not com­
plied with its order, it cited them for contempt and ordered 
them to adopt and publicize a plan which included the educa­
tion of police officers on their duties and responsibilities 
during demonstrations.32 jn two related cases, twelve civil 
rights workers filed a $425,000 damage suit against 
Bogalusa, Washington Parish, and the State of Louisiana; and 
two organizations and thirty-three individuals were 
restrained by the federal courts from interfering with the 
civil rights of black residents of Washington Parish.33
By the late 1960's, local authorities in some areas of 
the state were still attempting to prevent vocal protests by 
blacks against racial discrimination. Several blacks were 
arrested in 1968, while picketing the West Baton Rouge 
Parish School Board Office in Port Allen because of the 
racist policies of the board. Their arrests were based on a 
local ordinance that made picketing unlawful except under 
certain conditions. The federal district court in Baton 
Rouge upheld the ordinance, but the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the decision on the grounds that the
32lbid.; Hicks v. Knight, 10 RRLR 1430 (1965).
33United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux, 250 
F.Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1965).
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regulation violated the First Amendment because of its over­
breadth. The ordinance restricted all types of public and 
private picketing, prohibited picketing on sidewalks and 
streets, embraced all facilities in Port Allen, and limited 
the number of picketers to two.34
As racial tensions intensified in the mid-1960's, state 
and local officials became alarmed at the arrival within the 
state of large numbers of "outside agitators" whose purpose 
was to assist blacks in the attainment of their constitu­
tional rights. As a result of their concern, state autho- 
ities attempted to prosecute certain persons under the 
"Subversion Statutes" for their activities in promoting 
civil rights for blacks, as well as linking the civil rights 
movement with the time-honored charge that it was part of an 
international communist conspiracy. These attempts led to 
the case of Dombrowski v. Pfister (1964), in which a federal 
district judge approved of the state's attempts to prosecute 
civil rights workers for sedition, treason, subversion and 
communist activities aimed at the unlawful overthrow of the 
state government. However, the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision in 1965, invalidating Louisiana's anti-subversion 
statute because of its "chilling effect" on freedom of 
expression. The court found the statutory definition of 
"subversive organization" so vague, broad, and uncertain as 
to inhibit freedom of expression because of its threat of
^Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (E.D. La. 1968).
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criminal prosecution. The majority also voided the portion 
of the statute that required members of Communist-front 
organizations to register, because it failed to provide a 
method for procedural due process.35
The state riot statute was called into question at the 
end of the decade in the case of Douglas v. Pitcher. Under 
this law, the state prohibited the "endeavor by any person 
to incite or procure any other person to create or partici­
pate in a riot," which was defined as "a public disturbance 
involving an assemblage of three or more persons acting 
together or in concert which by tumultuous and violent con­
duct, results in injury or damage to persons or property." 
The law had been patterned on the federal Anti-Riot Act, 
which had been upheld by the federal courts. The Douglas 
case arose from the arrest of two black speakers at a mass 
protest rally in Baton Rouge following the killing of a 
black youth by a white city policeman. The rally was 
followed by disorders in which several persons were injured 
and property damage had occurred. Perhaps reflecting the 
national reaction to a more militant atmosphere that pre­
vailed by the end of the 1960's, the federal district court 
decided in the case to uphold the state's riot s t a t u t e . 36
^Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F.Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 
1964), 85 S.Ct. 1116 (1965).
^Douglas v. Pitcher, 319 F.Supp. 706 (E.D. La. 1970).
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The Lav and Racial Intimidation
Sometimes, Louisiana law was used to intimidate blacks
in order to render them ineffectual in attempting to gain
equal treatment and due process. This objective was sought
by various devices, but the intent was clear.
One of the earliest attempts to silence the voices of 
change was to strike at any organization which might possi­
bly challenge the segregated system. Because of its active 
involvement in the campaign to secure civil rights for 
blacks, the NAACP became the primary focus of the state 
government in stifling black aspirations in the latter half 
of the 1950's. Although the first state branch of the orga­
nization had been chartered in 1914, it was never seriously 
challenged until 1956. At that time, the NAACP was prose­
cuted under a 1924 anti-Ku Klux Klan law, which regulated 
"all fraternal, patriotic, charitable, benevolent, literary, 
scientific, athletic, military, or social organizations," 
requiring them to file a list of their members and officers 
residing in Louisiana. This requirement had to be met 
between December 15 and December 31 each year. However, the 
group was reluctant to file its membership list because of 
fears of reprisals by segregationists, which led to a court 
challenge. On March 29, 1956, a state district court judge 
issued a preliminary injunction banning the NAACP from oper­
ating within the state as long as it failed to comply with 
state law. The organization appealed unsuccessfully to
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federal and state courts and lay dormant until being resur­
rected in December in New Orleans, Lafayette, Lake Charles, 
Shreveport, Alexandria, and Baton Rouge. When State 
Attorney General Jack P. F. Gremillion announced his inten­
tion to prosecute them for failure to comply with the orders 
of the state courts, they decided to submit and file the 
required membership lists by the end of the y e a r . 37
Besides the NAACP, two educational organizations were 
also compelled to file membership lists because of the stand 
of their parent organizations on segregation in 1956. The 
state attorney general issued an opinion bringing them under 
the scope of the 1924 law, and declared that teachers who 
belonged to them could be dismissed under current teacher 
tenure laws. Therefore, the National Parent-Teacher 
Association filed a list of its 6500 Louisiana members, 
while the Louisiana division of the National Education 
Association filed a partial list of the names of 4000 of its 
approximately 9000 members.3®
In 1958, the state legislature enacted a new law aimed 
at integrationist organizations in the guise of forestalling 
Communist infiltration into the state. The statute required 
certain types of "non-trading organizations" that were 
affiliated with organizations created or operating under the
37Acts of Louisiana, 1924, Regular Sessions, no. 2; New 
Orleans Times-Picayune, Apr. 25, Dec. 20, 1956.
Og
New Orleans Times-Picayune, Nov. 28, 1956.
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laws of other states to file affidavits declaring that none 
of its officers was a member of any group cited by the House 
Un-American Activities Committee or the United States 
Attorney General as Communist, Communist-front or subver­
sive. 39 Under the 1924 and 1958 laws, members of the NAACP 
were being fired from their jobs, employees were being 
prohibited by their school boards from joining, and local 
NAACP leaders were being intimidated by law enforcement 
officers and white supremacist g r o u p s . ^0 The Shreveport 
affiliate of the NAACP challenged the two statutes in the 
federal courts, which voided them in the early 1960's on the 
grounds that the first violated due process while the second 
subjected members of the NAACP to possible economic 
reprisals. 41-
In another blatant episode of racial harassment, two 
cases arose out of an incident that occurred in Plaquemines 
Parish in the mid-1960's, but which was not settled until 
the early 1970's. One case involved machinations by parish 
authorities who grossly violated a black resident's civil 
rights. Then, when he selected an out-of-state civil rights 
attorney currently residing in Louisiana to defend him, 
parish officials began harassing his legal counsel in an
39Acts of Louisiana, 1958, Regular Session, no. 260.
^Burton, On the Black Side, 104.
^Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 181 F.Supp. 37 
(E.D. La. I960), 81 S.Ct. 1333 (1961).
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effort to deter any possibility of civil rights progress for 
black residents of the parish.
In the first case, Duncan v. Perez, a black man was 
arrested for simple battery in connection with his part in 
breaking up a confrontation between his two cousins and four 
whites in 1965. Although the charge was dropped, he was 
rearrested and his bond set at twice that of the parish bond 
schedule. In a non-jury trial, he was convicted and sen­
tenced. When his out-of-state civil rights attorney lost an 
appeal to the state supreme court, Duncan was again arrested 
and a new bond was set. Then, the attorney was arrested on 
a charge of practicing law in the state without a license 
after he attended a conference with the parish district 
judge to post an appeal bond for his client. Relatives who 
attempted to post a property bond for Duncan were informed 
by the sheriff that the assessed value of the property had 
to be at least double the amount of the bond, although this 
was contrary to state law and practice. The case eventually 
reached the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the 
conviction because the defendant had been denied trial by 
jury. Duncan then sued the parish district attorney in fed­
eral court to enjoin him from further prosecution on the 
charge of battery. In 1970, the court concluded that the 
defendant would not have been prosecuted and reprosecuted 
had it not been for the civil rights nature of the case, 
Duncan's selection of an out-of-state civil rights attorney 
to represent him, and his vigorous defense of his legal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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rights. Therefore, the court voided any future attempts by 
the state to reprosecute him, on the grounds that irrep­
arable injury and bad faith prosecution had been clearly 
established by the parish district attorney over the past 
five years of litigation.^
In the related case of Sobol v. Perez, parish officials 
conspired to make an example of Duncan's attorney. Sobol 
was licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and 
New York State, before the United States Supreme Court, and 
in federal courts operating in the Eastern District in 
Louisiana. He had resided in the state since 1965, perform­
ing volunteer work for the Lawyers Constitutional Defense 
Committee, which provided attorneys for civil rights litiga­
tion in the South. After being arrested in 1967, for prac­
ticing law in the state without a license, Sobol was finger­
printed, jailed for four hours and had his bail set at $1500 
without any appearance before a judge. Being joined by the 
United States as "intervenor," the attorney filed suit 
against Plaquemines Parish political boss Leander Perez,
Sr., his son who served as the parish district attorney, and 
the parish district judge. In 1968, the federal courts 
decided that Sobol's arrest was harassment and was meant to 
deter him as well as other attorneys from providing legal 
representation in civil rights cases. It was determined
^Duncan v. Perez, 321 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970), 455 
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
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that the plaintiff's actions in representing Duncan did not 
constitute unauthorized practice of law under Louisiana 
statutes, which allowed out-of-state lawyers temporarily 
present in the state to practice in state courts. The law 
had never been used against any other visiting attorney, so 
that its use in the Sobol case "could only be interpreted as 
harassment."43
Trial Procedure
The major issue arising in connection with trial proce­
dure was in the racial composition of grand and petit 
juries. On several occasions prior to 1954, the state 
supreme court had expressed its intentions that juries be 
selected without discrimination against members of the race 
of the accused. However, local and state officials were 
able to exploit loopholes in the law or within the de jure 
system of segregation itself to insure that virtually all- 
white juries were selected until the mid-1960's. In 
Louisiana, the roster of registered voters was the primary 
list used in compiling the general venire from which the 
grand and petit juries were selected. Since few blacks were 
registered to vote before the 1960's, it was practically 
assured that juries would be all-white. Then, local offi­
cials resorted to various other devices in order to purge 
the lists of any remaining black names.
43Sobol v. Perez, 321 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970), 455 
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
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The systematic exclusion of blacks from juries was the 
first major obstacle that had to be removed in order for 
black citizens to receive fair and equitable treatment in 
state courts. During the latter half of the nineteenth cen­
tury, attempts were made by the federal government to assure 
blacks of the selection of fair and impartial juries. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided harsh penalties for state 
officials who excluded blacks from jury duty. Then, in 
1880, the Supreme Court declared that every citizen was 
entitled to the right of trial by a jury that was free of 
prejudice. Although proscribing outright exclusion of any 
class or race, it did approve of the states establishing 
qualifications for juror eligibility. Unfortunately, this 
loophole subverted federal intentions of protecting the 
rights of 1&acks in the selection of a jury free of racial 
discrimination.44
In 1895, the Louisiana State Supreme Court ruled that a 
black defendant had the burden of proving that his jury was 
chosen under a policy of systematic exclusion of blacks. 
Otherwise, the court would accept the testimony of jury 
commissioners that some black names were included in the 
jury wheel at the time of the selection of the defendant's 
venire, and that they had made no distinctions on the basis
^Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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of race, color or previous condition of servitude in jury 
selection.45
Not until 1935 did the United States Supreme Court 
adopt a view contrary to this decision, when it declared 
that it would not accept a simple denial by the state that 
it did not discriminate. Instead, state officials would 
have to offer proof in the face of a strong prima facie 
challenge, and they would be required to demonstrate that 
there were reasons other than race for the lack of qualified 
blacks on juries.46
Whether or not naivete played a role in its decision in 
1937, the state supreme court held that there was no dis­
crimination on the grounds of alleged systematic exclusion 
of blacks from juries if the evidence showed that blacks 
were included in every jury list, that some blacks had 
served on grand or petit juries in the past, and if accused 
blacks were tried as fairly as whites in state courts.
Citing the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 2 of 
the Louisiana State Constitution of 1921, it declared that 
state action through the legislature, courts, or executive 
or administrative officers "in excluding all persons of the 
African race solely because of race or color from serving as 
grand or petit jurors in (the) criminal prosecution of a 
person of the African race, is a denial of equal protection
4^State v. Murray, La., 17 So. 832 (1895).
46Norris v. Alabama, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935).
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of the laws." No one had a right to a jury composed of only 
whites, only blacks, or mixed persons. A loophole in the 
ruling was provided when the court instructed jury commis­
sioners to select only "persons who they know to be compe­
tent, regardless of whether they are black or white." In 
addition, it stated that there would be no presumption of 
discrimination if all names but a few placed in the general 
venire were white, unless evidence to the contrary was pre­
sented. Otherwise, it would be presumed that the list was 
selected "in a fair effort to select best qualified persons, 
and not with any view of discrimination on account of race 
or color."47
During the 1940's, the state supreme court issued 
additional rulings on the waiving of rights, proportional 
representation on juries, and prima facie evidence of jury 
discrimination. In a 1940 case, the state supreme court 
held that a defendant had to first raise the issue of racial 
discrimination in the selection of his grand or petit jury 
at his initial trial. If not, he waived such right and 
could not later cite this reason in motioning for a new 
trial.48 As late as 1955, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld this decision, when it affirmed the conviction of 
three black Louisiana residents for rape, despite their 
allegations that blacks had been systematically excluded
47State v. Gill, La., 172 So. 412 (1937).
^®State v. White, La., 192 So. 345 (1940).
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from their grand jury. The high court decided that they had 
been provided with counsel and a reasonable opportunity to 
object to the composition of their grand jury "in a timely 
fashion," and in failing to do so, had waived their consti­
tutional rights at that t i m e . 49
In 1941, the state supreme court ruled on a case 
involving a parish jury commission that had drawn up its own 
prospective juror list, composed of black and white names of 
persons that it considered to be competent and qualified to 
serve. The justices held that "in absence of proof of fraud 
or designed discrimination, it is to be presumed that 
commissioners performed their duties within the spirit of 
the law, wisely and well." In addition, the court decided 
that the law did not set a fixed proportion or percentage of 
whites or blacks on juries, and that "negroes are not 
entitled to representation on grand and petit juries in 
proportion to the population."5® In the following year, the 
state supreme court declared that no violation of a black 
defendant's rights occurred if blacks were included on a 
petit jury panel, but none were selected.51
Louisiana's high court held in 1944, that the evidence 
showed that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was
^Michel v. Poret, Poret v. State, La., 76 S.Ct. 158 
(1955).
50State v. Pierre, La., 3 So. 2d 895 (1941).
"^State v. Augusta, La., 7 So.2d 177 (1942).
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made in Allen Parish, where 10 to 20 percent of the popula­
tion was black but where no black citizen had ever served on 
a jury in the history of the parish. Therefore, in a rare 
judgment, it was decided that the accused had been denied 
equal protection of the laws in the selection of his 
jurors.52
In 1947, the state supreme court ruled that a person 
charged with a crime was not entitled to have the exact per­
centage of his race placed on the general venire lists of 
grand and petit juries in order to avoid a charge of dis­
crimination. However, "substantial representation" by the 
race of the accused would be sufficient as opposed to "token
representation."53
• Congress re-enacted Section 4 of the 1875 Civil Rights 
Act concerning jury service in 1948. The statute declared 
that:54
No citizen possessing all qualifications which are 
or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified 
for service as grand or petit juror in any court 
of the United States, or of any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servi­
tude; and whoever, being an officer or other per­
son charged with any duty in the selection or 
summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon 
any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not 
more that $5000.
■^State v. Anderson, La., 18 So.2d 33 (1944).
^^State v. Perkins, La., 31 So.2d 188 (1947).
^ United States Code Annotated, Title 18 (hereinafter) 
cited as 18 OsCA), (St. Paul: West Publishing), Section
243.
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Despite the passage of this law, discrimination in the 
selection of juries in Louisiana remained the rule instead 
of the exception.
During the 1950's, the state supreme court and at least 
one trial court took a harder line toward systematic exclu­
sion or token inclusion of blacks on juries. In two cases 
decided in 1952 and 1957, the state supreme court held that 
such tactics were unconstitutional, but that the percentage 
of blacks and whites in the population or on the voter reg­
istration list was not to be used as a gauge in determining 
whether the selection of a grand jury was based on racial 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 55 in 1952, a district court in Orleans 
Parish became the first trial court to annul an indictment 
on the grounds that blacks had been systematically and 
intentionally excluded from parish grand juries because of 
their race and color in violation of the Fourteenth 
A m e n d m e n t . 56 j n  a 1955 case, the state supreme court upheld 
the conviction of a white man who had motioned for a new 
trial on the grounds of systematic exclusion of blacks from 
his grand jury. The court felt that he had no right to such 
a challenge of his indictment since neither he nor his vic­
tim was b l a c k . 57 xwo years later, the court overruled a
■^State v. Green, La., 60 So.2d 208 (1952); State v. 
Eubanks, La., 94 So.2d 262 (1957).
56Louisiana v. Dowels, 1952 (unreported case, cited in 
Eubanks v. State, 1958).
57State v. Lea, La., 84 So.2d 169 (1955).
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motion by a black defendant that "persons of color" who had
served on his grand jury were not of the same class as
"Negroes."58
The United States Supreme Court issued a major ruling 
concerning jury selection in Louisiana in the case of 
Eubanks v. State in 1958, reversing the decision of the 
state supreme court, which had declared that there was 
insufficient evidence for a charge of systematic exclusion 
of blacks from a grand jury in an Orleans Parish murder 
case. During the course of an investigation by the Supreme
Court, it was determined that the population of Orleans
Parish was one-third black, and that the parish jury commis­
sion had initially begun to include blacks as potential 
jurors in 1936. By 1954, when Eubanks was indicted, thirty- 
six grand juries had been selected, with at least six blacks 
being included in each list. However, only one black citi­
zen was selected among the four hundred thirty-two jurors 
named during the previous eighteen year period, and it was 
alleged that the single black juror chosen was thought to 
have been white. Despite the fact that there were a sub­
stantial number of blacks available and qualified for jury 
service, virtually none had served. In overturning the 
case, the Supreme Court held that the "mere general asser­
tions by officials of their performance of duty in select­
ing (a) grand jury is not an adequate justification for
■^State v. Palmer, La., 94 So.2d 439 (1957).
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exclusion of Negroes from grand jury service," declared that 
"chance and accident alone do not constitute adequate expla­
nation for continued omission of Negroes from grand juries 
over long periods of time," and overruled the defense "of 
local tradition" for failure of the state to comply with 
equal protection.59
At this same time, the state supreme court overruled a 
motion that the state was required to present evidence that 
blacks were being called for jury service. The justices 
declared that the court had ruled for nearly eighty years 
that discrimination in the selection of juries was unconsti­
tutional. Once again, the court held that the burden of 
proof for a charge of racial discrimination in the selection 
of a jury was on the defendant.50
In 1959, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, a 
Mississippi case in which a conviction was struck down on 
the grounds that there was strong prima facie evidence of 
systematic exclusion of blacks from juries. This decision 
became the foundation for subsequent decisions by the appel­
late court involving discrimination in jury selection.in 
a companion case in 1964, the court ruled that there was 
systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury system in a
59Eubanks v. State, 78 S.Ct. 970 (1958).
60State v. Fletcher, La., 106 So.2d 709 (1958).
^United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 
(5th Cir. 1959).
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Georgia case, and that the state had in effect required 
blacks "to choose between an unfairly constituted jury and a 
prejudiced jury."62
In the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama, the Supreme Court 
appeared to do an about face. Prior to this decision, the 
federal courts were predisposed to overturn convictions 
when there was complete exclusion of blacks or obvious 
tokenism of blacks on juries, and they had generally 
approved of prima facie evidence of jury discrimination for 
reversals. However, after Swain, the Supreme Court cast 
doubt on what constituted a prima facie case of discrimina­
tion, when it declared that "an imperfect system is not 
equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race." It 
also indicated that a jury system did not have to perfectly 
mirror the population and proportions of different groups 
present within the community.63 However, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals chose to strictly construe the meaning of 
this decision, and continued to apply the Constitution's 
guarantee of a fairly selected jury system. During the late 
1960's, the Fifth Circuit Court maintained a higher set of 
standards than those imposed by the Supreme Court.64
52Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964).
63Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965).
^Frank T. Read and Lucy S. McGough, Let Them Be 
Judged; The Judical Integration of the Peep_5outh 
(Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1978) 339.
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During the 1960's, the courts undertook the issues of 
criteria for jury selection, exemptions from jury service, 
use of prejudicial remarks during trials and the use of 
peremptory challenges. It was during this time that both 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States 
Supreme Court became actively involved in the supervision of 
jury procedures in the Southern states.
The Louisiana State Supreme Court handed down a major 
state decision in civil rights in 1962, in State v. Goree, 
which dealt with the use of "best man" criteria for jury 
selection. The case stemmed from a charge against several 
blacks for "battery with a dangerous weapon on a white man" 
in Lincoln Parish, the site of all-black Grambling College. 
The court discovered that the parish had a non-white popula­
tion of 11,925 persons out of a total population of 28,535 
in I960. On the official parish voter registration list, 
there were 860 qualified black voters among the nearly 8000 
persons registered. Of the registered black voters, 112 
were teachers, 38 were over sixty-five years of age, 440 
were women, 9 were school bus drivers, 61 were students and 
1 was a doctor. The evidence showed that the parish jury 
commission had used the registration list to draw up a gen- 
ral venire list from which the grand and petit jury lists 
were taken. In the five years prior to the Goree trial in 
1961, only one black name had been drawn for the petit jury. 
Jury commissioners testified in court that they had failed 
to include blacks in the general venire list because of
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their decision to place only the names of persons who they 
considered to be the "best men" for jury service. They 
claimed that their actions had not been motivated by racial 
considerations, and had only eliminated persons who were 
entitled to exemptions because of occupations or age. ^5
The trial court judge in Goree in 1961, held that the 
jury commission had carried out the state mandate of select­
ing "none but good and competent jurors" who were "of well 
known good character and standing in the community." He 
also ruled that the jury lists were virtually all-white 
"because of the well-known fact that the moral standards of 
Lincoln Parish Negroes are rather low," basing his opinion 
on personal observations that 85 percent of the criminal 
cases brought before his court had been committed by blacks. 
He also held that the number of blacks available for jury 
selection was low because the better qualified ones were 
entitled to exemptions from jury service if they were pro­
fessors, school teachers, school bus drivers or sixty-five 
years of age or older. ^6
In overturning Goree's conviction, the state supreme 
court held that the jury commission in Lincoln Parish had 
overstepped its authority by assuming the power of exempting 
qualified blacks, automatically exempting them without their 
prior consent. Under state law, persons desiring to invoke
^“*State v. Goree, La., 139 So.2d 531 (1962).
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the exemption law were required to produce certain documents 
declaring that they wished to be exempted. Since qualified 
blacks were available for jury service but no effort had 
been made to select them, the state supreme court decided 
that systematic exclusion of blacks from the general venire 
and petit jury lists had been established.
Shortly thereafter, the decision by an Orleans Parish 
jury commission to exempt common laborers from jury panels 
was challenged in federal courts, because of its effect in 
removing many qualified blacks from juries. In 1964, a 
federal district court approved the process because Orleans 
Parish did not pay its jurors, which would have worked a 
hardship on common or daily wage earners, many of whom were 
black. Therefore, the court validated the procedure even 
though it resulted in a disproportionate number of blacks 
being excused from jury service.^5
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
decision was reversed. Evidence was presented that no 
blacks had served on an Orleans Parish grand jury since 
1936, and that no blacks had ever been selected for petit 
juries in criminal cases. In addition, it held that the 
equal protection clause of the Constitution prohibited a 
state from creating arbitrary and unreasonable classifica­
tions for jurors in criminal cases, and that the state had
67Ibid.
68
United States ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 234 F.Supp.
171 (E.D. La. 1964).
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placing small numbers of blacks on its juries. In deciding 
to exempt certain persons from jury duty, the "overriding 
consideration . . .  is not the burden of jury service on 
prospective jurors but fairness of the system." The court 
could find no state statute permitting Orleans Parish to 
exempt laborers as a class. If such a law had existed, it 
would have been invalid on the grounds that it violated the 
constitutional requirement that an impartial jury represent 
a cross section of the community. However, the exclusion of 
certain occupational groups such as doctors and firemen was 
approved because of the need for their uninterrupted ser­
vices within the c o m m u n i t y .
In 1966, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
litigant who was not a member of an excluded class could 
also challenge the composition of a jury that was affected 
by discrimination. It ruled that a person was entitled to a 
jury that reflected "a fair cross-section of the commu­
nity . 70
It was this rationale that was the basis of the Jury 
Selection and Service Act of 1968, which prohibited any dis­
crimination in the jury selection process and designated the 
list of registered voters as the primary source of jurors. 
The law also required the use of other sources, when
69Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.1966).
^Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 
1966).
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necessary, to insure that federal grand and petit juries 
were "selected at random from a fair cross-section of the 
community," and to insure that all citizens would have the 
opportunity to serve as jurors. Another provision of the 
act stipulated that no citizen could be excluded from fed­
eral jury service on account of "race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, or economic status."71 Therefore, it was a 
logical progression in the line of judicial reasoning when 
the Supreme Court ruled in 1972, that whites could not be 
tried fairly by grand and petit juries from which blacks had
been excluded.72
A federal district court in Louisiana ruled in a 
Tangipahoa Parish case in 1967, that voter registration 
rolls which represented a fair cross-section of the commu­
nity could be used by a jury commission as the only source 
for the names of prospective jurors. Then, if the general 
venire reflected a cross-section of the community and the 
grand and petit juries were drawn fairly by lot from such a 
venire, it was immaterial that the racial composition of the 
ultimate jury was disproportionate. However, in a rehearing 
of the case before the court in 1969. it was shown that 
blacks made up 29 percent of Tangipahoa Parish's adult popu­
lation and 15 percent of its registered voters, but only 2.6 
percent of jury venires at the time of the defendant's
71Read, Let Them Be Judged, 344; 28 USCA, Sections 
1986-71.  —  ----
72Peters v. Kiff, 92 S.Ct. 2163 (1972).
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trial. Therefore, the court decided that a prima facie case 
of systematic exclusion of blacks from juries had been
established.73
In a Vermilion Parish case of 1976, the state supreme 
court upheld the practice of adding names of blacks to a 
jury venire if it included less than 20 percent blacks 
(their proportion of parish population). The court affirmed 
the procedure to enable the parish to meet the requirement 
that the venire represent a true cross-section of the 
community, even though it had to consciously take race into 
consideration.74
With the repeal or voidance of segregation laws and the 
inauguration of a more moderate state administration by the 
early 1970's, most state courts and jury commissioners were 
in compliance with federal guidelines for jury selection. 
Perhaps, the following case illustrates how far the courts 
of the state had gone in a few short years toward establish­
ing equal justice for black defendants. In a 1971 case 
charging Ouachita Parish with racial discrimination in the 
composition of parish juries, the state supreme court held 
that the representation of blacks on the parish jury venire 
was substantial, that its jury commissioners had used a wide 
variety of sources for acquiring the names of prospective 
jurors, that selections of jurors from the lists had been
^United States ex rel. Wilson v. Walker, 263 F.Supp. 
289 (E.D. La. 1967), 301 F.Supp. 95 (E.D. La. 1969).
^State v. Peters, La., 204 So.2d 284 (1976).
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conducted randomly, and that the defendant had produced no 
proof of actual intentional or purposeful discrimination by 
parish officials.75 Of course, discrepancies still 
occurred, but the days of blatant discrimination in the 
formation of jury venires was ended.
Another racial issue that confronted the courts during 
the 1 9 6 0 ' s  was the utterance of prejudicial remarks to the 
jury. In 1957, the state supreme court affirmed the deci­
sion of a trial court judge, who had allowed a juror to 
serve on a jury after having acknowledged his belief in 
"white supremacy." The judge stated that the juror was not 
prejudiced, and that his selection did not jeopardize the 
black defendant's right to a trial by a jury of his peers.76 
However, in a rehearing of another case in 1961, the state 
supreme court decided that a defendant’s attorney was enti­
tled to ask prospective jurors whether they belonged to 
religious, integrationist or segregationist groups for the 
purpose of uncovering the possibility of prejudice, thus 
enabling the defense to make a peremptory challenge of a 
juror. In a major breakthrough, the court held that member­
ship in an organization advocating racial segregation "might 
be regarded as proper notification" of possible p r e j u d i c e . 77
75State v. Millsap, La., 248 So. 2d 324 (1971).
76State v. Edwards, La., 94 So. 2d 674 (1957).
77State v. Hills, La., 129 So. 2d 12 (1961).
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However, as late as 1967, the state supreme court still 
affirmed some cases where there were obvious prejudicial 
remarks made during the course of a trial. Among the
grounds presented by one black defendant in motioning for a
new trial, were prejudicial comments made at the time of 
jury selection by the parish district attorney, who acknowl­
edged his membership in a White Citizens Council, and error 
by the trial court judge in refusing to allow the defense to
inquire of a juror whether his friends or associates were
members of the Ku Klux Klan. The state supreme court denied 
the motion and affirmed the conviction because of failure to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the jury 
selection process, the removal of any prejudicial effect of 
alleged prejudicial comments when the trial judge instructed 
jurors to disregard it, and because the refusal to allow the 
inquiry of the juror was p r o p e r . 7 8
The possible use of peremptory challenges in a racially 
discriminatory manner was the issue in three cases involving 
the State of Louisiana during the first half of the 1960's. 
In one trial, a prosecuter in Plaquemines Parish used 
peremptory challenges as a means of excluding blacks from a 
petit jury. However, the state supreme court declared that 
such action, along with the small number of blacks on a 
convicted black defendant's jury venires, did not show a 
planned or continued exclusion or inclusion of a token
^®State v. Rideau, La., 193 So.2d 264 (1966).
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number of blacks from the jury list.79 in a similar case 
decided in 1964, the court held that peremptory challenges 
could be exercised without the assignment of any cause, 
reason or inquiry into the motive.®® By 1965, it appeared 
that the Supreme Court had removed peremptory challenges 
from prosecutors as a jury discrimination device, but 
defendants were still required to prove that the prosecution 
had used such a method over an indefinite period of time to 
exclude blacks from juries. In order to allow lawyers to 
exercise freedom of discretion in removing jurors for valid 
reasons, the high court refused to seriously interfere with 
peremptory challenges.®*
During the 1970's, the state supreme court solidified 
its support for virtually unlimited discretion by attorneys 
in their use of peremptory challenges of prospective jurors. 
In 1971, the court once again ruled that it would not 
reverse the conviction of a defendant because of peremptory 
challenges of one or two blacks on a jury venire that has 
resulted in no blacks being seated on the jury.®^ Then, in 
1975, the court ruled that there were no grounds for review 
if the state used peremptory challenges allegedly to remove 
all blacks from the jury venire who were not earlier removed
^State v. Clark, La., 140 So.2d 1 (1962).
80State v. Ward, La., 167 So.2d 359 (1964).
8*Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965).
O O
State v. Square, La., 244 So.2d 200 (1971).
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for c a u s e . as late as 1976, the state supreme court ruled 
that the state's exercise of its peremptory challenges of 
prospective black jurors did not constitute denial of due 
process or equal protection if there was no evidence of a 
historical pattern of black exclusion from j u r i e s .
In the forefront of the civil rights struggle by blacks 
in Louisiana was the attempt to secure dignity, due process 
and equal treatment under the laws of the state. With the 
Brown decision of 1954, black citizens of Louisiana began to 
envision the possibility of the first real progress in race 
relations since the end of Reconstruction. Beginning in the 
latter half of the 1950's, a few daring black leaders in New 
Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport launched nonviolent 
protest movements to crack the facade of the de jure system 
of segregation. Although supported by large numbers of 
black college students, they were frequently alone in their 
fight as hundreds of thousands of blacks, made timid by the 
system of segregation, watched hopefully but silently.
Entrenched in every political, economic and social 
position within the state, the segregationists used the 
police powers at their disposal to counter every attempt by 
blacks to reverse their second-class citizenship. The 
state's leaders reacted to black demands for equal treatment 
by enacting a multitude of new legislation to thwart any
®^State v. Anderson, La., 315 So.2d 266 (1975).
®^State v. Haynes, La., 339 So.2d 328 (1976).
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possibility of black equality with whites, and by launching 
crushing attacks upon any individual or organization appear­
ing to lean toward integration. As sit-ins, boycotts and 
demonstrations spread during the early 1960's, along with a 
new invasion of Northern "agitators" and "communist agents" 
seeking to destroy the Southern way of life, the state's 
white leaders expressed their alarm by unrelenting attacks 
upon them by legal means. Only through the intercession of 
the federal courts, which neutralized the effectiveness of 
most of the arbitrary state legislation and restrained state 
leaders through injunctions from interfering with peaceful 
expressions by blacks against segregation, could any sem­
blance of progress be made. Not until then was the power of 
the segregationists broken and the first real promise of 
hope brought to the masses that real change in racial rela­
tions was present.
Among the most vexing problems in the state was the 
judicial system itself, where blacks were systematically 
excluded from juries prior to I960. Although the state 
supreme court and the federal government had banned such 
practices since the end of the nineteenth century, legal 
loopholes were found to prevent all but a handful of token 
blacks from serving. Tied to the jury system was voter 
registration, since the list of registered voters was used 
by parish jury commissioners to compile venire lists.
Because few blacks were registered to vote prior to I960, 
the system virtually assured the selection of all-white
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juries. Then, legal maneuvers such as peremptory challenges 
or exemptions of prospective jurors could be used to remove 
any remaining blacks from them.
Once again, it took vigilant federal efforts to break 
the hold of segregationists on the jury system. By 1970, 
overt discrimination in jury selection had become unten­
able. Although the legal system had come a long way by the 
early 1970's, isolated incidents of racial discrimination in 
the state's legal process continued, but with decreasing 
frequency as federal and state guidelines made it increas­
ingly difficult to escape from inspection when charges sur­
faced of discriminatory practices in violation of due pro­
cess and equal treatment under the law. However, as in 
other areas of civil rights, the federal government began 
retreating in its protection of black protests by the early 
1970's. Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
remained vigilant, the United States Supreme Court became 
less willing to support civil rights activities, or to 
interfere within court proceedings unless substantial evi­
dence was offered by a defendant that racial discrimination 
had been practiced on a systematic basis.
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Chapter III 
DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING AND ELECTIONS 
Introduction
The federal government was the primary agent in the 
eradication of discrimination in the area of voting and 
elections in Louisiana. The promise of political equality 
that was extended to the freedmen during Reconstruction 
quickly faded with the accession of the Bourbon Redeemers in 
1877. By 1900, 95 percent of blacks residing in the state 
had been disfranchised by de jure pronouncements. Not until 
the federal courts began the cumbersome process of unravel­
ing the intricate web of legal electoral barriers did the 
abandoned black citizen see a glimmer of hope for improve­
ment in his political situation.
After 1900, white leaders of Louisiana adopted the 
white primary to exclude the few remaining black voters and 
any viable Republican opposition. Under this system, candi­
dates for various offices were selected by party members in 
state primaries prior to a general election. Since only 
whites were allowed to belong to the Democratic Party and 
over 90 percent of the state's voters were registered as 
Democrats, selection in the white Democratic primary was 
tantamount to election. With the voidance of the white
60
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primary by federal courts in the 1940's, sizable numbers of 
blacks resumed registering to vote in the state. The flood 
of registrations in the 1950's alarmed conservative whites 
and prompted a racist attack and purge of registration rolls 
in various parts of the state beginning in 1956. Unlike the 
situation in the late nineteenth century, this time the 
federal government did not shirk its responsibilities but 
lauched a sustained and effective attack on efforts by 
election officials and white supremacy organizations to 
stifle black electoral aspirations. Assisting the federal 
courts were efforts by the Justice Department and Congress, 
which passed a series of civil rights bills to strengthen 
and encourage the endeavors of the judicial and executive 
branches to insure voter equality.
By 1964, the end of discrimination in voting was within 
sight. The poll tax had been outlawed by constitutional 
amendment and overt measures aimed at mass disfranchisement 
of blacks had been voided. Parish registrars were under 
strict inspection by the federal courts and the Justice 
Department for any indications of discriminatory operation 
of their offices, while the state's interpretation and citi­
zenship tests for registration were placed under a freeze in 
areas with a long history of voter discrimination.
The enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 tight­
ened loopholes in the Fifteenth Amendment and subsequent 
election laws. Thereafter, it became next to impossible for 
any overt discrimination in electoral procedures to pass the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
scrutiny of the federal government. By the late 1960's, the 
federal government shifted its attention to the issue of 
reapportionment plans for public bodies, many of which 
grossly underrepresented blacks. By 1972, blacks were 
beginning to take an active political role in the state, and 
de jure means of discrimination in voting and in the conduct 
of elections were fading into history. In the same year, 
the state saw the Inauguration of a liberal, neo-populist 
governor who had been elected by a coalition of blacks and 
South Louisiana Cajuns.
Disfranchisement of Blacks After Reconstruction
The first Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, imposed 
black suffrage on the ten Southern states that were subject 
to military reconstruction. Prior to that time, Louisiana 
officials had refused to take any action on the enfranchise­
ment of freed black males, despite strong encouragement of 
delegates to the 1864 state constitutional convention by 
President Abraham Lincoln and General Nathaniel Banks, who 
directed the federal occupation of southern Louisiana. 
Despite fierce opposition to any suffrage concessions to 
blacks, the convention adopted a resolution permitting the 
state legislature the discretion to extend the vote to some 
free blacks. Later suggestions to the new legislature by 
President Andrew Johnson and Governor James M. Wells to 
enfranchise loyal free blacks or black Union Army veterans 
fell on deaf ears. When the governor tried to force the
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issue by reconvening the 1864 constitutional convention, a 
riot ensued in New Orleans in 1866. This event became grist 
for nascent Radicals in Congress and helped persuade many 
Northern moderates to support harsher reconstruction mea­
sures. An investigation of the riot by the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction recommended in February of 1867, that 
Louisiana be placed under a military government until such 
time as a "loyal" state government could be formed.1
The second Reconstruction Act of March 23, 1867, pro­
vided for the calling of a state constitutional convention 
and outlined the procedures to be followed in writing a new 
state constitution. General Philip Sheridan, who commanded 
the troops occupying the state at this time, immediately 
complied with the Reconstruction Acts and began the task of 
registering qualified voters. When voters went to the polls 
to decide on the question of whether to hold a new constitu­
tional convention, there were over 78,000 blacks and over 
48,000 whites (down from 94,711 white adult males in i860) 
registered. In September of 1867, blacks cast their first 
ballots in Louisiana history, with the vote being 75,083 for 
and 4006 against holding the constitutional convention.^ 
Subsequently, the new constitution written by this legal 
body included a severe clause disfranchising disloyal
*Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974)
112-13.
2Ibid., 143-47,
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persons (later repealed by constitutional amendment in 1870) 
and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of 
citizenship.
Between 1869 and 1898, the federal government safe­
guarded, or at least abstained from interfering with, black 
suffrage. In 1869, Congress passed a constitutional amend­
ment which became the Fifteenth Amendment in the following 
year. Under it, the federal government undertook to estab­
lish the right of blacks to vote on a constitutional basis.
Unfortunately, in 1876, the United States Supreme Court
struck a major blow to the amendment in ruling that the 
measure did not confer suffrage on anyone, but merely pro­
hibited the states from denying the suffrage on certain 
grounds.3 in 1870, Congress enacted the Enforcement Acts, 
one provision of which declared that voting for federal 
Representatives was a constitutional right, and it was 
upheld by the federal courts in the 1880's.^ In the follow­
ing year, Congress made it a federal crime for any officer 
of a Congressional election to violate an electoral obliga­
tion imposed on him by state or federal law. By 1880, the 
Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to adopt state 
election laws and to add Congressional penalties to enforce 
such acts.5
^United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
^Ex parte Yarbrough, 4 S.Ct. 152 (1884).
5Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
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Within the State of Louisiana, an 1879 constitutional 
convention controlled by Bourbon Redeemers (Conservative 
Democrats who replaced the Radical Republicans in 1877) 
tried to undo the work of the 1868 Radical constitution. 
Blacks were not yet disfranchised, primarily because of 
fears of reawakening Northern wrath and beliefs by white 
Conservatives that black votes could be controlled or manip­
ulated to their own advantage. William Hair, historian of 
Bourbon Louisiana, contends that "Bourbon misrule" began 
with the inauguration of Governor Louis A. Wiltz in 1880, 
and was based on the Constitution of 1879 which "anchored a 
regime that was remarkably powerful, backward, and corrupt." 
He affirms that Bourbon power rested on the manipulation of 
black votes, because blacks outnumbered whites on the regis­
tration rolls until 1890. Republican voting strength in the 
state disappeared following the return of the pre-Civil War 
leadership, as predominantly black parishes consistently 
sent in overwhelmingly Conservative Democratic returns in 
elections wracked by fraud and intimidation.^
In 1898, a major downturn occurred in black suffrage in 
Louisiana. In the pivotal Supreme Court decision reached in 
Williams v. Mississippi, the court assented to an 1890 state 
literacy test for voter registration and a poll tax, holding 
that, if the two requirements were applied to whites as well
^William I. Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: 
Louisiana Politics 1877-1900 (Baton kouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1969) 107, 113.
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as blacks, they did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment, 
because they did not deny the right to vote on the grounds 
of race or color to a n y o n e .? In effect, this decision 
opened the way for mass disfranchisement of blacks through­
out the South.
With the advent of a strong Populist challenge to the 
Bourbon oligarchy in the 1890's, the administration of 
Conservative Democrat Governor Murphy J. Foster became 
determined to rid the state of "the mass of ignorance, vice 
and venality without any proprietary interest in the State." 
Beginning in the election of 1892, Populists (a loose polit­
ical alliance of primarily poor and rural whites and blacks) 
posed a threat to the hierarchy of Conservative Democrats. 
During the 1896 general election, the governor's supporters 
controlled the election machinery in many key parishes, 
and only through this means succeeded in securing his 
re-election in one of the most fraudulent elections in 
Louisiana history. Dissatisfied Democrats had joined 
Republicans and Populists in the most serious electoral 
challenge since the end of Radical Reconstruction in 1877.
A constitutional amendment recommended by Governor Foster 
and passed by the legislature in 1894 to restrict the suf­
frage by literacy and property requirements was also on the 
ballot, but failed to pass. Therefore, the legislature of 
1896 passed complex registration and election laws to break
^Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
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the back of Louisiana Populism, which had succeeded in 
appealing to the sympathies of a majority of the black 
voters of the state. Tens of thousands of poor whites and 
over 90 percent of blacks were disfranchised when the new 
election laws took effect on January 1, 1897. The legisla­
ture then took steps to assure the success of its actions by 
authorizing an election of delegates to a new constitutional 
convention. To seal the doom of both black and white 
Populists, the legislature decreed that the work of the 1898 
convention would not be submitted to the voters for their 
approval
The delegates to the 1898 constitutional convention 
were quite efficient in their aim to disfranchise a majority 
of the state's voters. By and large, the Constitution of 
1898 was essentially the Constitution of 1879. with the 
addition of measures restricting the suffrage. To eliminate 
migrant sharecroppers, requirements were imposed establish­
ing residency at two years in the state, one year in the 
parish, and six months in the precinct. Voters were com­
pelled to demonstrate their ability to read and write in 
their native language, or to show proof that they owned 
property assessed at not less than $300. Although blacks 
were hit hardest by this provision, many poor and illiterate 
whites were also entrapped. Electors were also subjected to 
a poll tax of one dollar per year, with receipts for the
Q
Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 234-35, 268-69.
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previous two years having to be presented at election time. 
This requirement was designed on the assumption that blacks 
were more likely to fail to pay their poll taxes during non­
election years, or to misplace their receipts. A provision 
was then added for poor and illiterate but loyal whites in 
the form of the nation's first "grandfather clause." Under 
this device, a man could register to vote if he, his father 
or his grandfather had been a registered voter in 1867. 
However, persons eligible under the grandfather clause were 
allowed only three and a half months to comply.9 Approxi­
mately 40,000 whites and 111 blacks were later registered 
under this provision.^ In order to make it easier for 
illiterate whites to identify Democratic candidates, the 
convention adopted the rooster emblem as the symbol on 
Louisiana election ballots for the state Democratic Party 
and white supremacy.^
After 1898, the only men who could still vote in 
Louisiana were literate, tax-paying property owners and 
their sons, and men who had voted in 1867, or their descen­
dants. The result of these electoral maneuvers was a dras­
tic decline in voter registration and voter turnout for sev­
eral decades, as presented in table 1. The number of black
^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1898, Articles 
197, 198; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana; A Bicentennial 
History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976) 144.
*^Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 277.
^Taylor, Louisiana, 144.
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voters declined from 130,444 or 44 percent of the state's 
registered voters in 1897, to a paltry 5,320 or 4.1 percent 
by 1900, when the full impact of the disfranchisement move­
ment was in effect. The lowest point in black voter numbers 
was reached in 1940, when only 886 blacks were registered, 
comprising 0.1 percent of the state's voters. Not until 
1948, was there significant improvement in the registration 
of blacks within Louisiana.*2
It is quite evident from the figures presented in table 
1, that Louisiana's Bourbon Democrats had succeeded in 
erasing all political progress made by blacks since 
Reconstruction, and had removed many of the "disloyal" poor 
whites from the rolls as well. Although blacks were the 
main target of the disfranchisement movement, the number of 
white registered voters in the state declined from 164,888 
in 1897 to 125,437 in 1900, and then to 106,360 in 1904. 
Another casualty of the disfranchisement movement was the 
decline in voter turnout, once elections had been "purified" 
of "corrupt tendencies" by the removal of black voters, and 
white men "were free to divide on the issues." Instead, 
voter apathy set in and viable opposition to the hegemony of 
Conservative Democrats was almost nil, as table 2 demon­
strates. With the elimination of 55.6 percent of the voters 
of 1897, the near record 73.7 percent turnout of 1896 was
12Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 
1812-1952 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Btate University Press,
T97TTT9TJ, 492.
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Table 1










1897 294,432 164,888 56.0 130,444 44.0
1900 130,725 125,437 95.9 5,320 4.1
1904 108,079 106,360 98.4 1,718 1.6
1908 154,142 152,142 98.9 1,743 1.1
1912 154,828 153,044 98.9 1,684 1.1
1916 187,312 185,313 98.9 1,979 1.1
1920 260,815 257,282 98.6 3,533 1.4
1924 323,555 322,600 99.7 955 0.3
1928 379,270 377,246 99.5 2,054 0.5
1932 559,233 557,674 99.7 1,559 0.3
1936 643,632 641,589 99.7 2,043 0.3
1940 702,545 701,659 99.9 886 0.1
1944 722,715 721,043 99.8 1,672 0.2
1948 924,705 896,417 96.9 28,177 3.1
1950 818,031 756,356 92.5 61,675 7.5
1952 1,056,720 945,038 89.8 107,844 10.2
Source: Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana,
1812-1952 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1971) 190, 422.
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not breached until 1912, and surpassed but six times in the 
fourteen gubernatorial elections held after 1896.*3 
Allan Sindler finds that the alleged aim of the 
Bourbons to establish class harmony by placing all whites in 
one large political party united by race was a monumental 
failure. Instead of whites being free of the worry of a 
black challenge to white supremacy and the possibility of a
Table 2










1896 73.7 36.1 1928 76.2 56.9
1900 55.9 51.9 1932 67.9 48.1
1904 50.2 49.9 1936 83.9 51.2
1908 69.3 49.0 1940 78.8 53.0
1912 79.7 50.9 1944 66.3 48.3
1916 61.1 49.6 1948 70.9 45.0
1920 55.0 48.5 1952 74.2 61.7
1924 74.0 37.7
Source: Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana,
1812-1952 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1971) 421-22.
13lbid., 190, 421-22.
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return to "black Republican rule," the disfranchisement 
movement brought about a dulling of the issues, low voter 
turnout, continued party control by an inner clique, and 
separation of the state from national issues and politics.*4
Roger Fischer claims that blacks submitted to the new 
disfranchisement measures and increased segregation by law 
after 1890, because they had lost all means by which to 
oppose their relegation to a lower caste. With no hope of 
relief through the political process or through the courts 
during the next few decades, any attempt to protest their 
condition by physical resistance would be suicide. Accord­
ing to Fischer, segregation hardened in Louisiana after 
1890, because whites of the state "had sampled the frighten­
ing fruits of black power before 1877," and Conservative 
leaders were adamant about preventing its recurrence by any 
means.*5
Federal Action to 1955
The federal government took very little action during 
the first quarter of the twentieth century to protect the 
rights of blacks, much less to begin the process of rolling 
back restrictions on black suffrage. Although the United
^Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana: State
Politics, 1920:1952 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956)
TT.
15Roger A. Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in 
Louisiana, 1862-77 (Urbanal University of Illinois Press,
i$74) 154-57.--------
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States Supreme Court struck down the grandfather clause in 
1915, as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, it was 
inadequate in preventing other more effective means of dis­
franchising blacks. By 1921, the State of Louisiana had a 
network of safeguards to prevent massive registration of its 
black residents. Among the devices used were strict regis­
tration requirements, a poll tax, the white primary, and 
various local election gimmicks to make it difficult for 
blacks to register or to cast a meaningful vote. Not sur­
prisingly, most whites easily met all electoral qualifica­
tions, while few blacks could satisfy either local or state 
regulations for registration. It is no small wonder, then, 
that blacks made up less than one percent of the registered 
voters between 1924 and 1944, although they made up from 39 
to 34.5 percent of the state's voting age population in 1920 
and 1940, respectively. It was not until the intervention 
of the federal courts in the late 1940's that blacks finally 
began to make progress in voting in the state.
In 1921, the state constitutional convention estab­
lished several qualifications for voter registration. Pro­
spective voters must have attained the age of twenty-one and 
resided in the state for one year, in the parish for six 
months, and in the precinct for three months prior to an 
election. In addition, a prospective voter was required to 
be able to read and write in English or in his mother 
tongue, to "be a person of good character and reputation," 
to "be able to understand and give a reasonable
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interpretation of any section" of the state or national 
constitutions, and to pay a poll tax. The section dealing 
with "good character" could be used to eliminate a host of 
"undesirable" registrants, including persons in common law 
marriages and those who gave birth to or fathered illegiti­
mate children. Finally, the constitution provided the means 
for private citizens to be able to challenge the names of 
illegally registered voters.1® In effect, the new consti­
tution extended the power of disfranchisement to local par­
ish registrars and vigilant white supremacists.
Besides registration requirements, Louisiana had an 
exclusive white primary to prevent the few qualified blacks 
from voting. As late as 1921, the view of the United States 
Supreme Court was that a party primary was not to be con­
strued as an election within the meaning of the 
Constitution. Therefore, the state's white primary was 
indirectly safeguarded by the nation's highest court.1^
The process of overturning the white primary began in 
the late 1920's and culminated with the Smith v. Allwright 
decision in 1944. A successful NAACP suit of 1927, chal­
lenging a Texas law that excluded blacks from participating 
in a Democratic Party primary election opened the way for 
future litigation on the suffrage issue. Then, in 1932, the 
Supreme Court voided another law that gave the Texas
^ Constitution of 1921, Article 8.
^Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
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Democratic Executive Committee the power to determine its 
own membership, thus excluding blacks from participation in 
its elections. When the high court finally invalidated the 
white primary itself in 1944, the way was legally opened for 
a return to massive voter registration and re-entry of 
blacks into Southern politics. However, it did not prevent 
the states from adopting other quasi-legal artifices and 
subterfuges to hamper black registration for another two 
decades.
Louisiana election laws first came under attack by the 
Supreme Court in 1941, in connection with a 1900 statute 
which provided for all political parties to nominate candi­
dates for United States Representatives by direct primary 
elections. The court declared that a citizen had the right 
to vote in a Congressional primary and to have his vote 
honestly counted. Since the state required that all poli­
tical parties nominate candidates for Representative in 
primaries, they were an integral part of the election proce­
dure and were thus subject to constitutional protections.
The Supreme Court was also cognizant of the reality that 
winning the Democratic primary in Louisiana was equivalent 
to election, and that general elections were mere formali­
ties .
^Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. 
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944).
19Acts of Louisiana, 1900, Regular Session, no. 46.
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The Southern states did not immediately comply with 
Smith v. Allwright, but resorted to such stalling devices as 
the "South Carolina Plan" and the "Bosworth Amendment." In 
the former scheme, South Carolina sought to circumvent 
action by the federal courts by deleting all references to 
"state" primaries from its constitution and laws, in an 
attempt to disguise its elections as being free of state 
action. Under the "Bosworth Amendment," Alabama required 
all voters to demonstrate their ability to understand and 
explain parts of the United States Constitution to the 
satisfaction of local registration officials. However, both 
contrivances were nullified by the federal courts in the 
late 1940's.20 Blacks in Louisiana won a somewhat limited 
victory in 1951, when the Democratic State Central Committee 
dropped its requirement that voters and party candidates be 
white. Any further resistance by the Southern states in 
maintaining white primaries or other devices to forestall an 
end to the all-white Democratic primary ended with the 
Supreme Court's decision in 1953, to outlaw sophisticated as 
well as simple modes of discrimination in the conduct of 
state primary elections.21
19Acts of Louisiana, 1900, Regular Session, no. 46.
20Rice v. Elmore, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); Schnell v.
Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
21 Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D'Amato and Rosemary 
Metrailer, Desegregation from Brown to Alexander: An
Exploration of Supreme Court Strategies (Carbondale;
Southern Illinois University I*ress, 1977) 34; Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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In the State of Louisiana, thousands of black residents 
began to resume registration for the first time since the 
1890's, but as Democrats rather than Republicans. This 
transformation of party allegiance began across the nation 
during the 1930's with the influence of such factors as the 
Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, the outmigration of blacks 
from the South to Northern urban centers, the dominance of 
the Republican Party by conservatives, and by the influence 
of Huey Long within Louisiana. Although the state's poll 
tax was repealed in 1934, it was the voiding of the white 
primary in the 1940's that resulted in a dramatic increase 
in the number of black voter registrations, especially in 
the more tolerant areas of New Orleans and South Louisiana. 
Black registration rose from 886 in 1940, to 28,177 in 1948, 
and to over 150,000 by 1956. According to Louisiana politi­
cal sociologist Perry Howard, the increase in black voters 
by 1948 became a factor to be reckoned with in close elec­
tions, and helped to give Earl K. Long his first primary 
gubernatorial victory in 1956. Blacks received their great­
est benefits through welfare legislation enacted during the 
tenure of Long governorships, and showed their appreciation 
to their benefactors at the p o l l s . ^2 New Orleans Mayor 
DeLesseps S. Morrison, who had received strong support from 
the city's 13,000 black voters, had won his first mayoralty 
election with a 4,372 vote margin of victory. The near
22
Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 275-77,
422.
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doubling of black registration in the city by 1950, made him 
extremely mindful of the importance of the black vote in his 
re-election campaign of that year. Therefore, he openly 
gave black New Orleanians assistance and attention, and was 
rewarded with their overwhelming support throughout his sub­
sequent political career in Louisiana.^3
Outside of New Orleans, the situation for blacks was 
less promising. Prior to 1956, blacks in northern and cen­
tral Louisiana, the Florida Parishes (the area which was 
formerly part of the West Florida territory until 1813), and 
in St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes in southern 
Louisiana, were strongly dissuaded from registering by
Table 3












1940 702,545 701,659 99.9 886 0.1
1944 722,715 721,043 99.8 1,672 0.2
1948 924,705 896,417 96.9 28,177 3.1
1952 1,056,720 756,356 89.8 107,844 10.2
1956 1,057,687 945,038 85.6 152,073 14.4
Source: Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 422.
23Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the Image 
of Reform: New Orleans Politics, j-946-1961 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1974) 39, 67.
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various means. In the parishes of East Carroll, Madison, 
Tensas and West Feliciana, there were no blacks registered 
at all.
The Voter Registration Purges of 1956
The two Brown cases of 1954 and 1955 served as cata­
lysts for the resumption of the race question in Louisiana 
politics. With the political advent of the Longs, the race 
issue was pushed into the background, but in the mid-1950's, 
race re-emerged as a potent force in the state's political 
arena. Since the Longs depended on both black and white 
votes for power, they largely remained silent on racial 
issues. As long as they kept race out of the forefront of 
politics, their power and the bifactional system operating 
in the state continued. However, Brown fractured whatever 
racial compromise had existed in Louisiana politics and led 
to the rise of a rabid racist faction that inflamed public 
opinion on a level unprecedented in twentieth century 
Louisiana. The state became divided over the racial issue 
and anyone who appeared bold enough to take a moderate stand 
on race was politically ruined by a nascent cadre of racist 
politicians determined to preserve white s u p r e m a c y . ^4
By 1956, State Senator Willie Rainach of Claiborne 
Parish in North Louisiana and Leander Perez, boss of
^Earlean M. McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official 
Resistance to Desegregation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, 1964) 11.
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Plaquemines Parish, had emerged as the foremost leaders of 
racists bent on preventing any cracks in the bulwark of 
segregation. At this time, Rainach served as the leader of 
the Louisiana Association of Citizens' Councils, the fore­
most white supremacy group in the state, and as the chairman 
of the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation, formed in 
1954 to serve as a watchdog committee of the state legisla­
ture to oversee de jure segregation in Louisiana. From
within his dual posts, Rainach was able to amass great power 
and influence over the state until his unsuccessful run for 
the governor's office in 1959.
As 1956 began, black voter registration in the state 
was over 151,000, a nearly 50 percent increase since 1952. 
Rainach warned that this was a dangerous trend and had 
"disastrous consequences" which portended a return to the 
days of Reconstruction. He alleged that the voter rolls
were filled with thousands of illegally registered voters in
violation of the state constitution's literacy clause. 
Therefore, under the auspices of the Citizens' Councils, a 
drive was pushed in 1956 to reverse the trend of black voter 
registration by challenging their names in primarily North 
Louisiana parishes. Directed by Rainach, Council members 
used a state constitutional provision that allowed private 
citizens to challenge the qualifications of any name on a 
parish voter registration list. A person whose name had 
been challenged then had to be notified by mail by the 
parish registrar, and had ten days to appear before the
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registrar to refute the challenge or his name would be 
removed from the voter l i s t . ^ 5
The effectiveness of the voter purge drew the attention 
of the Justice Department, which launched an immediate 
investigation into voter irregularities in ten Louisiana 
parishes. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Privileges and Elections, United States Assistant Attorney 
General Warren Olney III presented evidence of gross viola­
tions in the application of the state's voter registration 
laws. In these ten parishes alone, where only a scant per­
centage of the black residents were previously registered, 
8552 black voters were purged from parish registration 
rolls. In Ouachita Parish, where the most extreme voter 
purges had occurred, over 3400 names had been challenged "by 
a scheme and device to which a number of white citizens and 
certain local officials were parties." Olney disclosed that 
the scheme had begun to eliminate all black voters residing 
in Wards 3 and 19 of the parish in January of 1956. In 
March, the Ouachita Parish Citizens' Council began challeng­
ing names and induced the parish registrar to notify those 
challenged to appear before her within ten days to prove 
their qualifications by the affidavits of three witnesses.
In April and May, Citizens' Council members were allowed to 
examine voter records and to prepare lists of black voters,
25 New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 26, 1956; 
Constitution of 1921, Article 8.
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at which time they filed 3420 documents (only twenty-three 
of which were against whites) with the registrar, alleging 
that the persons challenged were illegally registered.26 
When large numbers of blacks appeared at the regis­
trar's office to respond to the challenges, they were 
informed that only fifty names would be reviewed per day, 
which effectively eliminated over 2700 of the 3240 persons 
soon to be removed from the voter list. The registrar then 
refused to accept as witnesses any parish voters living in a 
precinct other than that of the challenged voter, or persons 
who had already acted as witnesses for any other challenged 
voter. Thus, most of the deleted voters were unable to
Table 4






Bienville 560 LaSalle 345
Caldwell 330 Lincoln 325
DeSoto 383 Quachita 3240
Grant 758 Rapides 1058
Jackson 953 Union 600
Source: 2 Race Relations Law Reporter, 478 (1957).
262 RRLR, 469-71, 478 (1957).
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reply to their challenges and had no other recourse except 
to re-register. Blacks who then attempted to do so, were 
required to give a "reasonable interpretation" of a clause 
of the state or federal constitutions, while whites were not 
given such a test. Regardless of their interpretation, all 
blacks who submitted to the test were informed that their 
responses were "unreasonable".^7
Similar problems were encountered in the other parishes 
which had conducted voter purges. In Rapides Parish, two 
hundred blacks were improperly eliminated from the registra­
tion rolls within a ten-day period. The registrar of 
Caldwell Parish refused to accept witnesses unless they were 
accompanied by a law enforcement official and by a member of 
the local Citizens' Council to identify them, and would not 
allow whites to serve as witnesses for challenged blacks.
In several of the parishes, registrars allegedly did every­
thing in their power to discourage deleted voters from fil­
ing statutory reply affidavits as required by state law, 
then refused to accept them when proffered. Blacks were 
also told in several cases that they would need to contact 
an attorney to straighten out their registration.^ 8
As 1956 came to a close, Rainach announced "Operation 
Cleanup," a new Citizens' Council drive to purge state voter 
lists of "illegally registered voters," beginning January 1,
27Ibid., 477.
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1957. By the end of 1956, 11,000 blacks had been removed 
from the rolls in thirteen North Louisiana parishes.29
In January of 1957, United States District Judge Ben 
Dawkins ordered the registrars of Bienville, Jackson,
DeSoto, and Grant parishes to submit their voter registra­
tion records to a federal grand jury meeting in Shreveport 
to investigate the possibility of violations of civil rights 
laws. Rainach referred to the investigators as "Yankee 
lawyers" who were trying "to intimidate our people."30 
Less than a month later, Louisiana Attorney General 
Jack P. F. Gremillion explained to the Civil Rights 
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee the process 
for voter challenges and due process available to persons 
challenged and removed from the voter rolls. He contended 
that state laws were being fairly applied to both whites and 
blacks on a nondiscriminatory basis, and that "there has not 
been any deprivation of Civil Rights regardless of any 
minority group" in the state.31 Assistant Attorney General 
Olney refuted Gremillion's testimony, presenting further 
allegations of voter registration irregularities in the ten 
parishes under investigation. Among his charges was that 
some registrars did not give registrants the option of 
selecting a constitutional clause to interpret, as
29 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 15, 1956.
New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 29, 1957.
312 RRLR, 418-14 (1957).
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Gremillion had declared. Also, in none of the parishes did 
registrars routinely send a reply affidavit form to chal­
lenged voters.32
The registrar of Ouachita Parish was the subject of two 
suits in conjunction with the 1956 voter purges. In the 
case of Sharp v. Lucky, a black attorney claimed that the 
registrar had injured him in his status as an attorney by 
refusing him permission to inspect a client's registration 
in her office, and by refusing to permit blacks to use her 
office for registration matters. When the United States 
District Court dismissed the case, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed on the grounds that a registrar may not 
operate a segregated office. On remand, the district court 
ruled that the registrar had acted in good faith and with 
good will in providing services when segregation had been 
practiced, but that this policy had been discontinued.
Thus, the court declined to take any action, and its 
decision was affirmed on a p p e a l . 33
The case of Reddix v. Lucky involved a black man whose 
name had been challenged and removed from the Ouachita 
Parish voter registration list in 1956. Claiming that 
racial discrimination had led to the illegal removal of his 
name, he brought suit against the registrar in federal
32Ibid., 477.
33Sharp v. Lucky, 148 F.Supp. 8 (W.D. La. 1957), 165 
F.Supp. (W.D. La. 1958), 266 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1959).
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court. The district court held that the registrar had only 
done what she was required to do by state law, and that the 
plaintiff had failed to exhaust available legal remedies, 
including attempting to re-register. On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that Reddix 
had a case under the requirements of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and because the actions of the registrar in 
removing 2500 names from the voter roll within thirty days 
of an election was "shockingly unfair."34
Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1957
A major step was taken by the federal government in the 
protection of the right to vote with the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1957. Though modest, it aimed at 
strengthening the enforcement of voting rights by the fed­
eral courts, created a Civil Rights Commission to investi­
gate alleged racial discrimination in voting, created the 
Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice, and 
granted the United States Attorney General power to insti­
tute suits in conjunction with v o t i n g . 35
Within Louisiana, the Citizens’ Council of New Orleans 
declared that the act was "calculated to destroy the 
American right of local self-government" and was "the first
34Reddix v. Lucky, 2 RRLR 426-27 (1957); 252 F. 2d 930 
(5th Cir. 1958).
3^Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 83-315, 71 
Stat. 634 (1957).
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step in the federal government taking over complete control 
of the election processes of the state." Among the few 
supporters of the act was Camille Gravel, Jr., chairman of 
the Democratic State Central Committee and a national com­
mitteeman from the state, who defended the civil rights law 
as a way to prevent "un-Christian, un-American, and un- 
Democratic" anti-black activities in Louisiana. In 1957, 
Gravel affirmed his support of the Brown decision and his 
opposition to segregation and the efforts to remove thou­
sands of black voters. His outspoken attitude resulted in 
several attempts to remove him from his position of leader­
ship in the state Democratic Party. However, the chairman 
of the Democratic National Committee refused to remove him 
and Gravel would not resign. Gravel avowed that he was "a 
moderate, loyal, realistic Louisiana Democrat" who believed 
in respecting and recognizing human rights of minority 
groups, and that the "right to vote is a fundamental right 
in a democracy." He charged Senator Rainach with trying to 
destroy the Democratic Party in the state and trying to make 
a name for himself in preparation for a run for governor.^
Using the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Justice 
Department initiated suits against various parish registrars 
and other persons who allegedly deprived blacks of their 
right to vote. In Washington Parish, the local Citizens'
og
New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 31, July 7, 17,
1957.
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Council and the registrar were charged with acting "under 
color of law" and conspiracy in fraudulently purging parish 
voter registration rolls. The federal district court 
rejected claims that parts of the Civil Rights Act were 
unconstitutional, and enjoined Council members from further 
vote challenges and interference with the rights of citizens 
to v o t e . 37 Xn a Bienville Parish case, local officials 
claimed that the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments were unconstitutional. Rejecting their 
contentions, the court held that the local Citizens' Council 
had deprived blacks of their right to vote by its purge of 
voter rolls, during which 95 percent of registered blacks 
were challenged for registration errors, while white voters 
with similar errors were ignored. Since the registrar had 
continued to discriminate against blacks seeking to regis­
ter, it ordered the reinstatement of the names of those 
persons deleted from the registration list in 1956, and 
enjoined the registrar from such action in the future.38
State Legislation and Politics, 1958-1960
By 1958, the atmosphere in the state legislature had 
changed dramatically since 1956 (sessions held in
374 RRLR 962-63 (1959), 5 RRLR 112-13 (I960); United 
States v. Mcfilveen, 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La. 1959), 180 
F.Supp. 10 (E.D. I960).
38 5 RRLR 773 (I960); 6 RRLR 802-03 (1961); United 
States v. Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana, 196 
F.Supp. 908 (E.D. La. 1961).
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odd-numbered years were devoted exclusively to fiscal mat­
ters). The state hovered on the brink of disaster as segre­
gationists under the influence of Senator Rainach reigned 
supreme over the regular legislative session, with only 
feeble opposition to the demands of racist legislators. To 
oppose them was to risk being accused of integrationist or 
communist sympathies.
Among the numerous segregation measures enacted in 
1958, were three which dealt with voting. One statute 
empowered the attorney general to defend parish registrars 
from suits involving federal rights, while other acts con­
tinued the salary of voter registration officials who were 
called away from their official duties because of federal 
litigation relating to voting and extended the prohibition 
against the selling of votes to include registration.39 By 
the end of the 1958 session, tensions ran so high that 
absence or abstention from a vote on segregation laws made a 
solon suspect, placing him at risk of political suicide.
One senator, J. D. DeBlieux of Baton Rouge, counselled mod­
eration and was defeated for re-election by a racist chal­
lenger in the 1959-60 state elections.^
Continued voter purges in 1958 resulted in open opposi­
tion from parish registrars in Winn and St. Landry Parishes,
39Acts of Louisiana, 1958, Regular Session, no. 482, 
no. 483, no. £>17.
^McCarrick, "Louisiana’s Official Resistance," 81.
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in a federal investigation, and in a clash between Governor 
Earl K. Long and Senator Rainach. A report released in 1958 
showed that four parishes had no blacks registered to vote, 
while nine others had less than one hundred registered. 41 
After receiving sixty-eight complaints of discrimination 
being practiced in registration, the United States Civil 
Rights Commission met at Shreveport to investigate charges 
against seventeen registrars, whose records were subse­
quently subpoenaed. State Attorney General Gremillion por­
trayed the commission as "a grand inquisition by the federal 
government," and accused it of "threatening, coercing and in 
a tyrannical manner bringing unlawful procedures to bear, 
causing great injury" to the registrars as well as to quali­
fied v o t e r s . 42 jn October of 1959, a three-judge federal 
court decided that the commission had exceeded its powers, 
and had threatened the registrars with "immediate and irrep­
arable damage" by failing to advise the accused registrars 
of charges against them. The court then enjoined the com­
mission from conducting further hearings in Shreveport. Not 
until I960, did the United States Supreme Court reverse the 
lower court ruling and affirm the actions of the Civil
R i g h t s  C o m m i s s i o n . 4 3
^Burton, On the Black Side, 114.
^New Orleans Times Picayune, June 25, Aug. 1, 1959.
^New Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 8, 1959; Larche v. 
Hannah, 177 F.Supp. Bib (W.D. La. 1959).
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During the first half of his term, Governor Long 
refrained from any serious attacks on Rainach or his sup­
porters. However, when the senator interfered with voter 
registration in Winn Parish, the governor's home base, to 
influence the outcome of the Eighth Congressional District 
election in 1958, Long unleashed a scathing attack on him. 
The governor, not known for mincing words, declared that 
many people were following Rainach "not because they agree 
with you but because they are scared of you," and inferred 
that the senator was raising the segregation issue in order 
to further his own political ambitions. Long then avowed 
his "1000 per cent" support for segregation and declared 
that segregation should not be used as an issue for running 
for- political o f f i c e .
Senator Rainach achieved his revenge during the 1959 
legislative session, when he and John Garrett, the leading 
racist in the House of Representatives, succeeded in defeat­
ing two administrative measures that were designed to break 
the power of the racists. One bill would have allowed voter 
challenges only where names had been on the registration 
list more than twelve months prior to the challenge, while 
the other bill would have prohibited the removal of a voter 
for "an inconsequential or inadvertant error." Although 
Rainach's allies defeated the measures in the Senate on the
^St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, June 27, 1958; New 
Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 10, 1958.
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grounds that they were not fiscal items, the senator encoun­
tered his first strong opposition in the process. Governor 
Long had been tardy in confronting the racists earlier when 
their power was in its infancy, and now, with the first 
gubernatorial primary scheduled for late 1959, and with the' 
racists in ascendance nationwide, taming the movement proved 
to be too great for Long.45 Louisiana historian Glen 
Jeansonne observed that as the governor approached the end 
of his political career, he had never really decided what 
kind of stand to take on the race issue. For fear of losing 
the small but increasing black vote, he rarely resorted to 
race-baiting, but to champion blacks might cost him much of 
the white vote. Therefore, the ill and exhausted Long 
straddled the issue until his death in 1960.46
The 1959-60 gubernatorial election was the first state 
election since 1924, in which race was the major issue. No 
avowedly segregationist candidate made the second Democratic 
primary, although Rainach placed third in the first primary. 
However, the apparent failure of the "peace and harmony" 
campaign of Jimmie Davis in the first primary led to his 
decision to adopt racism in the second, and to abandon all 
attempts to win black votes, most of which went to
^McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 93-94, 
99-100.
^Glen Jeansonne, "Racism and Longism in Louisiana:
The 1959-60 Gubernatorial Elections," Readings in Louisiana 
Politics, ed. Mark T. Carleton, Perry H. Howard and Joseph 
6. Parker (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing, 1975) 475.
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front-runner DeLesseps S. Morrison. With its obvious impli­
cations, Davis announced that he would not accept the sup­
port of the NAACP or of Teamster boss Jimmy Hof fa, and would 
not tolerate Northern groups coming into the state "with a 
designed plan to divide our people and disrupt our Southern 
way of life."^7 a Davis ad claimed that Morrison had won 
74.84% of the black vote as a result of courting blacks by 
placing them on the New Orleans city payroll and by putting 
up token resistance to integration of municipal facilities 
in New Orleans. Davis received the backing of Earl Long, 
Leander Perez and Willie Rainach, while the influential 
New Orleans Times Picayune and Shreveport Times exaggerated 
the significance of the bloc of black votes received by 
Morrison in the first primary. Glen Jeansonne holds that 
the second primary of I960 revealed that segregation had 
become the major single issue in the election and that the 
segregation crisis brought out 80.7 percent of the state's 
approximately 850,000 white and 150,000 black Democratic 
v o t e r s . Of course, the result of this intensely racist 
campaign was disaster for Morrison, as Davis swept into 
office with a mandate for white supremacy and segregation.
During the campaign, Davis had committed his adminis­
tration to a course of defiance, and he now proceeded to
^ A. J. Liebling, The Earl of Louisiana (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970) 194-96, 205-06; New 
Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 8, I960.
/  Q
Jeansonne, "Racism and Longism," 453-55.
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steer segregationist forces in the direction of resistance 
to federal attempts to eliminate state segregation laws. In 
his May 10, I960, inaugural address, Governor Davis pledged 
to preserve segregation and to "maintain our way of life 
without compromise,, without prejudice and— without vio­
lence," and declared his intention to "cooperate with the 
federal government." However, he would "not permit inter­
ference with those rights that the constitution specifically 
reserves to Louisiana."^9
The I960 regular session of the state legislature was 
preoccupied with preserving racial segregation, and pro­
ceeded to enact several measures to prevent large numbers of 
blacks from successfully registering to vote. Three acts 
dealt with voter registrars, making it a crime for elected 
officials or private citizens to interfere with, coerce or 
influence a registrar; empowering the state attorney general 
to serve as legal advisor to registrars; and requiring all 
registrars to comply "faithfully and without reservation of 
conscience or mind" with all state registration and election 
laws.50 Another statute specified the form to be used for 
voter registration and barred from registration applicants 
who had been convicted of a felony, had participated in a 
common law marriage or had borne or fathered an illegitimate
^New Orleans Times Picayune, May 11, I960.
^ Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 82, 
no. 484, no. 485.
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child within the past five years. This measure was sub­
sequently approved by the state's voters as a constitutional 
amendment, in the mistaken belief that placing voter 
restrictions in the state constitution might dissuade 
federal courts from interfering with the wishes of the 
people of L o u i s i a n a . a final act required all candidates 
for public office to list their race on all forms relating 
to nomination and candidacy, and provided for listing their 
race on the ballot. This law was designed to prevent a 
recurrence of the success of two black office-seekers who 
had qualified in the recent second primary in New O r l e a n s . 52
Impact of the Civil Rights Act of I960
One bright spot for voter rights in Louisiana was 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of I960, which extended 
federal authority over registration by granting the Justice 
Department additional powers to protect voting rights. The 
United States Attorney General could request that the 
federal courts determine whether discrimination was the 
result of a "pattern or practice" by the state, and federal 
courts were empowered to appoint referees to help determine 
qualified voter applicants.53
Ibid., no. 305, no. 613.
52Ibid., no. 538.
53Civil Rights Act of I960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 
Stat. 86 (1960).
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Prior to its passage, the new Civil Rights Act was 
condemned by Third Congressional District Representative 
Edwin Willis, with the support of First District 
Representative F. Edward Hebert, as "one of a series of 
punitive political measures to penalize the Southern States" 
in an appeal for the minority vote of Northern and Western 
cities in the upcoming Presidential election of I960. 
Referring to the act as "unconstitutional" and "devastat­
ing," he declared that it restored the old Force Bills of 
Reconstruction days "when the people of the South lived 
under a government by carpetbaggers," and was sure to breed 
"racial troubles of untold proportions."54
Shortly after passage of the Civil Rights Act in May of 
I960, Louisiana Attorney General Gremillion sought to ban 
its use in a federal probe of voting rights complaints 
against several parish registrars. However, a three-judge 
panel upheld the constitutionality of the law and voided 
state attempts to prevent the Justice Department from 
inspecting, reproducing and copying all records and papers 
having to do with registration or voting in federal 
elections conducted by the registrar of East Feliciana
Parish.55
In mid-1960, the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights conducted additional hearings on voter registration
“*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 7, I960.
^Ibid., May 26, July 28, I960; In re Palmer, 5 RRLR 
774 (19W T
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in Louisiana. Witnesses from East Carroll, Madison, 
Claiborne, Caddo, and Jackson parishes testified before the 
commission that they had tried numerous times to register, 
only to be denied for various reasons. They were informed 
that they needed two registered voters to identify them, 
that the time had not yet come for blacks to register, that 
blacks would get too much power if they were allowed to 
vote, that the registrar was out of application forms, that 
they had failed the constitutional interpretation test or 
that they had spoiled their registration forms by omissions 
or e r r o r s . 56 As the year came to an end, former State 
Senator J. D. DeBlieux, a racial moderate, was appointed 
chairman of the Louisiana Advisory Committee of the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights. Its main function was to 
study the state's achievements and problems in voting, 
administration of justice, public employment, employment by 
federal contractors and public e d u c a t i o n . 5 7
In hearings conducted by the Commission on Civil Rights 
in May of 1961, voting rights violations in Plaquemines, 
Bossier, Webster, St. Helena and Jackson parishes were 
investigated. State Attorney General Gremillion testified 
that there was no discrimination against blacks in the 
state, and charged that federal officials were "far more 
interested in forcing Louisiana Negroes to vote than are the
■^New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 28, I960.
57Ibid., Dec. 15, I960.
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Negroes themselves." He then proceeded to outline benefits 
accorded to blacks in the state: 72 percent of aid to
dependent children, 46 percent of old age assistance, 53 
percent of disability payments and 66 percent of all 
admissions to charity hospitals, despite the fact that only 
32 percent of state population was black. Also called to 
testify were several registrars. The registrar of Jackson 
Parish required perfect spelling and the ability to inter­
pret parts of the United States Constitution, but had rarely 
asked whites to interpret provisions because "they were more 
intelligent along these lines." The registrar of Webster 
Parish informed the commission that she skipped the test
with people she knew, most of whom were white. However,
records showed that of the 15,035 white adults residing in 
the parish, 11,881 were registered, while only 125 of 7313 
black adults were registered. The registrar of Plaquemines 
Parish required applicants to calculate their ages in years, 
months and days. When asked by the commission to demon­
strate with her present age, she failed her own t e s t . 58
By the end of November of 1961, voter registration in
Louisiana had reached 1,071,242 (919,520 white and 151,722 
black). As the year came to an end, the Justice Department 
challenged the voter interpretation test, claiming that its
58Ibid., May 5, 6, 1961.
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purpose was to allow parish registrars arbitrary discretion 
to deprive otherwise qualified blacks to register to vote.59
Slow Progress in Black Registration, 1962-1964
During the early 1960's, the Justice Department and the 
federal courts took the leading role in removing the legal 
obstacles preventing blacks from mass voter registration.
The Louisiana State Legislature continued to impede federal 
attempts to equalize voting rights for blacks by the passage 
of additional measures to forestall the inevitable. How­
ever, the federal judicial and executive branches conducted 
a relentless attack upon the state and its subdivisions 
through litigation and voidance of de jure statutes and 
other discriminatory actions in registration and voting. 
Congress joined them by its passage of Title I of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which established the legal framework 
for the momentous Voting Rights Act of the following year.
In the 1962 regular session of the Louisiana State 
Legislature, additional registration laws were enacted. One 
act established the procedure for conducting a new citizen­
ship test and required the state board of voter registration 
to direct parish registrars to use the test for voter eligi­
bility. A companion statute prescribed a form to use for 
voter registration, including restrictions on felony
•^Ibid., Dec. 29, 1961; Baton Rouge State Times,
Nov. 30“ 19bl.
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convictions, common law marriages and fathering or giving 
birth to an illegitimate child. A constitutional amendment 
was sent to the voters directing the state voter registra­
tion board to adopt a specified written test on the obliga­
tions of citizenship for use by parish registrars.^ 0
The federal courts granted the Justice Department per­
mission to inspect and reproduce past and present records of 
several registrars in 1962. They also ordered the registrar 
of East Carroll Parish to accept specific documents such as 
drivers' licenses as identification for voter registration, 
enjoined him from requiring that black applicants be person­
ally known to him or be identifiable by a white registered 
voter, and required the registrar to submit monthly progress 
reports showing the names of all persons rejected for regis­
tration and the reason for their rejection. In July, the 
United States District Court certified twenty-eight blacks 
who had applied and qualified for registration in East 
Carroll Parish, but who were unable to register due to the 
resignation of the registrar. Following this action by the 
court, the state again challenged the constitutionality of 
the Civil Rights Act of I960, alleging that it violated the 
Tenth Amendment. However, the court upheld the right of a 
federal court to certify applications, and declared that the 
state's exercise of powers under the Tenth Amendment (powers
^ A cts of Louisiana, 1962, Regular Session, no. 62, 
no. 63>~no. 53^.
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reserved to the states) was subject to the Fourteenth (due 
process and equal protection of the laws for all citizens) 
and Fifteenth Amendments (prohibited denial of suffrage on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude). 
A year later, the federal district court held that the Tenth 
Amendment did not impinge on expressed or implied powers 
delegated to the federal government, even where those powers 
were in conflict with state powers. Since Article I,
Section 4 of the United States Constitution gave the federal 
government power over the holding of federal elections, it 
also had control over registration for such elections.
Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, voter quali­
fications had to be nondiscriminatory.^l
During 1963, the federal courts continued to review the 
past and present actions of primarily North Louisiana regis­
trars. The actions that resulted in the removal of 85 per­
cent of the voters of Jackson Parish in 1956 were voided, 
public officials and the local Citizens' Council were 
enjoined from such action in the future, and registration 
officials were enjoined from requiring applicants to pro­
nounce or define any words or statements in the application 
form or to give an interpretation of a provision of the 
constitution.^2 Another registrar was enjoined from
617 RRLR 327 (1962); United States v. Manning, 215 
F.Supp. 272 IW.D. La. 1963).
62United States v. Wilder, 222 F.Supp. 749 (W.D. La.
1963).
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refusing to accept certain types of documents of identifi­
cation and from using different and more stringent proce­
dures on registration tests for blacks than for whites in 
Madison Parish.^3
A major breakthrough in the destruction of Louisiana's 
de jure attempts to restrict black suffrage came in 1963, 
with the voiding of the state's laws which permitted local 
registrars to test voter applicants on their ability to 
interpret provisions of state or federal constitutions. In 
United States v. State of Louisiana, the federal courts 
enjoined the use of such testing throughout the state, in 
order to reverse the effects of past discrimination in the 
use of the interpretation test. It was held that the inter­
pretation test had been in every state constitution since 
1898, but had never been enforced until August 3, 1962, and 
that it was another grandfather clause that effectively 
disfranchised blacks. The courts also placed a freeze on 
the use of the new citizenship test in twenty-one parishes 
where there had been evidence of discriminatory application 
of the interpretation test between 1956 and I960. Black 
registration in these parishes had declined from 28,504 in 
1956, to 10,256 in I960, out of a total black population of 
107,446 within this region. By comparison, 162,427 whites 
were registered in these parishes in I960, out of a total
^United States v. Ward, 222 F.Supp. 617 (W.D. La.
1963).
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white population of 212,273. Therefore, the federal courts 
forbade the use of the citizenship test in all of these 
parishes until black applicants could be judged by standards 
equal to those persons already registered, and until there 
was no further evidence of discriminatory effects of past 
tests. However, the citizenship test could be administered 
to persons not yet of voting age by August 3, 1962, to 
persons who had not met residency requirements by then or 
for a general re-registration of an entire p a r i s h .
Following this decision, the federal judiciary 
continued to keep a watchful eye on these parishes during 
1963, to detect any signs of maneuvering to defer action on 
registrations and to accelerate the registration process. 
When- the registrars of East and West Feliciana Parishes 
closed their offices with the excuse that they had no legal 
standards to use in testing applicants for registration, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered them to reopen their 
offices in accordance with hours specified by state law and 
to "process expeditiously" all applications of qualified 
v o t e r s . j n Red River Parish, which had 93 percent of its 
adult white population registered but less than 2 percent of 
its adult blacks, the registrar had rejected 70 percent of 
black applications and accepted 90 percent of white ones
^United States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. 353 
(E.D. La. 1963); New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 28, 1963.
^United States v. Palmer, 230 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La.
1964); 9 RRLR 783 (1964).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
since the registration purge of 1956.^6 In Webster Parish, 
the courts discovered that the registrar had administered an 
oral constitutional interpretation test to blacks from 1957 
to 1962, and then had reintroduced the test in 1963, when 
large numbers of blacks had begun to register and to pass 
the new citizenship test. Also, she would not process the 
applications of blacks when alone in her office, had 
required blacks to produce witnesses for identification and 
had used the registration application in a discriminatory 
way as a testing device for blacks from 1957 to 1963. By 
September of 1962, 53 percent of white adults and only 1.3 
percent of black adults in the parish were registered. In 
all cases, the federal courts ordered registrars to cease 
discriminatory operation of their offices, to make their 
records available for inspection and duplication, to notify 
each voter applicant of the reason for his rejection and to 
file regular registration reports with the courts.^7
During 1963, CORE conducted voter registration drives 
in various parts of the state. In 1963, their target was 
the Sixth Congressional District, which had Baton Rouge as 
its hub. There were over 800,000 Louisiana residents of 
voting age in the state who were not registered at this 
time. In the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts,
United States v. Crawford, 229 F.Supp. 898 (W.D. La.
1964).
67United States v. Clement, 9 RRLR 772-73 (1964).
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there were more persons nonregistered than those who were.
By November of 1963, there were 1,182,676 persons registered 
to vote in the first Democratic primary for governor in 
December. Of this total, 86.4 percent were white and 13.6 
percent were black registrants. Tensas Parish still had no 
blacks registered, while Claiborne, Plaquemines, Red River, 
West Carroll and West Feliciana parishes had less than a 
hundred blacks registered. Not until December of 1963, did 
the first black resident since Reconstruction register to 
vote in Tensas Parish.
The 1963-64 Democratic primaries for governor were the 
last blatantly racist gubernatorial elections in Louisiana 
history. As in the 1959-60 primaries, race played a major 
role in determining the final outcome. During the first 
primary in December of 1963, the extreme segregationists 
were again unsuccessful in placing a candidate in the run­
off, and two moderates emerged to run in the second primary. 
DeLesseps S. Morrison placed first ahead of newcomer John J. 
McKeithen, who ran a distant second. As in the first pri­
mary in 1959, Morrison received a lopsided majority of the 
black vote and was immediately placed on the defensive. 
Backers of McKeithen accused Morrison of secretly collabo­
rating with the NAACP for the black vote in exchange for a 
promise to liberalize the state's voter registration laws.
68Baton Rouge State Times, Aug. 9, Nov. 22, Jan. 17, 
1964; New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 27, 1963, Jan. 8, 
1964.
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Because Morrison failed to extricate himself from allega­
tions of being an integrationist conspiring to amass enough 
black votes to propel himself into the governor's office, 
the extremists threw their weight behind McKeithen in the 
second primary as they had done for Davis in I960, and waged 
a bitterly racist campaign. The result was Morrison's 
defeat in his third and last try for the governorship of 
Louisiana. According to the Public Affairs Research Council 
of Louisiana (PAR), McKeithen's victory was due primarily to 
the issue of race, religion and urbanism. At his inaugura­
tion, however, Governor McKeithen disappointed the rabid 
segregationists when he spoke in favor of reason and modera­
tion on the race issue.^9
In early 1964, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down Louisiana's I960 law which required that the race of 
all candidates for public office be designated on all nomin­
ation and candidacy forms as well as on the election ballot. 
In Anderson v. Martin, a lower federal court ruling that had 
affirmed this statute was overturned by the Supreme Court, 
which held that compulsory designation of race violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
placed the state behind an attempt at racial discrimination 
at the polls. Further, the indication of race or color on
69William Greer McCall, "School Desegregation in 
Louisiana: An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues" (Ph.D
dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1973) 192-93; New 
Orleans Times Picayune, May 12, 1964.
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the ballot furnished a means for arousing prejudice for or 
against individual candidates.70
Two major federal enactments had a major influence on 
the franchise in the South in 1964: the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act. Although Louisiana had 
repealed its poll tax in 1934, the new federal amendment had 
a major impact on the few Southern states still requiring 
this device for voting. Of more far-reaching importance was 
Title I of the new Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohib­
ited the unequal application of requirements for voter 
registration in federal elections, prohibited denial of the 
vote because of minor errors and omissions on registration 
applications, denied the use of all but written literacy 
tests for registration, made a sixth grade education in 
Erglish sufficient proof of literacy and empowered the 
United States Attorney General to expedite electoral suits 
by requesting a three-judge federal court to hear cases of 
alleged discriminatory application of election laws.?*
During the summer of 1964, CORE once again conducted a 
voter registration drive among blacks in Louisiana.
Although there were 1,193,775 persons qualified to vote in 
the second primary in January of that year, the number of 
registered voters declined and had only risen to 1,191,021
70Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 538; 
Anderson v. Martin, 84 S.Ct. 454 (1964).
71Civil Rights Act of 1964, 18 USCA Section 101.
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by the end of the summer (86.3 percent white and 13.7 per­
cent black). For the Presidential election in November, 
totals rose to 1,202,056, but then dropped back down to 
1,197,766 (1,033,915 whites and 163,851 blacks) by the end
of the y e a r . ^2
Impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
All federal forces united in 1965, to deliver a crush­
ing blow to remaining organized attempts to discriminate in 
registration and voting. The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the right of the federal government to sue a state 
and its officials in order to safeguard voting rights,73 and 
upheld a lower court ruling that had voided Louisiana's 
interpretation test. In turn, Congress broadened its role 
in protecting the right to vote and strengthened the powers 
of the executive branch by passage of the Voting Rights Act, 
which undermined further de jure attempts to prevent massive 
black registration in the Southern states.
In March of 1965, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the federal district court decision of 1963, which 
had voided Louisiana's constitutional interpretation test 
and enjoined the use of the citizenship test in parishes 
which showed evidence of past discrimination in the use of
72 New Orleans Times Picayune, May 28, Sept. 22, 1964; 
Baton Rouge State Times, Oct. 2 8 ,  Dec. 2 2 ,  1964.
^United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
tests for voter registration. The 1965 Louisiana State 
Legislature promptly amended and re-enacted a 1962 law that 
prescribed a form for use in the registration of voters. 
Essentially, this form was the same as the one provided for 
in 1962.7*
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 protected the right of 
citizens to register as well as to vote, and opened the 
floodgates for black registration in Louisiana for the first 
time since the 1890's. The statute waived the use of the 
poll tax in certain state elections, prohibited the use of 
literacy tests and unfair devices to restrict the suffrage 
in any state or county where less than half of the voting 
age population was registered or had voted in the 1964 elec­
tions, extended the 1964 Civil Rights Act's sixth grade 
literacy requirement, and empowered the United States 
Attorney General to appoint federal examiners to register 
voters and federal observers to supervise elections in areas 
with a history of practicing discrimination in voting. In 
addition, the act granted the Attorney General and the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
prior approval of voting laws in areas suspected of practic­
ing discrimination, and authorized the Attorney General to 
begin legal proceedings to end state and local poll taxes.
In the following year, the United States Supreme Court
^Louisiana v. United States, 85 S.Ct. 817 (1965); Acts 
of Louisiana, 1965, Regular Session, no. 165.
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upheld the validity of the Voting Rights Act and voided 
state poll taxes because they denied equal protection.75
Using the Voting Rights Act, the federal courts issued 
five-year freezes against the use of registration tests in 
Louisiana parishes with long histories of voter discrimina­
tion, and ordered registrars to accept authentic licenses, 
permits, military identification documents and records of 
real property as proof of identity.76 Also in 1966, the 
state's laws regarding the procedure for identifying voter 
applicants and residency requirements for voting were 
upheld, but the statute which denied assistance to illiter­
ate voters in casting ballots was voided as a violation of 
the Voting Rights Act. The state was ordered to provide 
assistance for illiterate voters as it did for handicapped 
voters. However, the courts upheld the state's contention 
that federal election officials in Louisiana were misapply­
ing the 1965 act, and ordered them to comply with the 
state's residency requirements.77
Beginning in 1965, dramatic changes became evident in 
voter registration and in the conduct of elections in 
Louisiana. In a ten-year period between 1964 and 1974, the
75Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 
Stat. 437 (1965); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 
(1966).
7^United States v. Clement, 358 F.2d 89 (5th. Cir.
1965).
77United States v. Louisiana, 265 F.Supp. 703 (E.D. La.
1966).
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Table 5








I960 1,152,000 993,000 86.2 159,000 13.8
1962 1,087,000 935,000 86.0 152,000 14.0
1964 1,202,000 1,037,000 86.3 165,000 13.7
1966 1,315,000 1,072,000 81.5 243,000 18.5
1968 1,438,000 1,133,000 78.8 305,000 21.2
1970 1,462,000 1,143,000 78.2 319,000 21.8
1972 1,785,000 1,388,000 77.8 397,000 22.2
1974 1,718,000 1,330,000 77.4 388,000 22.6
Source: United States, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract, 1972-1975.
number of qualified black voters in the state more than 
doubled, from approximately 165,000 in 1964, to about
388.000 in 1974. Also, between I960 and 1974* percentages 
of the black adult population that were registered to vote 
increased from 31.1 percent to 58.9 percent (table 5). The 
number of blacks who were registered to vote in the eleven 
former Confederate States rose from 1,463,000 in I960 to
3.449.000 in 1971; and black registration percentages
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Table 6







I960 13,739,000 12,276,000 89.4 1,463,000 10.6
1962 13,591,000 12,110,000 89.1 1,481,000 10.9
1964 16,428,000 14,264,000 86.8 2,164,000 13.2
1966 16,999,000 14,310,000 84.2 2,689,000 15.8
1968 18,814,000 15,702,000 83.5 3,112,000 16.5
1970 20,342,000 16,985,000 83.5 3,357,000 16.5
1971 20,837,000 17,378,000 83.4 3,449,000 16.6
Source: United States, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract, 1972-1975.
expanded respectively from 29.1 percent to 58.6 percent 
(table 6).
In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a 
lower court ruling and declared that federal courts had 
jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, granting a 
person the right to recover damages from private individuals 
who had conspired to deny him the right to vote.^9 At this
7 8 U. S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
1975, 449.
79Payne v. DeLee, 377 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1967).
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time, the federal courts also affirmed a 1916 Louisiana 
statute that required each elector to vote for as many can­
didates as there were offices to be filled, or the entire 
ballot would be invalidated. The courts were persuaded that 
this measure was designed simply to assure full participa­
tion of voters in elections.®® A town marshal's election 
was overturned in Tallulah, Louisiana, in 1969, because 
voters had not been adequately informed that the use of a 
master lever would not automatically cast a vote for town 
marshall. A federal district court held that part of the 
Voting Rights Act had been violated because of the imposi­
tion of a practice that had the effect of "denying or
abridging the vote on account of race or color," and because
public officials had failed in their duty to accurately and 
fairly tabulate, count and report a qualified voter's 
ballot.81
Political Changes in the State, 1967-1969
The 1967 Democratic state primary for governor was the 
first since 1955, in which race was not the major issue. 
Governor John J. McKeithen ran for re-election after secur­
ing voter approval of a state constitutional amendment in
1966, allowing him to succeed himself. With little viable
80Amedee v. Fowler, 275 F.Supp. 659 (E.D. La. 1967).
8*United States v. Post, Wyche v. Post, 297 F.Supp. 46 
(W.D. La. 1969).
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opposition, and riding a crest of popularity, the governor 
won handily with 70 percent of the votes cast. Later, in 
the summer of 1968, the state sent its first integrated 
delegation to the Democratic National Convention meeting in 
Chicago. Eleven blacks served among the delegates.
A major sign of political change within the state 
occurred in the 1960's with the mayoral elections in New 
Orleans, where the black vote became the decisive element 
for the first time and coalition-style politics became the 
key factor for election. The groundwork had been laid 
between 1946 and 1962 by Mayor DeLesseps S. Morrison, who 
had established a firm electoral basis on upper class white 
moderates and the increasing black vote. In the 1965 
mayoral election, Victor Schiro (Morrison's successor) 
quietly courted the city's black vote, winning 35 percent of 
it to defeat James Fitzmorris. In the 1969 Democratic first 
primary, Fitzmorris emerged as the frontrunner along with 
Maurice "Moon" Landrieu in the run-off. The strategy of 
Fitzmorris was to rely heavily on white support along with 
significant black support that he had received in 1965. 
However, he misunderstood the black disposition when he 
endorsed a white candidate over black State Representative 
Ernest "Dutch" Morial in a race for councilman-at-large on 
the New Orleans City Council, and refused to declare pub­
licly that he would appoint a black to head a city depart­
ment. Landrieu acceded to both requests, actively sought 
black support and received assistance from influential civic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and business leaders of the city. In the second primary, 
blacks made up 30 percent of New Orleans voters, and over 75 
percent of both white and black electors turned out. The 
result was that Landrieu won the election with 40 percent of 
the white vote and over 90 percent of the black v o t e . 82
The results of the 1969 New Orleans mayoral election 
demonstrated that ignoring an increasing black electorate 
could be politically self-destructive. Conversely, a candi­
date who could win overwhelming black support, along with a 
decent percentage of the white vote, could win an election. 
Blacks continued to register in large numbers, and had 
become the balance of power in New Orleans politics. In 
fact, the city already had a black population of between 45 
and 50 percent, and was expected to top 50 percent in 1971. 
The old campaign strategy of race-baiting in areas of the 
state where a significant black vote existed had become, by 
1969, doomed to defeat.®^
Reapportionment Struggle, 1969-1972
While by 1969, the Voting Rights Act had accomplished 
its task by destroying de jure means to prevent blacks from 
registering, voter apathy still immobilized tens of thou­
sands of adult blacks and whites. Electoral litigation in
82James Chubbuck, Edwin Renwick and Joe E. Walker, "The 
Emergence of Coalition Politics in New Orleans," Readings in 
Louisiana Politics, 474-77.
Qo
Ibid., 484; New Orleans Times Picayne, Mar. 3, 1970.
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the courts began to focus on the issue of reapportionment of 
the state legislature and of local government bodies, such 
as the police juries and school boards, because of under­
representation of blacks in multi-member districts.
In a Rapides Parish case of 1969, a federal district 
court voided a school board redistricting plan in which 
eleven members would be elected from eleven wards and seven 
from the parish at-large, because members of a racial 
minority would be a minority in the parish as a whole and 
thus would be unable to elect a candidate of their choice 
under such a districting plan. Instead, the court approved 
a "weighted vote plan" in which each board member would be 
allotted a vote weighted from one to eight, in proportion to 
the approximate percentage of persons he represented follow­
ing the 1970 c e n s u s . in a Caddo Parish case involving the 
reapportionment of its police jury, a federal court over­
turned the local government body's plan to redraw district 
lines and to designate incumbent police jurors as represen­
tatives of the newly drawn districts. The court ordered the 
police jury to choose between a weighted vote plan based on 
the number of registered voters in each ward, and holding 
new elections from the newly drawn districts.
a/
LeBlanc v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 315 F. Supp. 
783 (W.D. La. 1969).
Fain v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 312 F.Supp. 54 
(W.D. La. 1969, 1970).
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In 1971, the federal courts ordered the reapportionment 
of the state legislature. A new legislative apportionment 
plan was adopted by the state legislature in June of 1971, 
to replace the current one drawn up in 1966. The new stat­
ute created a patchwork of single-member, multi-member and 
“floating" member districts. An amendment to create single­
member districts was proposed by Republican Representative 
James Sutterfield of New Orleans and was rejected, although 
it had the support of black groups, the state chamber of 
commerce and the Louisiana Municipal Association. In July, 
Louisiana Republicans asked the United States Justice 
Department to void the legislative reapportionment plan in 
favor of statewide single-member districts. In the follow­
ing month, the Justice Department rejected the plan on the 
grounds that it would discriminate against blacks by dilut­
ing their voting power. Under the 1971 statute, Orleans 
Parish, which was 45 percent black, would have been divided 
into eleven districts, electing eighteen representatives to 
the legislature, but with only two of these districts having 
a black majority.®*’
Less than a week after the decision by the Justice 
Department, United States District Judge E. Gordon West 
approved a plan designed by the court's special master, 
Edward J. Steimel (executive director of the Public Affairs
86Atlanta Constitution, June 6, 1971; New Orleans Times 
Picayune, July 24, l97l; New York Times, Aug. 21, 1971.
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Research Council), but without a public hearing. Under the 
Steimel reapportionment plan, statewide single-member dis­
tricts were created and several incumbent legislators were 
forced to run against one another because of new district 
lines. A suit was quickly initiated by the state attorney 
general's office, three New Orleans solons (Adrian 
Duplantier, Nat Kiefer and Michael O'Keefe) and the state 
branch of the AFL-CIO, which favored multi-member districts. 
In early September, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals overturned the district court's decision 
because Judge West had failed to conduct a public hearing. 
Time was now a major factor because of the approaching state 
primary, scheduled for November 6, 1971.
Within a week, Judge West held a public hearing on the 
Steimel reapportionment plan, and restated his approval of 
it. The opposition again appealed the decision, but the 
Fifth Circuit Court refused to delay implementation of the 
new plan, although it did modify the Steimel plan slightly. 
Governor John J. McKeithen and other state officials then 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to postpone the 
legislative primary, but their request was denied in mid- 
October of 1971. Under the West-Steimel reapportionment 
plan, one senatorial and five house of representative 
districts in New Orleans had a black majority. Several 
parishes in North Louisiana, as well as Republicans, also
87New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 26, Sept. A, 5,
1971.
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had a better chance of electing blacks under the new plan 
because of the creation of new single-member districts and 
the redrawing of district boundaries.®®
In a case involving a suit to order the reapportionment 
of judicial districts of the Louisiana State Supreme Court, 
the courts ruled that the concept of "one-man, one-vote" 
reapportionment did not apply to the judicial branch. Since 
the judicial districts had been created by the 1921 state 
constitution, the federal courts felt that they could not be 
changed by state legislation.®^
By 1974, the federal courts stated their preference for 
single-member districts for reapportionment of public 
bodies, because they tended to preserve the voting rights of 
minorities. However, the courts were willing to approve 
multi-member districts if they were justified by other valid 
considerations and did not involve attempts at racial dis­
crimination.
During the early 1970's, the federal government tackled 
two major voting issues. In 1970, Congress voted to extend 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for another five years. The 
law also extended the suffrage to eighteen year olds in all 
national, state and local elections; abolished literacy
88Ibid., Sept. 11, 18, 1971; National Observer,
Oct. 16,' 1971.
89Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972).
Q0Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 376 F.Supp. 690 
(W.D. La. 1974).
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tests for five years; and reduced residency requirements to 
thirty days for voting in presidential elections. In the 
same year, the United States Supreme Court upheld the liter­
acy ban and the residency requirements.91
The next voting issue confronted by the federal courts 
was Louisiana residency requirements in 1971. It was deter­
mined that the states had broad powers over suffrage so long 
as they did not apply their election laws in a discrimina­
tory way, and that no federal constitutional objection was 
presented by a state requirement of age, literacy and lack 
of a previous criminal record as a condition for suffrage. 
Upholding Louisiana's residency requirement of one year in 
the state and six months in the parish preceding an elec­
tion, the courts declared that there was no inherent right 
to vote, but that voting was a privilege granted by the 
state. A resident of a state did not have a right to vote 
in state elections, the United States Constitution as 
amended did not grant the right to vote and suffrage was not 
derived from United States citizenship.92 However, in 1972, 
the United States Supreme Court struck down Tennessee's law 
requiring one year residency in the state and ninety days in 
the county as being too lengthy and discriminating against 
new state residents. Although the court did not mandate the
^Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 
314; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
^Fonthem v. McKeithen, 336 F.Supp. 153 (E.D. La.
1971).
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amount of time that would be considered the maximum waiting 
period, it did say that "30 days appears to be an ample 
period of t i m e . "93 xhe other states, including Louisiana, 
took note and reduced residency in all elections to thirty 
days.
Evidence of Real Change for Blacks, 1972-1974
In 1972, the fruits of two decades of efforts in the 
state to bring about changes in the voting status of blacks 
became apparent. With federal laws to prevent discrimina­
tion in voting in full operation, blacks desiring to vote or 
run for political office in Louisiana were free to do so.
The election of Edwin Edwards as governor was a historic 
moment in race relations in the state in 1972. This was the 
first time that a neo-populist coalition of blacks and 
whites had elected a governor, although it had come close to 
occurring in the Populist-Republican fusion ticket in 1896, 
and had been a possibility in the I960 and 1964 gubernato­
rial elections when Morrison had sought the office. How­
ever, the school desegregation issue and heightened racial 
tensions within the state had denied him the chance. A 
similar coalition was currently operating in New Orleans 
under the Landrieu Administration, which was elected in 
1969. The Cajun-black coalition of 1972 brought to fruition 
a long-standing dream of political unity between the races
^Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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on the statewide level, when Edwards was elected with a 
solid South Louisiana French-Catholic vote and a bloc of the 
state's black vote. The major differences between the 
Morrison defeats and the Edwards victory were the presence 
of a significantly larger black vote in Louisiana in 1972 
than in I960 or 1964, and Edwards' reception of 75 percent 
of the Cajun vote, while Morrison could get only 60 percent 
of it.9^
One of the most striking changes in Louisiana during 
the early 1970's, was the election of numerous blacks to 
various local offices. Blacks elected to office prior to 
1970 were indeed rare occurrences, although several had run 
during the 1960's and a few had reached the second primary. 
By 1971, there were seventy-four blacks serving in elected 
offices, but their number had more than tripled by 1975. 
Although nearly all of these positions were minor offices, a 
definite trend had developed, encouraging other black asp­
irants to enter the political field (table 7).^5
The early 1970's witnessed the continuation of efforts 
by the federal government to assure that suffrage was pro­
tected, though the Nixon Administration relegated civil 
rights to a diminished level of priority. The vigorous 
desegregation policies of the Johnson Administration were
q /
Charles E. Grenier and Perry H. Howard, "The Edwards 
Victory," Readings in Louisiana Politics, 488, 497.
^Statistical Abstract, 1971, 1975.
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Table 7















1971 74 1 37 23 13
1972 119 8 59 29 23
1973 149 8 74 26 41
1974 237 9 114 34 80
Source: United States, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract, 1971-1975.
replaced by a federal policy that appeared to become 
actively involved only when blatant de jure action was 
detected, while de facto or cultural forms of discrimination 
went largely unnoticed. Even the federal courts appeared to
back away from vigorous involvement in the civil rights
struggle. Perhaps, the country was tired of the movement
and desired a breathing spell after two decades of disquiet.
It may also have been due to the tremendous success of the 
movement itself, because black citizens now had the ability 
to utilize the political process to effect change and had 
legal channels to vent their anger and frustration at ill- 
treatment .
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Over the more than seven decades since black residents 
of Louisiana had been disfranchised, various artifices had 
been implemented by white leaders of the state to prevent 
mass black voting. Segregationists, fearing a return to 
conditions prevalent under Radical Reconstruction, desired 
to keep blacks in a subservient position. If their vote 
could not be controlled, then they would be disfranchised. 
Until 1944, no progress was made in black suffrage in the 
state, with less than one percent of the black adult-aged 
population registered.
Not until the late 1940's did a few thousand blacks 
succeed in registering to vote, primarily in South Louisiana 
and in the New Orleans area. When large numbers of blacks 
sought to register in the 1950's, white registration leaders 
employed several remedies to discourage them from seeking to 
register. However, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1957, the federal government began to take an increas­
ingly active role in extending the vote to black citizens of 
Louisiana. Federal investigations of registration proce­
dures were conducted in parishes where few if any blacks 
were registered, or in those where Citizens' Council purges 
had removed hundreds of thousands of blacks and few whites 
from the voter rolls. Local registration officials were 
ordered to justify their operations, became subject to 
inexpedient and costly litigation, and were ordered to cease 
discriminatory operation of their offices henceforth.
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With the racist atmosphere that prevailed in the late 
1950's and early 1960's within Louisiana, segregation 
leaders utilized de jure means to thwart federal intentions 
to dismantle racial barriers that intimidated blacks from 
asserting their right to full participation in the political 
process. Not until these contrivances were voided would 
blacks be able to right other injustices through the 
democratic process.
In the early 1960's, with the passage of new civil 
rights legislation in I960 and 1964, the federal government 
actively protected the right to register to vote and elimi­
nated state attempts to retain or reinstitute measures that 
perpetuated past racial discrimination in voting. With the 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and a vigorous 
effort by all three branches of the federal government, 
racial barriers to political equality in Louisiana crumbled. 
State leaders found it virtually impossible to prevent 
blacks from registering by de jure means, as litigation made 
it unwise if not counterproductive to continue resistance at 
the state level.
As larger numbers of blacks began to register under 
federal protection, they began to voice their opinions and 
vent their anger and frustration within the political 
process. Uniting together and often forming coalitions with 
racially moderate whites in local areas, blacks succeeded in 
getting elected persons who were sympathetic or at least not 
hostile to black aspirations. For the first time in nearly
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a century, blacks were elected to local offices or had 
spokesmen who took an active role in safeguarding their 
interests and future. No longer did the overwhelming 
majority of black citizens of Louisiana need to await the 
sympathy and assistance of forces outside of the state to 
rescue them from an oppressive and subservient situation. 
Of course, much work still had to be done, and an ever 
vigilant effort had to stand guard to prevent a recurrence 
of former conditions.
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Chapter IV 
DESEGREGATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
Introduction
Public institutions of higher education in Louisiana 
were the first de jure segregated facilities in the state to 
fall when seriously challenged in federal courts. The 
federal district court in New Orleans issued initial deseg­
regation orders in the early 1950's, supported by the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, that brought about the destruction 
of the century-old system of segregated operation of the 
state's colleges and universities.
Unlike the chaos and violence that accompanied the 
onset of desegregation of major universities in neighboring 
states, desegregation of Louisiana's institutions was accom­
plished with relative calm through litigation. State offi­
cials resorted to the use of various legal and extra-legal 
artifices to forestall the dismantling of the segregated 
system and to wear down the opposition. However, no gover­
nor or other important state official "stood in the doorway" 
of a state-supported university spouting platitudes for the 
mob and vowing to defy federal marshals and court orders to 
the death, only to have to turn aside later and humbly allow 
desegregation to proceed anyway. There were no displays of
127
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massive resistance, defiance or riots as had occurred over 
the brief enrollment of Autherine Lucy at the University of 
Alabama in 1956, or with the enrollment of James Meredith at 
Ole Miss in 1962. Instead, desegregation in Louisiana 
proceeded gradually, orderly and cautiously without the 
explosive scenes accompanying that of several other states 
in the Deep South.
The first challenges to the segregated system of col­
leges and universities maintained by Louisiana were filed 
prior to 1950. As in other Southern states, desegregation 
efforts were focused initially on graduate and professional 
schools, usually targeting the states' largest universities. 
After limited integration had been achieved on some level, 
it then trickled down to undergraduate programs, smaller 
public colleges and finally to private institutions. Unlike 
the situation in other Southern states in the 1950's and 
early 1960's, governors of Louisiana did not play forceful 
roles in attempts to prevent desegregation in higher educa­
tion. Instead, a handful of vocal racists led the state 
legislature and were instrumental in the passage of massive 
resistance measures to prevent, delay or curtail desegrega­
tion orders. However, by 1958, the federal courts had 
broken the state's organized resistance and then proceeded 
on a case-by-case basis to create a nondiscriminatory system 
in admissions policies in the state's public colleges and 
universities. By 1965. this goal had been reached.
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In the late 1960's, a major problem continued to plague 
higher education. The disestablishment of the dual system 
of public colleges and universities was unlike the situation 
present in the dismantling of the separate systems provided 
for blacks and whites in elementary and secondary schools. 
There, a racial balance could be achieved often by simply 
busing students or redrawing school district lines. How­
ever, over the past century, a dual system of parallel sepa­
rate but unequal colleges for blacks and whites had sprung 
up within some of the same cities in Louisiana. Often 
referred to as "sweetheart schools," they presented an 
apparently unsolvable problem in the 1970's, being the de 
facto relics of the de jure system and causing major concern 
for the NAACP and the Justice Department because of their 
very existence. Renewed challenges were made to the state's 
system of colleges and universities in the 1970's, resulting 
in intensive negotiating sessions that led to a compromise 
between officials of the state and federal governments in 
the form of the Consent Decree of 1981, under which the 
state's institutions of higher learning were to operate for 
the next six years.
Higher Education in Louisiana Prior to 1950
Four of Louisiana's predominantly white institutions of 
higher education were created prior to the Civil War, three 
as private institutions and one public. The three private 
schools were Centenary College, Tulane University and
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Louisiana College. The only public institution was 
Louisiana State University. All were designated for the 
education of whites only, and no antebellum facilities were 
provided for the higher education of blacks in the state.
Centenary began operation in 1825, as the College of 
Louisiana in Jackson, Louisiana. In 1845, it came under the 
control of the Methodist Conference of Louisiana and 
Mississippi and was merged with another Methodist college in 
Mississippi to become Centenary College of Louisiana at 
Jackson. In 1908, Centenary was relocated to its present 
site in Shreveport.*
Tulane was founded by several physicians as the Medical 
College of Louisiana in 1834. After the state legislature 
of 1845 provided for the creation of the University of 
Louisiana at New Orleans, the Medical College became its 
medical department in 1847. As with other existing colleges 
in the state, its existence was threatened by the Civil War 
and a shortage of funds. However, the generosity of Paul 
Tulane in the 1880's put the college on a sound financial 
basis. The state legislature rewarded his benevolence by 
renaming the institution in his honor in 1884, but also 
stipulated that the college would be for the education of 
white students o n l y . ^
^State of Louisiana, Board of Regents. The Master Plan 
for Higher Education in Louisiana (April 1984TJ
2Ibid.
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Louisiana College, the last of the present private 
colleges dating prior to the Civil War, began as Mt. Lebanon 
College for males under the auspices of the North Louisiana 
Baptist Convention in Bienville Parish in 1852. A similar 
facility for women was established nearby in DeSoto Parish 
by another Baptist organization as the Keatchie Female 
College 1857. Both colleges were later closed and merged 
into the new Louisiana College, beginning operation at 
Pineville, Louisiana, in 1 9 0 6 . 3
The state's largest institution of higher learning, 
Louisiana State University, was first provided for by the 
legislature in 1855, as a public university with a strong 
military leaning. The new Louisiana State Seminary of 
Learning and Military Science began operating on January 2, 
i860, in Pineville, Louisiana, under the superintendency of 
William T. Sherman of later Civil War fame. With the seces­
sion of the state and the impending war, the new institution 
was closed in the following year as its superintendent 
returned to the North and most of the cadets and instructors 
joined the ranks of the Confederate Army.^ After the Civil 
War, the seminary resumed operations primarily through the 
efforts of former Confederate Colonel David F. Boyd, who 
secured the position of superintendent when it reopened in 
October of 1865. Two years later, the seminary came under 
heavy criticism from Radicals for being "an enclave of the 
3Ibid.
*Ibid., 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
Confederacy," because of the presence of several former 
Confederate soldiers or their sons on the faculty and within 
the student body. According to Boyd's biographer, Germaine 
Reed, the seminary was not integrated after the Civil War 
principally because of its remote location from New Orleans, 
the hub of Radical Reconstruction in the state, and because 
of the efforts of political defenders of the institution.5 
When the seminary burned in 1869» it was transferred "tempo­
rarily" to Baton Rouge, where it has remained, and was 
renamed Louisiana State University. In 1876, the state 
legislature merged the university with a land grant college 
that it had authorized two years earlier, and formed 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical 
College
After the Civil War, the state legislature gradually 
expanded educational opportunities in higher education for 
whites across the state. In 1884, Northwestern State 
University began operation as Louisiana Normal School, a 
two-year teacher college in Natchitoches. Louisiana Tech 
began operation as the Industrial Institute and College of 
Louisiana at Ruston in 1894, with the purpose of educating 
students in "the practical industries of the age." The last 
white public institution of higher learning created before
5
Germaine M. Reed, David French Boyd: Founder of
Louisiana State University (baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1977) 55-62, 68-69.
^The Master Plan for Higher Education, 2.
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1900, was the University of Southwestern Louisiana, estab­
lished as Southwestern Louisiana Industrial Institute in 
1898.7
Prior to 1900, only one public and four small private 
colleges were established for blacks in Louisiana. In 1869, 
Straight University, Union Normal School and Leland College 
began operation in New Orleans, while Coleman College opened 
in Gibsland in 1890, and remained in operation until 1929. 
Straight and Union Normal, founded by the Congregational and 
Methodist Episcopal Churches respectively, merged in 1930 to 
become Dillard University, and remains in operation. Leland 
College closed in 1915, reopened in Baker, Louisiana in 
1923» and then closed permanently in I960, for financial 
reasons.®
The first state-supported institution of higher learn­
ing for blacks was Southern University, created by the state 
legislature in 1880 (under an 1879 constitutional mandate) 
as the Louisiana State Institute for the Higher Education of 
Colored Youths. In theory, it was supposed to be the "sepa­
rate but equal" equivalent of Louisiana State University 
(LSU), but meager funding kept it operating at a mere 
subsistence level. Originally located in New Orleans, the 
property was sold and the institution relocated to
7Ibid., 3.
8Ibid., 2.
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Scotlandville north of Baton Rouge, where it has been in 
operation since 1914.9
Between 1900 and 1920, several more private colleges 
were established in the state. Grambling University began 
as a private industrial school for blacks in 1901, and 
became a public training school under the authority of the 
Lincoln Parish School Board in 1918. In New Orleans, four 
private Catholic colleges were created, three for whites and 
one for blacks. The white colleges included Loyola (1904), 
St. Mary's Dominican (1910) and Our Lady of Holy Cross 
(1916). The only black Catholic college in the state, 
Xavier, was created as a high school in 1915, and added a 
university division in 1917.*®
The 1921 State Constitution and subsequent legislation 
stemming from its provisions were the basis for the later 
court battles to dismantle the de jure system of segregation 
in higher education in Louisiana. Each institution that 
operated in the state first had to secure a charter from the 
state legislature. When this document was granted, it 
included a statement stipulating that the institution would 
be operated as a white or black college. Article 12,
Section 1 of the 1921 State Constitution required separation 
of the races in the state's public schools, and later became 
the focal point for basing massive resistance measures to
9lbid.
10Ibid., 3.
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harden segregation in the 1950's and early I960's.
Section 24 of the article applied segregation to private 
institutions as well. The constitution also created two 
governing boards for all public colleges and universities. 
The Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors was 
established to rule over the expanding empire of the state's 
oldest and largest public institution of higher learning, 
while the State Board of Education would exercise jurisdic­
tion over all other public elementary, secondary and higher 
learning institutions in the state.^
Between 1921 and 1950, new public institutions of 
higher learning for whites mushroomed across the state. 
Delgado Community College was opened by New Orleans as a 
vocational trades school in 1921. Tangipahoa Parish opened 
Hammond Junior College in 1925, which later became 
Southeastern Louisiana University. In 1931, the legislature 
authorized the creation of Louisiana State University 
Medical Center in New Orleans, while Ouachita Parish Junior 
College (the future Northeast Louisiana University) opened 
branches at Lake Charles in 1939, and at Thibodaux in 1948. 
The former became McNeese State University and the latter 
Nicholls State University.^
**State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1921, Article 12, 
Sections 1, 24; The Master Plan for Higher Education, 4.
12The Master Plan for Higher Education, 4.
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While opportunities for whites expanded rapidly in the 
field of higher education, black gains in the state were 
almost nil. Grambling was transferred from the control of 
Lincoln Parish to that of the state and became a black 
junior college in 1924. It was reorganized in 1936, to 
offer a rural teacher education program, and in 1940, began 
offering a four-year curriculum. The only other provision 
made for blacks was the hasty creation of a law school as 
part of Southern University in 1948. This action was 
primarily a response by fearful white Louisianians to the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents (1948), which reaffirmed the court's earlier 
decision in Gaines v. Canada (1938), involving black 
requests for admission to white state-supported law schools 
in Oklahoma and Missouri, where no separate black law 
schools were available.
Heretofore, the state had largely neglected black 
education. On the eve of the issuance of the first deseg­
regation order to the state's ins*itutions of higher learn­
ing, there were only two small, inadequately supported 
public colleges for blacks: Grambling in North Louisiana
and Southern University in the southern part of the state, 
both of which were far inferior on all levels to any of the 
institutions provided for whites. By contrast, there was an
^ Ibid., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 
(1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
(1938).
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expanding network of white public colleges and universities, 
with LSU having become one of the foremost universities in 
the nation as well as in the South, with its own separate 
governing board and further plans for expansion. In 
addition, whites were able to take advantage of public 
colleges located in every corner of the state: Northeast,
Northwestern and Louisiana Tech in North Louisiana; 
Southwestern and McNeese in Southwest Louisiana; and LSU, 
Southeastern and Nicholls in Southeast Louisiana.
The decision by the Supreme Court in Sipuel in 1948, to 
reaffirm its stand concerning the right of blacks to attend 
professional schools, shook the leaders of the South from 
their complacency in neglecting to provide at least marginal 
educational opportunities for blacks. Many of the more 
realistic leaders discerned that the seeds of destruction- 
for the de jure system of segregation in education lay in 
the doctrine of "separate but equal," upon which the entire 
system was based. Therefore, several Southern states 
embarked upon a massive building program to provide separate 
facilities for blacks, particularly in education, that were 
more closely "equal" to those provided for whites. However, 
such an undertaking could not be completed in the short 
space that the South had remaining to persuade the courts 
that segregation was neither unfair nor a violation of 
rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Louisiana's leaders were slow to respond to the Sipuel 
decision, creating a law school for blacks on the Southern
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
University campus but providing nothing else of substance. 
The real question of "equality" now arose. Was the estab­
lishment of a separate law school in the state for blacks 
the same as equal treatment, and was such action sufficient 
to justify the continued operation of a dual system of 
public higher education?
Desegregation of Higher Education, 1950-1954
In 1950, the United States Supreme Court handed down 
two significant decisions affecting the segregated operation 
of public colleges and universities. In Sweatt v. Painter, 
the court challenged the doctrine of separate but equal in 
education by working within the framework of the Plessy 
case. Since the Southern states based their legal founda­
tions for the creation of a dual system of higher education 
on this theory, the court challenged them to prove that the 
"separate" facilities provided were truly "equal." Address­
ing the question of "substantial equality," the Supreme 
Court overruled an attempt by the State of Texas to create a 
separate law school for blacks in order to keep the 
University of Texas Law School white. It determined that 
the black law school was inferior to the one provided for 
whites and could not stand the constitutional test. On the 
same day, the Supreme Court decided in McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, which involved seating restrictions placed on
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a black graduate student, that the state must accord equal 
treatment to all students.^
Between 1947 and 1954> the primary targets of desegre­
gation suits in Louisiana were the graduate and professional 
schools operated under the LSU system. The filing of two 
suits against its medical and graduate schools in 1947, 
resulted in the establishment of a law school at Southern 
University. The case of Wilson v. Board of Supervisors 
involved the rejection of applications by twelve blacks for 
admission to the LSU School of Law solely because of their 
race and color. The plaintiffs argued that it was the only 
law school in the vicinity where they could receive the high 
degree of training that they needed, and that the "separate 
but equal" law school provided by the state for the use of 
blacks at Southern University nearby was not a suitable 
substitute.*5
Evidence presented in the case attested that the two 
law schools did not meet the test of "substantial equality." 
The LSU system had an estimated plant value of $35,000,000; 
was approved by every applicable accrediting agency in 
America; had twelve colleges and several divisions within 
them; and offered various undergraduate, professional,
^Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
^Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F.Supp. 986 (E.D. 
La. 1950); Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 14, 1950.
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masters and doctoral degrees. Its law school was founded in 
1906, while the Southern University Law School had been 
created reluctantly in 1948, in order to provide an educa­
tion in law for blacks. Southern University had an esti­
mated plant value of only $2,500,000; had the highest rating 
offered but was not a member of the Southern Association of 
Colleges and Secondary Schools; and except for its meager 
law school facilities, was merely a college instead of a 
university.^
Excluding the fact that they were not white, the court 
found that the plaintiffs met all of the qualifications 
necessary for admission to the LSU Law School. Therefore, a 
three-judge federal panel granted Roy Wilson and the other 
plaintiffs their request for admission on the grounds that 
they had been denied their Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Although one state representative wired the governor 
requesting that he close the law school immediately, nine 
blacks were enrolled in the LSU Law School in 1950. Four of 
them took non-degree courses, three were dropped or withdrew 
and two were subsequently admitted to the Louisiana State 
Bar Association.
In two other cases involving LSU in 1950, its medical 
school and graduate school of arts and sciences were ordered
^Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F.Supp. 986 (E.D. 
La. 1950).
17Ibid., Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Oct. 15, 1950; 
New Orleans Times Picayune, Oec. 1, 1957.
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desegregated, but its undergraduate school remained rela­
tively segregated until 1964. By 1956, the graduate school, 
school of social welfare, law school, and combined arts and 
sciences and law undergraduate program were subject to 
desegregation. However, all black students in attendance at 
LSU were graduate or professional students, with the excep­
tion of one black undergraduate student admitted briefly in 
the fall of 1953.18
In 1953, a suit to desegregate LSU's undergraduate 
Junior Division was brought on the behalf of A. P. Tureaud, 
Jr., by his father, a prominent New Orleans civil rights 
attorney who represented black plaintiffs in most of the 
early desegregation cases filed in Louisiana. Upon applying 
for admission to LSU to pursue a six-year combined curricu­
lum of arts and sciences and law courses, Tureaud was 
informed by the Registrar's Office that his application was 
rejected because of the university's policy not to admit 
blacks. In the subsequent lawsuit, the LSU Board of 
Supervisors argued that Southern University was equal to 
LSU, and that black students could take their arts and 
sciences program there, then transfer to LSU School of Law 
if they were dissatisfied with the one provided for them at 
Southern. However, Judge J. Skelly Wright investigated the 
"substantial equality" between the two universities, taking
18Foister v. Board of Supervisors, Payne v. Board of 
Supervisors (unreported cases, 1950); confidential communi­
cation.
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into consideration the education and reputation of the 
faculty, variety of courses offered, physical facilities, 
library facilities, position and influence of the alumni, 
standing of the university in the community, and traditions 
and prestige. He concluded that the programs offered by LSU 
and Southern in the six-year combined arts and sciences and 
lav courses did not pass the constitutional test, and thus 
ordered the admission of Tureaud and other qualified 
students "similarly situated."^
Tureaud became the first black undergraduate student to 
enroll at LSU in the fall of 1953, but was dropped in 
October when the university successfully challenged the 
district court ruling. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the lower court's decision in Tureaud's favor on 
the grounds that a three-judge tribunal needed to hear the 
case since it involved a ruling on laws and policies that 
violated the United States Constitution. Several months 
later, Tureaud won an appeal to the Supreme Court, which 
vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the case 
"in light of the Segregation Cases decided" by then in 
Brown. In March of 1955, the district court reinstated its 
1953 desegregation order that Tureaud be admitted to LSU's 
Junior Division to take an arts and sciences and law pro­
gram. Tureaud had attended Xavier University and wanted to
I Q
Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 116 F.Supp. 248 
(E.D. La. 1953).
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transfer his education courses to the undergraduate division 
when he sought to enroll at LSU for the fall term in 1955. 
However, he was informed by the registrar that the court 
order allowed him to "enroll as a combination student in 
arts and law" only, and that all other undergraduate schools 
were closed to him. At this same time, a United States Army 
veteran was denied the right to transfer from Southern 
University to the LSU college of commerce. In October, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals returned to its previous 
position that a three-judge panel was necessary to decide 
Tureaud's case, then cancelled this decision in early 
January of 1956, and upheld the district court's earlier 
desegregation order. However, by then, Tureaud had aban­
doned his suit to become a student at LSU, frustrated by 
legal maneuvering and having lost valuable time necessary, 
for his education and training.^
While Tureaud was battling unsuccessfully for admission 
to LSU, another suit was being fought by black students to 
gain admission to Southwestern Louisiana Institute (SLI) in 
Lafayette and McNeese State College in Lake Charles. In 
September of 1953, black students residing in the Lafayette 
area sought to enroll at SLI, but they were denied admission 
because of their "race and color." After an unsuccessful 
appeal to the State Board of Education, which administered
20Ibid., 207 F.2d 807 (5th. Cir. 1953), 74 S.Ct. 784 
(1954), 225 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955), 228 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 
1956).
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over SLI, suit was filed in federal court in January 1954. 
During the trial, the State Board of Education maintained 
that it based its decision to deny blacks admission to SLI 
on Act 62 of the 1898 legislature and on Article 12,
Section 1 of the 1921 State Constitution. Act 62 created
SLI "for the Education of the white children of the State of 
Louisiana in the arts and sciences," while Article XII, 
Section 1 provided separate public schools for blacks and
whites of six to eighteen years of age.21
The court decided that a denial of the request by the 
plaintiffs would cause hardships by either precluding them 
from the opportunity of receiving a college education, or 
subjecting them to undue hardships commensurate with having 
to commute to or reside in a distant locality in order to 
attend a black college. The alternatives to SLI were 
Grambling and Southern, one hundred twenty-six and eighty- 
nine miles respectively from Lafayette. The court felt that 
all three public institutions were equal in physical facil­
ities, and that to deny qualified black students the oppor­
tunity to attend college at home, while whites in the area 
had that benefit, "constituted an unlawful discrimina­
tion."22
21Constantine v. Southwestern Louisiana Institute, 120 
F.Supp. 417 (W.D. La. 1954); Acts of Louisiana, 1898,
Regular Session, no. 62; Constitution of 1921, Article 12, 
Section 1.
22Constantine v. Southwestern Louisiana Institute
(1954).
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In November of 1954, a federal district court ruled 
that sixteen blacks residing in the Lake Charles area were 
entitled to attend McNeese State College since no similar or 
equal institution for blacks existed in the vicinity. In 
the following May, the state legislature approved an appro­
priation of $5,000,000 for the construction of a branch of 
Southern University in the Lafayette area to dissuade blacks 
in southwestern Louisiana from attending McNeese or SLI. 
However, no further action was taken on this matter. A year 
later, federal courts ordered Southeastern Louisiana College 
in Hammond to admit qualified blacks. Therefore, by the 
middle of 1956, LSU law and graduate schools, and the under­
graduate schools of SLI, McNeese and Southeastern were 
desegregated with litigation being the only organized oppo­
sition encountered.23
Collapse of Massive Resistance
The Louisiana State Legislature met in an atmosphere of 
emotion, tension and frustration in the spring of 1956.
Since its last meeting, the United States Supreme Court had 
voided a Baltimore ordinance providing for segregated public 
beaches and bathhouses, as well as segregated operation of a 
municipally-owned golf course in Atlanta in 1955.24 in
27
Pittsburgh Courier, Dec. 4, 1954; New Orleans Times 
Picayune, May 30, 1955, Apr. 2, 1956.
^Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); 
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
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addition, the first decision had been rendered in Bush v. 
Orleans in early 1956, ordering the desegregation of Orleans 
Parish public schools and invalidating a package of state 
lavs that had been enacted in 1954, to circumvent the first 
Brown ruling. The order handed down in Bush was applicable 
to higher education, since it declared that all federal, 
state or local laws requiring or permitting" racial 
discrimination in public education "must yield to" the 
principle established in the first Brown ruling.^5
Alarmed at this progress being made in the desegrega­
tion of public education, the state legislature of 1956 
enacted thirteen separate segregation laws without a dis­
senting vote. Two of them, Acts 15 and 249» applied to 
higher education. Act 15 required all persons seeking 
admission to a public college or university in the state to 
submit a certificate signed by the principal of the high 
school and by ihe superintendent of the school system from 
which they graduated, attesting to the applicant's eligibil­
ity and "good moral character." Act 249 amended the teacher 
tenure laws of the state, making it possible to remove 
public school teachers found guilty after a hearing:^
of being a member of or contributing to any group, 
organization, movement or corporation that is pro­
hibited by law or injunction from operating in the
^Bush v. Orleans, 138 F.Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956).
26
Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 15, 
no. 249.
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State of Louisiana, or of advocating or in any 
manner performing any act toward bringing about 
the integration of the races within the public 
school system or any public institution of higher 
learning of the State of Louisiana.
If there was any doubt about the true intent of the 
legislators in passing these two acts, it was dispelled by 
its proponents shortly after the adjournment of the session. 
State Senator Willie Rainach declared that Act 15 would be 
applied to both new and current students at public colleges 
and universities, while other proponents boldly stated that 
the two acts were intended to prevent the further enrollment 
of blacks in predominantly white institutions and to force 
out blacks already in attendance under federal court orders. 
However, State Attorney General Jack P. F. Gremillion said 
that certificates were only required of new students.^7 
The two acts apparently had their desired effect 
because the four desegregated state institutions of higher 
learning all reported reductions in black registration. At 
LSU, it fell from a high of three hundred two in the summer 
of 1955, to a low of sixty-two in the fall of 1956. Black 
registration at Southeastern fell from forty-nine to six­
teen, and similar reductions were reported at McNeese and 
SLI in the fall of 1956. In addition to all black appli­
cants, hundreds of whites were also rejected at these
27Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, July 17, 1956; New 
Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 2FJ T956; State of Louisiana, 
Report and Opinions of the Attorney General of the State of 
Louisiana From May 18, 1956— March 1, 195B, 710.
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institutions because of their failure to submit the required 
certificates in the spring of 1957.^®
In the midst of the controversy over Acts 15 and 249, 
LSU President Troy Middleton submitted a list of questions 
and answers to the LSU Board of Supervisors regarding the 
treatment of blacks at the university, and they were subse­
quently adopted by the board as controlling regulations on 
September 1, 1956. Under the new guidelines, segregation 
was required at any function defined as social, but no 
segregation was imposed on truly educational activities. 
Blacks would be segregated at athletic and entertainment 
events, but could attend educational meetings with whites. 
They could be elected to honor societies but could not 
attend the organization's annual banquet or university-wide 
dances or use the swimming pools. On campus, blacks would 
not be segregated in dormitories or in classrooms and could 
use common restrooms, cafeterias, dining halls, utensils and 
drinking fountains. At commencement, black guests would be 
placed in segregated seating, but black graduates would be 
seated and awarded degrees together with whites.^9
In early 1957, the validity of Acts 15 and 249 was 
challenged in federal courts. Because black registration 
was placed in jeopardy by Act 15, federal judges issued
28New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 28, 1956, Feb. 8, 
1957; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Oct. 11, 1956.
29 New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 2, 1956.
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temporary restraining orders in January, ordering the regis­
tration of twelve blacks at McNeese, SLI and Southeastern. 
Three separate discrimination cases filed by plaintiffs 
presently attending LSU, Southeastern or SLI were consoli­
dated for judgment in Ludley v. Board of Supervisors. After 
an investigation, the court could find no incidence where a 
single principal or superintendent had signed a certificate 
as required under Act 15> which effectively barred all 
blacks from admission to any predominantly white college. 
Furthermore, Acts 15 and 249 had the effect of resegregating 
the state's colleges and universities by providing another 
legislative method for preserving segregation in education 
by de jure means. Thus, the court voided Act 15 because 
"the obvious intent of the legislature in passing the act 
was to discriminate against Negro citizens," and Act 249 . 
because it violated equal protection.30
The LSU Board of Supervisors and the State Board of 
Education appealed the decision on the grounds that they 
were agencies of the state, which had not only withdrawn its 
consent to be sued but had acquired immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court decision, then produced letters 
from black principals who had refused requests for their 
signatures on certificates because of fear of reprisals by
30Ludley v. Board of Supervisors, Bailey v. Louisiana 
State Board of Education, Lark v. Louisiana State Board of 
Education, 150 F.Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957).
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their white superiors. The court construed the offending 
legislation as attempts to grant arbitrary power to certain 
officials in order to deny students admission to public 
colleges without establishing objective standards which they 
could attempt to satisfy. In reference to the state consti­
tutional amendment withdrawing the consent of the state to 
suits against itself through its officials, the appellate 
court held that this did not prevent a federal court from 
determining that a suit against an official was not a suit 
against the state.31
Massive resistance efforts to maintain the state's dual 
system of colleges and universities were delivered a major 
blow with the settlement of the case of Fleming v. Board of
Supervisors in 1958. The suit arose out of the decision by
the LSU Board of Supervisors to deny blacks admission to its
new branch in New Orleans. The board responded in court
that previous injunctions and court orders had applied 
exclusively to the main campus in Baton Rouge. After only 
thirty minutes of deliberation, the federal district court 
ordered the board to admit blacks at its branch. The board 
then appealed for a stay of the order, hoping to lengthen 
the process of desegregation and to wear down the opposi­
tion. However, the appellate court denied its request 
within ten days from the date of filing of the appeal. Such
•ji
Ludley v. Board of Supervisors, 252 F.2d 372 (5th 
Cir. 1958).
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quick action was a major defeat for segregationists, who 
were not sufficiently prepared to defy the federal courts as 
swiftly and deftly. Thereafter, attempts to block desegre­
gation of public colleges were only face-saving maneuvers 
with little chance of s u c c e s s . 32
A historic event occurred in September of 1958, when 
the new Louisiana State University at New Orleans (LSUNO) 
registered more than fifty blacks, thus becoming the first 
state college to begin operation on a desegregated basis. 
Although the campus was plastered with Ku Klux Klan banners 
and racist grafitti a week later, few incidents marred its
initial semester.33
In 1958, LSU faced a State House of Representatives 
probe because of the actions of sixty-six of its professors 
who had signed a Louisiana Civil Liberties Union petition 
which expressed opposition to segregation bills to close the 
public schools. Among the leaders of the LSU protests was 
English Professor Waldo McNeir. LSU President Troy 
Middleton was summoned to a legislative hearing, where he 
avowed his support for segregation and declared his inten­
tion to follow "whatever the law is." His responses to 
questions posed by legislators assuaged their concern, and 
the matter was dropped temporarily. However, McNeir's use
^Read, Let Them Be Judged, 200; Fleming v. Board of 
Supervisors, 265 F*.2d 73b (5th Cir. 1959).
^Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 19, 1958.
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of LSU letterhead stationery in late I960, to send letters 
to two racist legislators protesting against interposition 
and declaring the actions of the legislature in two special 
sessions in I960 as "a disgrace and a national scandal" 
which "seriously damaged this country in the eyes of the 
world," resulted in another probe of the university for 
alleged subversive activities. Following another appearance 
before a legislative hearing, Middleton issued new rules for 
faculty conduct on matters of public controversy. Quoting 
from the manual of the American Association of University 
Professors, he declared that a teacher was not to use his 
position to discuss in class controversial topics that were 
not within his field of study, and stated that any member of 
the university who could not act in the best interest of LSU 
was "a handicap and a burden to the organization he serves." 
Two weeks later, McNeir resigned (effective June 1, 1961) 
because of "outside threats and outside pressures," although 
both he and Middleton denied that this was the actual cause 
for his leaving LSU after eleven years.34
In early 1959, the LSU Board of Supervisors again 
appealed the lower court's decision to allow blacks to 
enroll at LSUNO. Its new appeal was on the grounds that the 
board was a specific agency of the state, which could not be
New Orleans Times Picayune, June 11, 1958, Dec. 19, 
I960, Jan. 5, 1961.
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sued without its consent. In a more formal opinion, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the desegregation 
order and overruled the board's claim of exemption from an 
injunction prohibiting its attempts to segregate LSUNO. 
Additionally, the court held that an individual officer or 
corporate agency that acted on the behalf of the state, 
ceased to represent the state when it attempted to exercise 
power in violation of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . 35 Hence, the 
state's largest university had failed to dissuade the fed­
eral courts from desegregating its branch in New Orleans as 
well as its own graduate and professional schools. It would 
now be only a matter of time before the entire edifice of de 
jure segregation in the state's colleges and universities 
would crumble.
Desegregation of Higher Education, 1959-1965
By 1959, the back of massive resistance attempts to 
halt or delay desegregation in higher education in Louisiana 
had been broken. The attention of segregationists in the 
legislature was now focused on preventing the desegregation 
of public elementary and secondary schools in New Orleans. 
During the next six years, the remaining undergraduate 
departments of the sprawling LSU system and other state 
colleges were peacefully desegregated on a case-by-case
Fleming v. Board of Supervisors, 265 F.2d 736 (5th 
Cir. 1959).
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basis. There were no further legislative attempts at mas­
sive resistance, and neither did any Louisiana governor 
stand in a university doorway, nor did campus riots prevent 
the registration and admission of blacks to the state's 
colleges. The major weapon used by the state was its con­
tention that its institutions of higher learning were agen­
cies of the state and were thus protected by state immunity 
from suit without its consent.
The scenario for desegregation of a college typically 
followed the pattern of filing a discrimination suit, fol­
lowed by a hearing within a few days in federal court. At 
that time, attorneys for the State Board of Education would 
admit that the board was maintaining a policy of segregation 
and would justify its actions by hiding behind the Eleventh 
Amendment. The district court would promptly issue a deseg­
regation order, which would be followed by an immediate 
appeal for a stay order by the state attorney general. This 
request would then be denied quickly by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and desegregation would proceed.
Prior to I960, the campuses of Southeastern, the 
University of Southwestern Louisiana (formerly SLI) and 
McNeese had been desegregated, as had most of the LSU 
system, with the exception of the undergraduate division on 
its main campus in Baton Rouge. In the fall of 1962, there 
were 50 black graduate students at LSU's main campus (108 in 
the previous summer semester), over 250 undergraduate black 
students at LSUNO (an additional 217 graduate students in
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the summer semester) and no blacks at its Alexandria campus. 
Southeastern had 20 black undergraduates, McNeese had 
approximately 150, and USL had 247. There were no blacks 
enrolled at the other state colleges: Louisiana Tech,
Nicholls, Northeast and Northwestern.3®
In the fall of 1963, fifty-nine blacks were enrolled in 
LSU graduate and professional schools, but none in its 
undergraduate schools since the brief admission of A. P. 
Tureaud, Jr., in 1953. In November of 1963, a black appli­
cant for admission as an undergraduate student was denied. 
However, in May of 1964, LSU acknowledged that it would 
admit a black woman in pre-law during the summer semester 
under the 1953 court order to enroll blacks in arts and 
sciences. University officials took this opportunity to 
state that the school's policy on segregation remained the- 
same. Less than two weeks later, the NAACP filed a suit 
against LSU to force it to admit six blacks to other under­
graduate departments. In early June, LSU registration offi­
cials were ordered to admit seven blacks, but by the middle 
of the month, twenty black students were enrolled.37 Racial 
discrimination at the university did not end here, though.
LSU President John A. Hunter ordered the closing of the 
university swimming pool on June 15, 1964, reportedly to
og
Baton Rouge State Times, Oct. 3, 1962.
*^Ibid., Jan. 21, June 8, June 16, 1964; Anderson v. 
Board of Supervisors, 9 RRLR 603-04 (1964).
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repair damage caused by an Alaskan earthquake of the previ­
ous March. However, the campus newspaper alleged that the 
closure resulted from a black undergraduate's attempt to use 
the pool, which led to the circulation of a petition by 
students and faculty in protest of the pool closing. The 
denial of the use of the pool and the refusal of the LSU 
Union barbershop to give a haircut to another black student, 
despite earlier pronouncements by university officials that 
blacks would be accorded all rights and privileges of white 
students, were the two most significant incidents brought on 
by integration, which otherwise proceeded quietly.3®
The same scenario of litigation was followed in the 
desegregation of Nicholls, Northeast, Delgado, Northwestern 
and Louisiana Tech between 1963 and 1965. Nicholls was 
ordered to desegregate in the fall of 1963, complied, then 
filed an appeal which it lost in the following year. The 
same situation occurred with Northeast and Delgado in 1964, 
and Northwestern and Louisiana Tech in 1965.39 The deseg­
regation of Grambling brought an end to the last segregated 
state-operated college, when it was ordered to admit a
3®Baton Rouge State Times, June 26, 1964.
39Baker v. Louisiana State Department of Education,
339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); McCoy v. Louisiana State
Department of Education, 229 F.Supp. 735 (E.D. La. 1964);
Williams v. Board of Managers, 9 RRLR 1783 (1964); Burton v.
Louisiana State Department of Education, 10 RRLR 116 (1965);
Potts v. McKeithen, 10 RRLR 116 (1965); New Orleans Times
Picayune, Oct. 23, 1964; Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 3,# ------------
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white student in its summer session of 1965, despite a state 
law that forbade the enrollment of whites at black colleges 
(the same order had been given to the Southern University 
branch at New Orleans in 1964).4° Therefore, by 1965, both 
blacks and whites were free to attend any public institution 
of higher learning in Louisiana without fear of denial 
because of race or color under jure restrictions.
During the 1960's, another question arose in Louisiana 
concerning the right of a private college to racially 
discriminate in its admissions. Such a case arose over 
Tulane University, which claimed to be an entirely private 
university. In April 1961, the administrators of the Tulane 
Educational Fund declared that they would admit qualified 
black applicants "if it were legally permissible" to do so. 
However, Act 43 of the 1884 state legislature and Article 
12, Section 24 of the state constitution prevented it from 
desegregating, and university officials were concerned with 
the issue of restrictive covenants, since bequests by Paul 
Tulane and Sophie Newcomb were restricted to white students
only.41
^Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 3, 1965; Jamieson v. 
Louisiana State Department of Education, 10 RRLR 1004 
(1965); Welch v. State Board of Education, 9 RRLR 1737 
(1964).
^*Acts of Louisiana, 1884, Regular Session, no. 43; 
Constitution of 1921, Article 12, Section 24; Guillory v. 
Administrators of tulane University, 203 F.Supp. 855 (E.D. 
La. 1962); New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 14, 1961.
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When Barbara M. Guillory and Pearlie H. Elloie were 
denied admission to Tulane's graduate school on racial 
grounds in 1961, they brought suit in federal court.
Tulane's response was that it was not subject to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of its 
private character, that state laws prohibited the university 
from admitting blacks, and that past donations to Tulane had 
clauses restricting their use to whites only. In one of his 
last decisions as a federal district judge in New Orleans,
J. Skelly Wright ruled that Tulane was a public institution 
by virtue of the substantial support and management in its 
affairs that it had received from the state since its incep­
tion, and therefore, was subject to the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. He found the question of previous donations to the 
university to be moot, since the Supreme Court had already 
declared such restrictive covenants to be judicially unen­
forceable. In regard to state prohibitions on Tulane which 
mandated its operation on a segregated basis, judge Wright 
professed that Louisiana "can no more dictate discrimination 
in private institutions than it can segregate its own 
facilities." Thus, if Tulane officials desired, there was 
no legal impediment to the enrollment of black student s.^2
Less than two months later, a new federal judge ordered 
another trial because of unresolved issues concerning
/9
New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 2, 1961;
Guillory v. Administrators of tulane University, 207 F.Supp. 
554 (E.D. La. 1962).
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Tulane's status as a public school and the degree of 
involvement by the state in its operation. In a new trial, 
Tulane was declared a private institution and not subject to 
Fourteenth Amendment restrictions. However, racial restric­
tions on the use of state funds and private donations to the 
university were voided because they were restrictive cove­
nants, and thus judicially unenforceable. Since Tulane was 
private, Act 43 was unconstitutional to the extent that it 
restrained the university from desegregating, because "a 
state may not compel racial segregation in private affairs." 
Therefore, Tulane had no legal requirements by restrictive 
covenants or by state statute to retain segregation, and 
could validly admit black applicants if it desired.43*
A week later, in December of 1962, Tulane announced 
that it would begin accepting qualified black students in 
its spring semester. In January, eleven black graduate 
students (including Guillory and Elloie) enrolled without 
incident. In a campus newspaper interview in April, several 
of the students reported that they were treated fairly, had 
found no distinction made because of their race in social or 
class activities, were allowed full access to university 
facilities available to other students, and had encountered 
no problems from either students or professors. When 
Newcomb College, the seventy-five year old exclusive women's
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 212 
F.Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
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adjunct to Tulane, admitted its first black student in the 
fall semester of 1963, the Tulane system became fully 
integrated.^4
Higher Education in Louisiana Since 1965
By 1965, de jure segregation in higher education in 
Louisiana had been brought to an end. However, the more 
difficult problem of de facto segregation had replaced it.
In the course of establishing a dual system of higher edu­
cation for blacks and whites in the state since 1880, the 
legislature sought to mute black protests at being excluded 
from white institutions by establishing black colleges in 
some of the same cities where white colleges existed. As a 
result of this policy, the LSU and Southern University 
systems rose side-by-side, with "sweetheart schools" being 
established for each race at state expense and usually 
located at opposite ends of the same city. It was the 
existence of these parallel schools which perplexed the 
NAACP and the federal government from the late 1960's, and 
has yet to be resolved.
LSU became established in Baton Rouge as a white 
institution in 1869, while Southern University arrived there 
in 1914, after a brief tenure in New Orleans. By 1948, each 
university had its own law school, though the one at LSU
^New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 13, 1962, Jan. 26, 
1963; Tulane University Hullabaloo, Apr. 5, 1963; Pittsburgh 
Courier, Oct. 5, 1963.
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antedated Southern's by over forty years. In 1956, the 
legislature authorized the construction of branches of both 
LSU and Southern in New Orleans. Another expansion was 
approved in 1964, when two branches of LSU were created at 
Eunice and Shreveport, and a branch of Southern at 
Shreveport-Bossier City. Therefore, with the rapid 
dismantling of the segregated de jure system in higher 
education, the state continued to fund and establish a dual 
system of predominantly white and black colleges, further 
entrenching a de facto system.
In 1965, J. D. DeBlieux, chairman of the Louisiana 
Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, reported that fifteen colleges and universities in 
the state had signed compliance agreements under the 
requirements established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. • 
These institutions agreed not to discriminate because of 
race, color or national origin in the admission or treatment 
of students in all academic programs as well as social, 
recreational and extracurricular activities. There would 
also be equal access by all students to dormitories, 
cafeterias and other facilities on c a m p u s . ^5
In the fall of 1967, there were 85,140 students 
enrolled in public colleges and universities in Louisiana.
Of this number, 68,907 (80.9 percent) were white and 16,233 
(19.1 percent) were black. However, 13,597 (83.8 percent)
/c
Baton Rouge State Times, May 21, 1965.
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of the total black enrollment were attending a predominantly 
black institution, and only 2636 (16.2 percent) a predomi­
nantly white institution. The percentage of blacks 
enrolled at formerly white universities ranged from 0.83 
percent at Southeastern to 9.00 percent at McNeese. No 
white students enrolled at Southern University at New 
Orleans (SUNO) and Shreveport-Bossier City (SUSBO), one at 
Grambling and only nine at Southern in Baton Rouge (table 
8). On the three Southern University campuses, only 9 
whites were enrolled out of 9453 students. On the six LSU 
campuses (including the Medical Center in New Orleans), only 
884 blacks were enrolled out of 28,429 students (table 9).^
The NAACP, the Justice Department, the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and the federal courts 
viewed the continued existence of the dual system in higher 
education in Louisiana with increasing interest. HEW was 
particularly concerned with "trouble spots" arising over 
separate branches of LSU and Southern at Baton Rouge, New 
Orleans and Shreveport, and with the existence of Grambling 
and Louisiana Tech within three miles of one another. 
Beginning in January of 1969, HEW suggested "a system-wide 
plan of cooperation between institutions involving consoli­
dation of degree offerings, faculty exchange, and general 
institutional sharing of resources." Since all of these
^ Southern Education Research Service, "School Desegre­
gation in the Southern and Border States (October 1967).
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Table 8

















Grambling 4,154 1 0.02 4,153 99.98
La. Tech 7,147 7,058 98.75 89 1.25
LSU 28,429 27,545 96.89 884 3.11
McNeese 4,542 4,133 91.00 409 9.00
Nicholls 3,727 3,611 96.89 116 3.11
Northeast 6,740 6,472 96.02 268 3.98
Northwestern 6,333 5,877 92.80 456 7.20
Southeastern 5,283 5,239 99.17 44 0.83
SUBR 7,338 9 0.12 7,329 99.98
SUNO 1,758 0 0.00 1,758 100.00
SUSBO 357 0 0.00 357 100.00
USL 9,332 8,962 96.04 370 3.96
Totals 85,140 68,907 80.93 16,233 19.07
Source: Southern Education Research Service (October 1967).
universities received federal funding, the continued opera­
tion of an alleged dual system of higher education by the 
state placed approximately $30,000,000 in federal funds in 
jeopardy.^
^New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 19, 1969.
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Table 9






Alexandria 25 New Orleans 450
Baton Rouge 350 Shreveport 12
Eunice 44 Medical Center-NO 3
Source; Southern Education Research Service (November 
1967).
Beginning in 1969, the Justice Department initiated 
efforts to secure voluntary cooperation with state and 
university officials in arriving at a satisfactory desegre­
gation plan. However, the state and LSU officials main­
tained that it was already in full compliance with federal 
guidelines, and William Arceneaux, director of the Louisiana 
Coordinating Council for Higher Education, responded that 
submitting a plan "would be an admission of guilt." In 
October, Governor John J. McKeithen informed HEW officials 
that he would not comply with federal demands for complete 
desegregation of Louisiana colleges, which had been deseg­
regated "since the Brown decision," and that further 
desegregation would have to be enforced by federal marshals 
because he would not force anyone to attend a college that
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was not his choice. Following a meeting between state and 
federal officials in November, the governor pledged full 
cooperation in efforts to encourage students to attend 
various state institutions of higher learning, and renewed 
his refusal to order any student to attend a college other 
than his own preference.
Although some progress was reported between Louisiana 
Tech and Grambling in the fall of 1969, HEW was not satis­
fied with the responses from state and university officials, 
and declared that Louisiana (and subsequently the states of 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Virginia) was operating 
a racially segregated system of higher education in viola­
tion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 
January 1970, LSU President John A. Hunter declared that HEW 
plans would result in the closure of Southern University in 
Baton Rouge, that LSU was in compliance with desegregation 
orders and that the only way to eliminate the racial iden­
tity of Southern was to eliminate Southern.^
During the next four years, only limited action was 
taken by any of the parties, primarily because of their 
common realization of the innumerable problems inherent in
48 United States v. State of Louisiana, 527 F.Supp. 509 
(E.D. La. 1981); Miami Herald, Oct.31, 1969; New Orleans 
Times Picayune, May 23, June 20, Nov. 16, 1969.
^United States v. State of Louisiana (1981); New 
Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 17, 1970.
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this enigma, which had no simple resolution. Colleges and 
universities were not cost-free, so such factors as student 
transportation, finances and personal preference had to be 
taken into consideration. Since the state no longer had 
laws requiring the segregated operation of any of its insti­
tutions of higher learning, it was difficult to arrive at a 
prompt solution as was often available in the dismantling of 
dual systems in public elementary and secondary education. 
Another vexing problem that needed to be addressed was the 
division of opinion among blacks themselves concerning 
federal pressure to dismantle the dual system in higher 
education. With the disestablishment of public schools in 
Louisiana during the late 1960's and early 1970's, black 
pride and heritage had taken a beating as former black 
schools were either closed or absorbed into the previously 
all-white system. Blacks were proud of the strides made by 
Grambling and Southern over the past century and were 
opposed to seeing them absorbed into the predominantly white 
LSU system or into Louisiana Tech.
Although no real progress had been made to dismantle 
the dual higher education systems in Louisiana by 1974, 
blacks did achieve a few gains in the limited attempts by 
university officials to assuage federal concern. In the 
fall of 1969, Louisiana Tech and Grambling began conducting 
joint programs and allowing students from each university to 
take courses on either campus, while pursuing a degree pro­
gram at one of the institutions. It was also agreed upon to
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conduct faculty exchanges between the two campuses and to 
merge the agricultural programs of the two universities. 
After July 1972, agricultural majors of both universities 
would graduate from Louisiana Tech.50
In 1970, LSU and Southern University (SU) in Baton 
Rouge began a cross-registration program, which by 1974, 
permitted any student at either university to take a course 
each semester at the other campus without charge. In 1974, 
one hundred twenty-four LSU and SU students were involved in 
this and other "special cooperative student exchange pro­
grams" in education, ROTC, engineering and graduate school. 
Besides employing blacks in faculty positions at LSU, a 
faculty exchange program was conducted between the two 
universities. Between 1967 and 1969, fifty-nine LSU faculty 
members and ten from SU participated in the program. By . 
1974, faculty exchanges and cooperative programs had been 
instituted in many of the departments of both institutions. 
LSU and SU also began sharing facilities, such as the LSU 
library and gym-auditorium.51
Because not enough action had been undertaken to bring 
about a resolution of the dual system in higher education, 
the Justice Department brought suit against the State of 
Louisiana and university officials in 1974. Grounds for the
50New Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 30, 1969.
51Louisiana State University, Report on Compliance with 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Nov. 6, l9B6.
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suit included the defendants' establishment, maintenance and 
perpetuation of "an unlawful dual system of higher education 
based on race;" failure to comply with Title VI and HEW 
guidelines concerning the nondiscriminatory expenditure of 
federal funds; and failure to voluntarily submit a constitu­
tionally acceptable plan to disestablish the dual system of
universities.52
As if to exacerbate the existing problems, a new state 
constitution was approved by the voters in 1974, and took 
effect in 1975. Under the new plan of government, voters 
rejected a proposed plan to create a single governing body 
over all institutions of higher learning, choosing instead 
to create four boards to oversee the operation of higher 
education in the state. The Board of Trustees for State 
Colleges and Universities was given jurisdiction over 
Delgado, Louisiana Tech, USL, Southeastern, Nicholls, 
Northwestern, Northeast, Grambling and McNeese. The 
Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors would govern 
the main campus in Baton Rouge; branches in Alexandria, 
Eunice, New Orleans and Shreveport; the Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center on the Baton Rouge campus; and the Center for 
Agricultural Sciences and Rural Development in Baton Rouge. 
The Southern University Board of Supervisors would have 
jurisdiction over its main campus north of Baton Rouge and 
branches in New Orleans and Shreveport-Bossier City.
52
United States v. State of Louisiana (1981).
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Finally, the Board of Regents was set up as a super board, 
serving as a statewide planning and policy-making agency to 
help coordinate the activities of the other three boards. 
Unfortunately, the actual power lay within the three sepa­
rate boards, while the Board of Regents would serve merely 
in an advisory capacity.53
During the next six years after the Justice Department 
suit was filed in 1974, little was accomplished to resolve 
the problems that resulted in the suit. Beginning in 1980, 
a series of intensive meetings was held, which resulted in 
the formation of a compromise that became known as the 
Consent Decree of 1981. A three-judge court approved it in 
the belief that it was a sound, reasonable and systemwide 
desegregation plan that offered realistic hopes for the 
creation of a unitary system of higher education and held 
out the promise of enhancing predominantly black universi­
ties in the interim.54 The decree was scheduled to end on 
December 31, 1987, but continued until the middle of 1988.
At that time, the federal government scrapped the decree, 
declaring it to be a failure, because the system of predom­
inantly white and black universities was no nearer to con­
solidation in 1988, than it had been in 1981.
In 1988, the composition of Louisiana's public univer­
sities was little different from that of 1974. However, it
^The Master Plan for Higher Education, 7; Constitution 
of 1974.
■^United States v. State of Louisiana (1981).
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was a vast change from 1954, when only two meagerly funded 
and equipped black colleges served the needs of the state's 
black population, while whites had access to a system of 
colleges and universities spread across the state. Begin­
ning in 1880, provisions for the higher education of blacks 
had slowly advanced and survived for a century despite innu­
merable burdens and hardships, while being considerably 
outdistanced by white institutions.
Desegregation was imposed by federal courts on white 
institutions of higher learning, beginning with the LSU Law 
School in 1950, then spreading to smaller state colleges 
after 1954. As the courts became increasingly involved in 
the dismantling of the dual system of public elementary and 
secondary school systems in the early 1960's, scant atten­
tion was focused on the state's colleges and universities.
By 1965, qualified black and white Louisiana citizens were 
able to attend any public institution of higher learning 
within the state, without fear of denial because of race or 
color. In contrast to the situation in several nearby 
Southern states, desegregation of the state's colleges had 
proceeded rather smoothly, the major challenge being 
litigation.
After 1965, de jure segregation ceased to be a problem, 
but its residual effects continued to operate on a de facto 
basis. The operation of separate LSU and SU systems within 
the state since 1880, had resulted in the establishment of 
predominantly white LSU and black SU branches in Baton
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Rouge, New Orleans and Shreveport-Bossier City. De jure 
segregation had also resulted in the creation of predomi­
nantly white Louisiana Tech and black Grambling only three 
miles apart in North Louisiana. The continuation of these 
separate, virtually one-race, universities in close proxim­
ity but without laws mandating attendance of one or the 
other, became the major concern of the NAACP and the federal 
government after the termination of de jure segregation in 
1965.
Today, one of the major problems facing higher educa­
tion in Louisiana is determining how to consolidate the dual 
system without unintentionally discriminating against minor­
ities or violating the right of Louisiana citizens to attend 
the university of their choice. This enigma continues to 
perplex state and university officials, black groups and the 
federal courts as they seek an equitable resolution to this 
winless situation.
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Chapter V
DESEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1954-1962
Introduction
Prior to 1954, conditions for black children in public 
education were deplorable, both in the South as well as in 
many Northern cities with large black populations. Although 
the two decisions rendered in Brown v. Board of Education in 
1954 and 1955 had declared de jure segregation in public 
schools unconstitutional, and had ordered the dismantling of 
all dual school systems for blacks and whites, the actual 
process of disestablishing the system was painfully slow. 
This was because the decision when and how to desegregate 
each individual Southern school district was left up to the 
local federal district courts, which had to deal with 
widely differing circumstances and patterns of resistance.
No other issue had the emotional impact on citizens of 
Louisiana that public school integration did. Although 
still behaving in a rational manner in 1954, Louisiana 
officials immediately invoked the powers of the state to 
conduct a campaign of "massive resistance" to federal orders 
to desegregate the state's public schools, and periodically 
added laws later to reinforce an already weighty defense of 
segregation. The segregationist atmosphere that dominated
172
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the state legislature peaked with a crisis over the deseg­
regation of public schools in New Orleans in the fall of 
I960. However, the defeat of the segregationist forces in 
that battle did not dissuade them from continuing their 
efforts to resist integration. If integration could not be 
prevented, then it might be delayed or circumvented.
By the end of 1962, the public schools of Orleans 
Parish were under court orders to increase integration, and 
desegregation orders were pending against the parishes of 
St. Helena and East Baton Rouge. In addition, the Roman 
Catholic schools of the Archdiocese of New Orleans were open 
to all qualified black applicants and had enrolled several 
black students in the fall of 1962. However, public schools 
outside of New Orleans and parochial schools outside of the 
archdiocese, still rigorously maintained segregation.
Pre-1954 Federal Court Decisions and State Actions
Beginning with the case of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, 
the federal courts gave legal sanction to the principle of 
"separate but equal." Previously, the executive and legis­
lative branches of the federal government had relinquished 
their obligations to protect the equal rights of all 
American citizens, and would not re-assume those responsi­
bilities for another half century. Following the lead of 
the Supreme Court, the courts took a conservative approach 
toward segregation and allowed the doctrine of "separate but 
equal" to flourish across the nation. Thus, the South was
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permitted to erect a bulwark of segregation laws based on 
Plessy.
Although Plessy established court approval of segrega­
tion in the area of transportation, it became the legal 
basis for a discriminatory policy that culminated in the 
creation of a dual system of education in Louisiana. By 
then, the leaders of the state realized that the federal 
government would not come to the aid of blacks, and tragi­
cally, "separation" came to mean "exclusion."
Within the next thirty years, the Supreme Court 
extended constitutional protection of segregation to the 
dual school systems of the South. In 1899, it affirmed 
"separate but equal" in public schools when it upheld the 
closure of a black high school in Georgia, allegedly for 
economic necessity. Remarkably, the court decided that the 
board's actions were not based on race and that no one’s 
rights had been violated by the closure.*
In the next decade, the Supreme Court entered the field 
of private education, when it upheld a Kentucky statute that 
prohibited private schools from admitting blacks and whites 
to the same institution.^ The last overt decision by the 
court in upholding segregation in education came in 1927, 
when it affirmed the decision by a Mississippi county to 
exclude a Chinese girl from attending the county's only high
^Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
^Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
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school on the grounds that she was not "Caucasian."3 
Unfortunately, the high court failed to address the central 
question of equality presented by this case. How "equal" 
was a situation in which a high school existed in a school 
district for whites, but none existed for non-whites?
The situation for blacks residing in Louisiana was 
similar to that of other Southern states. In many areas of 
the state, dilapidated one-room schoolhouses or abandoned 
buildings served as the only school for blacks to attend 
within a parish, if a black school existed at all. Black 
students received little, if any, supplies or funds from 
parish and state coffers, while black teachers were often 
paid less and had a much higher pupil-teacher ratio than 
their white counterparts. Black education was frequently 
only an after-thought, receiving meager funding from the 
inadequate appropriations with which the white school system 
was willing to part.
The first mention of the state's public school system 
was in the Constitution of 1845, with the simple sentence 
that "(T)he Legislature shall establish free public schools 
throughout the State," and would support them by taxation on 
property or by other means.4 The Constitution of 1852 
provided that free public schools were intended for free 
white children, while the Constitution of 1864 extended the
3Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1845, Article 134.
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provision for education to all children between the ages of 
six and eighteen residing in Louisiana, although it was 
popularly interpreted to mean the "white" children of the 
state. 5
A native white supremacist government dominated state 
government from 1865, until military reconstruction was 
imposed in 1867. State Superintendent of Schools Robert M. 
Lusher envisioned an excellent system of public education 
for white children as an assurance that white citizens would 
continue their intellectual and cultural dominance over 
Louisiana, while the education of blacks was left to the 
federal government under the Freedmen's Bureau. Lusher 
rejected as too radical the proposal of Governor J. Madison 
Wells to create black schools with black tax money, and 
opposed any education for blacks, much less the creation of 
a dual system of segregated schools.^
When a Radical-dominated convention met to draft a new 
constitution for the state in 1867» one of the major 
achievements for blacks was the adoption of Article 135, 
which provided for the establishment of at least one tax- 
supported public school in each parish for "(A)11 children 
of this State," between the ages of six and twenty-one. The 
article also stipulated that children would be admitted to
c
State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1852, Article 136; 
State of Louisiana, Constitution of 18b4, Article 141.
^Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in Louisiana, 28.
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all "institutions of learning sustained or established by 
the State . . . without distinction of race, color, or pre­
vious condition," and that there would be "no segregated 
schools or institutions of learning, established for any 
race by the State of Louisiana."7
In 1869, the state legislature created a public educa­
tion system without a compulsory attendance provision, but 
with stiff penalties for refusing to admit any child to 
state-supported schools. Louisiana historian Roger A. 
Fischer found that rural parishes either ignored, disobeyed 
or circumvented the law. In some North Louisiana areas, 
blacks and whites quietly agreed to establish a dual system 
of separate schools for each race, while segregated Catholic 
schools and private academies in the southern part of the 
state served as alternatives to mixed schools.®
Only in New Orleans was there a serious attempt to 
desegregate the public schools. The city's residents vainly 
set up a dual system of schools after 1867, in hopes of 
preventing desegregation. When integration came in 1871, 
white flight caused private and parochial schools to mush­
room across the city. Fischer points out that desegregation 
was effective only from 1871 to 1874, and that whites were 
tranquil and tolerant of the five hundred to a thousand
^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1868, Article 135.
g
Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in Louisiana, 90-91,
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blacks scattered among several thousand white students only 
because of their helplessness to prevent it at that time. 
Meanwhile, five thousand black students attended all-black 
city schools. Although white parents sent their children to 
integrated public schools, they never accepted the situa­
tion, and the desire to resort to violence and intimidation 
was always at hand. When racial violence broke out in New 
Orleans at the end of 1874, progress in the desegregation of 
city schools was halted, and whites awaited the opportunity 
to resegregate their schools.9
The return of Conservative Democrat leaders to power in 
Louisiana in 1877, resulted in the rapid dismantling of the 
desegregated school system in New Orleans. Lusher returned 
as superintendent of public schools, with the desire to 
relegate blacks to a position bordering on slavery. In the 
fall of 1877, the new school board in Orleans Parish quietly 
and in an orderly manner reassigned blacks to all-black 
schools, and the dual system became entrenched in the city. 
When appeals to Governor Francis T. Nichoils brought the 
response that he had not promised integration but "equal 
facilities," black activists resorted to litigation.10 Paul 
Trevigne and Arnold Bartonneau filed separate suits chal­
lenging violations of Article 135 of the state constitution 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
9Ibid., 114-20, 131-32.
10Ibid., 139, 120, 131-32.
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but were denied relief.^ Then, in 1878, the United States 
Supreme Court declared Louisiana's Civil Rights Act of 1869 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Finally, the state's new "Redeemer” 
government drafted a new state constitution in 1879, which 
removed all legal impediments to segregation by maintaining 
silence on the issue of equality between the races and by 
deleting all references to race or discrimination.
Although it did not provide for a dual system of educa­
tion based on race, the 1879 state constitution failed to 
provide safeguards for black education and thus prepared the 
way for discrimination and exclusion of blacks from the 
public schools. The first mention of separate schools for 
the races was made in the 1898 constitution, which declared 
that "(T)here shall be free public schools for the white and 
colored races, separately established" for all children 
between the ages of six and eighteen and supported by taxes. 
When the constitution was redrafted in 1913, it simply 
restated the 1898 provision regarding public education.13
The 1921 state constitution was the last to be in 
effect in Louisiana prior to the disestablishment of the 
dual educational system. Article 12, which dealt with the 
creation and operation of all public schools, provided that:
11Ibid., 140-41.
12Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
*^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1898, Article 
248; State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1913, Article 248.
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The educational system of the State shall consist 
of all free public schools, and all institutions 
of learning, supported in whole or in part by 
appropriation of publi c funds• S eparate free pub­
lic schools shall be maintained for the education 
of white and colored children between the ages of 
six and eighteen years . . .
The article also provided for the creation of a State Board 
of Education to oversee the public school system, and stipu­
lated that the board "shall not control the business affairs 
of the parish school boards, nor the selection or removal of 
their officers and directors." Provision was made for the 
creation and election of parish school boards as well as for 
separate municipal boards already in existence. By the 
1950’s, there were sixty-four parish school boards and three 
municipal ones operating in Monroe, Bogalusa and Lake 
Charles. Article 12 further declared that no public funds 
could be used to support any private or sectarian school.
As desegregation of public schools approached, though, con­
stitutional restrictions such as this one were overcome in 
the quest for an alternative to court-ordered integration of 
the public schools.
Federal Court Policy to 1955
Beginning with the case of Gaines v. Canada in 1938, 
the United States Supreme Court began an exceedingly slow 
reassessment of "separate but equal" as applied to educa­
tion, culminating in 1955 with the order to desegregate
^Constitution of 1921, Article 12.
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schools "with all deliberate speed." If the Southern states 
wished to separate blacks in professional and graduate 
schools, the court said, then the state had to provide 
blacks with equal facilities to match those provided for 
whites. However willing they may have been to comply, the 
Southern states were unable to provide a completely equal 
system for blacks, while the Supreme Court would not be 
entirely satisfied with separate facilities even if they 
were equal.
In 1951, a three-judge federal district court held the 
Clarendon County, South Carolina, school system accountable 
to the Supreme Court test that was applied to higher educa­
tion. The school district was to immediately improve physi­
cal facilities for blacks if it continued to maintain its 
dual education system. However, the judges would not over­
turn the Plessy decision. On appeal by the NAACP, the 
Supreme Court consolidated this case with several other 
pending school desegregation cases under Brown v. Board of 
Education in 1954.
On May 17. 1954. the United States Supreme Court 
announced in its first Brown decision by a unanimous vote 
that de jure segregation in the public schools was 
unconstitutional. It was no longer a matter of making dual 
systems truly equal, because the entire system was declared
1SBriggs v. Elliot, 98 F.Supp. 529 (E.D. S.C. 1951).
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patently unfair and unconstitutional. Instead of establish­
ing a timetable for the actual dismantling of the dual 
school systems, time was given to interested states and 
other parties to send representatives to enlighten the court 
on the amount of time sufficient to complete the transition 
to a completely unitary system.^
Prior to this time, there was little doubt or uncer­
tainty in the minds of most white Louisianians about the 
legal and ethical considerations of segregating whites and 
blacks into two separate school systems. This point had 
never before been seriously challenged within the state, and 
it had been taken for granted that the majority of whites 
across the United States felt the same about segregation as 
Louisianians always had. Therefore, the Brown decision 
startled the state's leaders, who quickly attributed it to 
the influence of a communist conspiracy to undermine the 
values and foundations of the nation.
The major impact of Brown was its destruction of the 
moderate course on race that had been followed in Louisiana 
for nearly three decades, and allowance of the rise of a 
small cadre of segregationist reactionaries to wrest control 
of the state's moral conscience. The decision reinjected 
race as an issue into state politics, shattering the compla­
cency of many Louisianians and compelling them to take a 
position on racial segregation. For a time, anyone who
*^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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attempted to remain neutral on the race issue was branded as 
being "soft" on the American way of life, and his motives 
became suspect. In fact, many Louisianians felt the need to 
go out of their way in order to prove their racism and to 
allay charges that they were "closet communists" or "inte- 
grationists," which were the same thing in the minds of many 
white citizens. Brown was an emotional tug-of-war for 
whites, but brought more uncertainty for blacks. It was a 
rare black Louisiana citizen who risked economic reprisal, 
as well as the real threat of physical danger to himself and 
his family, in order to exert his new-found rights.
Following a year of taking testimony and wrestling with 
the problem of setting a feasible timetable for desegrega­
tion, the Supreme Court decided that' flexibility was the key 
to making its decision work. In its second Brown decision 
in 1955, the court decided that desegregation would proceed 
"with all deliberate speed," thus allowing lower federal 
courts discretion as local conditions warranted, and grant­
ing the public time to become adjusted to the idea of inte­
gration. The high court hoped that its decision would be 
carried out steadily and gradually with a minimum of protest 
or violence.However, the court did not foresee the 
campaign of massive resistance soon to be erected by the 
Southern states to delay the inevitable and to wear down 
those in opposition to segregation. Fifteen years after the
*^Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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first Brown decision, the dual systems in the states of the 
Deep South were basically intact through the employment of 
various legal maneuvers to hinder desegregation.
State Action to Prevent Desegregation, 1954-1959
A political effect of the first Brown decision in 1954, 
was the predominance in Louisiana of the state legislature 
in the struggle to safeguard the security of segregation.
In contrast to later situations in Arkansas, Mississippi and 
Alabama, the battle to preserve the system of segregated 
schools in Louisiana was led by legislators, while governors 
played a minor role. With a small group of legislative 
segregationists seizing the initiative and guiding the state 
with or without the assistance of the state's chief execu­
tive, a role reversal took place in twentieth century 
Louisiana, which heretofore had a reputation for having 
virtual despots for governors and rubber stamp legislatures.
The state legislature was in session in 1954, when the
Brown decision was announced, and action was taken almost
immediately as a typical show of Southern defiance. Gaining 
power gradually between 1954 and 1959, segregationist repre­
sentatives primarily from North Louisiana dominated the 
state's official response to court orders to desegregate the 
state's public schools. The most determined and vocal of 
the legislative racists were John Garrett in the State House 
of Representatives and Willie Rainach in the State Senate.
Together, they were an almost unbeatable team and succeeded
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in obtaining most of the segregationist legislation they 
sought.
Louisiana's governor was the only source of opposition 
that might have tempered the meteoric rise of the segrega­
tionist legislators and the vitriolic atmosphere of racism 
that they created in the late 1950's. Unfortunately, 
Governor Robert Kennon took no action to prevent their 
ascendancy, and his successor in 1956, Earl K. Long, tried 
to straddle the issues and appear to be all things to all 
people. Long's inaction for three years allowed a ground- 
swell of support to rally to the segregationist cause, and 
helped propel the state toward a confrontation with federal 
authorities. The legislative segregationists browbeat the 
moderates into silence in the late 1950's, planned strategy 
for massive resistance to delay integration, and incited * 
white public opinion in behalf of defiance that erupted into 
violence during the desegregation crisis in New Orleans in 
the fall of I960. As it turned out, the principal antagon­
ists in the battle to retain segregated schools were the 
legislature and the federal district court in New Orleans.
By the time that Governor Long tried, in 1959, to halt the 
movement toward an explosive climax, he was powerless to act 
effectively.
Within three days of the announcement of Brown in May 
of 1954, the state legislature adopted Resolution No. 22,
18McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 24.
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which began Louisiana's official resistance to desegrega­
tion. In it, the legislature declared its belief in the 
compact theory of the nature of the Constitution of the 
United States, in the strict constructionist theory, and in 
the state sovereignty theory, although each of these theo­
ries had been discarded previously by the federal executive 
and judicial branches. The segregationists were intent on 
defying the federal government, and since the moderates felt 
that such action was relatively harmless, they allowed their 
opponents to win a victory by either voting for the measure 
or abstaining.
Of a more serious nature was the decision of the legis­
lature to create a joint legislative committee on segrega­
tion, that was designed to study the means by which the 
state could circumvent the Brown decision, and to carry on 
and conduct "the fight to maintain segregation of the races 
in the state." Selected to chair the new committee was 
Senator Rainach, who already served as the leader of the 
White Citizens' Councils. Under Rainach, the group sowed 
the seeds of massive resistance and served as the state's 
official body for advocating a policy of delay, evasion and 
defiance. Next, the legislature adopted a stand of interpo­
sition, whereby the state would use its police powers and
IQ Ibid., 29; Acts of Louisiana, 1954, Regular Session, 
Resolution Mo. 22.
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Eleventh Amendment protection of immunity from prosecution
against its consent to deter desegregation.20
Three laws were enacted to strengthen segregation by
erecting a legal framework of resistance. Article 12 of the
state constitution was amended by Act 752 (approved by
voters later in the year) to read:
All public elementary and secondary schools in the 
State of Louisiana shall be operated separately for 
white and colored children. This provision is made 
in the exercise of the state police power to pro­
mote and protect public health, morals, better edu­
cation and the peace and good order in the State, 
and not because of race. The Legislature shall 
enact laws to enforce the state police power in 
this regard.
Act 555 prohibited the State Board of Education from approv­
ing any public school that violated Act 752, prohibited 
state colleges and universities from recognizing diplomas 
issued by such schools, and forbade the allocation to these 
schools of state funds, free textbooks and other school 
supplies. Lastly, Act 556 extended the powers of local 
school boards to enable them to impede racial desegregation 
of their school systems.21
In the fiscal session of the state legislature meeting 
in 1955, Senator Rainach embarked on a course to persuade 
the federal courts in Louisiana to back away from desegrega­
tion if there appeared to be no "substantial difference"
20Acts of Louisiana, 1954, Regular Session, Resolution 
No. 27; McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 31.
21Acts of Louisiana, 1954, Regular Session, no. 752, 
no. 555, no. 55b.
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between white and black public schools. His "School 
Equalization Bill" proposed to equalize school facilities 
for whites and blacks at a cost of $33.5 million, but failed 
because of executive and legislative opposition. Governor 
Kennon wanted a dollar matching program because the proposal 
was too expensive, and he preferred to spend the funds on 
highway construction. Meanwhile, many legislators felt that 
the Supreme Court would soon outlaw segregation anyway, so 
it would be a waste of money.22
When the Supreme Court established the dictum of "with 
all deliberate speed" in 1955, Louisiana leaders breathed a 
sigh of relief. In essence, it meant that desegregation 
would be left to the local federal district courts, which 
would have wide latitude to fashion orders to the specific 
needs and circumstances of individual school districts.
]ohn Garrett declared that it was a mild ruling, and that 
the court had admitted its "mistake" in the first Brown 
decision by returning control to the local level; while 
Alexander P. Tureaud, Sr., representing the NAACP in its 
struggle to desegregate Orleans and St. Helena Parish public 
schools, observed that the decision would place the burden 
for desegregation on the parents of black students. Per­
haps, Willie Rainach stated it best when he said that it was 
a "milder decree than we expected" and "gives us room to
22New Orleans Times Picayune, May 20, 1955.
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continue our fight."23 Thus, the segregationists found the 
means for deterring desegregation indefinitely through pro­
tracted litigation.
Prior to the meeting of the next regular session of the 
state legislature, a significant event occurred in February 
of 1956. In Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, Federal 
Judge J. Skelly Wright declared segregation in the Orleans 
Parish school system unconstitutional and ordered the board 
to begin desegregation "with all deliberate speed." In 
addition, he voided Acts 555, 556 and 752 of the 1954 
legislature.24
In May, Governor Long opened the regular session of the 
1956 legislature with a message calling for "reasonableness 
and caution" on race relations, but sought to conciliate the 
segregationists at the same time.25 For the next three 
years, he steered a neutral course between racist hysteria 
on one side and the feeble voice of moderation on the other, 
but would not exert forceful leadership on the race issue.
In this vacuum, Senator Rainach and his colleagues thrived.
By a unanimous vote, the legislature quickly adopted a 
concurrent resolution interposing the sovereignty of the 
State of Louisiana "against encroachment upon the police 
powers reserved to" the state by the United States
23Ibid., June 1, 1955.
2^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board (1956).
otz
New Orleans Times Picayune, May 13, May 18, 1956.
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Constitution. This measure expressed the intent of the 
legislature to use its powers to use force, if necessary, to 
interpose the authority of the state to maintain segregated 
public schools, parks and recreational activities despite 
federal court decisions rendered in Bush v. Orleans and in 
other such cases infringing upon the rights of the states.^ 
Thus, lawmakers had begun the long trek toward defiance that 
would peak during the crisis over the desegregation of New 
Orleans schools in I960.
With minor opposition, the 1956 legislature enacted a 
series of education laws to insure the preservation of the 
de jure system of segregation in public schools. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, several laws were passed 
that affected higher education and teacher tenure. Any 
employee of a school board— teachers, school bus operators 
or other non-teaching personnel— could be dismissed for 
"advocating or in any manner performing any act toward 
bringing about integration of the races within the public 
school system or any public institution of higher learning 
of the state." Other laws were passed which transferred to 
the legislature the authority of local school boards to 
classify schools on a racial basis, and suspended the 
operation of the state compulsory school attendance law in 
any area where integration was required. Finally, a state
26Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, House 
Concurrent Resolution No. HT
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constitutional amendment was proposed which withdrew the 
consent of the state to suits against certain agencies of 
the state, including the State Board of Education and all 
sixty-seven local school systems within the state.27
During the next two years, no action was taken on the 
desegregation of any schools within Louisiana, but leaders 
continued to pontificate on possible solutions to Brown and 
to line up behind measures proposed by the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Segregation. In 1957, Eighth District 
Congressman George S. Long suggested that the public school 
system be abolished and immediately replaced by a private 
school system. Then, all taxes dedicated to the support of 
public education could be repealed. Governor Earl K. Long 
later declared his belief that desegregation would not 
improve life for blacks, who he felt were not in favor of- 
integration.28 gy 1958, though, the racists were in firm 
control of the state legislature, and it was no longer pos­
sible to take a moderate stand on segregation.
In 1958, the state legislature enacted several measures 
to strengthen the state's position in the event that federal 
courts set a date for the desegregation of Orleans Parish 
schools. Among the laws enacted were a new pupil assignment 
law, a comprehensive school closure law, and a tuition grant 
program. The school closure law authorized the governor to
^ Ibid., no. 249, no. 319, no. 438, no. 613.
28New Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 2, Dec. 1, 1957.
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close any school under orders to desegregate, as well as any 
black schools still in operation once nearby white schools 
had been closed because of desegregation mandates. In order 
to hinder possible integration, the legislature redesigned 
the procedure for student requests for transfers and assign­
ments, allowed parents to withdraw their children from the 
public schools, and declared that no child could be com­
pelled to attend an integrated school against the wishes of 
his parents. In the event that public schools were closed
or that whites fled schools ordered to desegregate, the
procedure was established for the formation of "educa­
tional cooperatives" as alternatives to integrated schools. 
The legislature authorized the payment of tuition grants to 
students attending private schools in school districts where 
no segregated public schools were available. In addition, 
school boards were authorized to transform the public school 
system into a private system by permitting them to:^9
. . . sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of, at 
public or private sale . . . any real or personal 
property used in connection with the operation of 
any school . . . which has been indefinitely 
closed by order of the Governor . . .  to any 
private agency, group of persons, corporation, or
cooperative bona fide engaged in the operation of
a private non-sectarian school . . .
In 1959, fears of desegregation once again swept over
the state. A political showdown occurred during the fiscal
29Acts of Louisiana, 1958, Regular Session, no. 256, 
no. 257, no. 258, no. 259.
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session of that year between Senator Rainach and Governor 
Long in the state legislature. The result was a crushing 
legislative and physical defeat for the governor, whose 
power and health had eroded to the point of ineffectiveness. 
As the gubernatorial election of 1959-60 approached, many 
legislators and state leaders feared that Rainach's popular­
ity among voters might elevate him to the governorship, and 
that he would vent his wrath on his opposition. Of major 
concern to the state's voters was the federal court order to 
the Orleans Parish School Board in the summer of 1959, to 
prepare a desegregation plan by March 1, I960 (later changed 
to May 16).30 With a date finally set, desegregation was no 
longer a theoretical issue but a real threat to the state's 
dual education system. This peril was thrust into the 
gubernatorial campaign and resulted in the election of 
Jimmie Davis, who received the support of racial extremists 
and a bloc of the North Louisiana vote.
The Desegregation Crisis in Orleans Parish, 1960-1961
From I960 to 1961, the nation witnessed a massive 
effort by Louisiana legislative and administrative officials 
to prevent the desegregation of Orleans Parish public 
schools. Beginning with the passage of pro-segregation 
measures in the regular session of I960, the legislature 
presented the federal courts with the prospect of closing
3°Bush v. Orleans, L, RRLR 582 (1959).
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the public schools rather than surrendering to integration.
A battle ensued between state legislators backed by Governor 
Jimmie Davis on one side, and the federal courts on the 
other, with Judge J. Skelly Wright playing the key role in 
voiding all attempts by the state to delay desegregation any 
further. Six successive special sessions of the legislature 
met to deal with the desegregation crisis in New Orleans in 
the space of five months, during which time approximately 
one hundred acts and resolutions were adopted to circumvent, 
prevent, delay or curtail integration. By the end of I960, 
the fury of the extremists was spent and the federal courts 
had triumphed, although the state legislature continued to 
vocally resist desegregation in Orleans Parish in early 
1961.
In May of I960, the state's new governor assumed office 
with a mandate to do everything within his power to prevent 
any crack in the facade of de jure segregation. Although 
Willie Rainach was no longer in the State Senate (because of 
his unsuccessful run for governor in 1959), the power and 
influence of the segregationists had not diminished, and 
their bellicose attitude placed the state perilously near 
the brink of a serious confrontation with federal authority. 
When the Orleans Parish School Board failed to submit a 
desegregation plan by the May 16 deadline, the federal court 
established its own, ordering integration to begin in 
September, then enjoined the school boards in St. Helena and 
East Baton Rouge Parishes from continuing to require the
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segregated operation of their school systems.31 jt was in 
this crisis atmosphere that the I960 regular session of the 
legislature met.
On the day that Judge Wright issued his desegregation 
plan for Orleans Parish, Governor Davis addressed the legis­
lature, repeating his inaugural pledge to "maintain segrega­
tion without compromise, without prejudice, without vio­
lence," and pledged to recommend a number of bills to ful­
fill his pledge. During the regular session of the legisla­
ture, most of the laws enacted simply reaffirmed or extended 
previous legislation, some of which had been invalidated by 
the federal courts. A new school closing bill authorized 
the governor to close all public schools when any of them 
was threatened with integration. Because of the federal 
court decision in April to desegregate several state trade 
schools, three acts were passed, applying the same regula­
tions to trade, industrial and special schools that had been 
applied to the public schools, while another law prohibited 
the allocation of supplies to integrated public, trade and 
special schools.32
Once the state legislature had adjourned, it was up to 
the governor to continue to resist or to submit to federal
^Bush v. Orleans, 5 RRLR 379 (I960); Hall v. St. 
Helena, 5 RRLR 654 (I960); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board, 5 RRLR 653 (I960).
32 Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 542, 
no. 495, no. 575, no. no. 58^7 no. 496, no. 492, no.
581.
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desegregation orders. On August 18, acting under legisla­
tive authority and a state court order of July 29, Governor 
Davis announced that he was assuming control of New Orleans 
public schools. Five days later, the governor announced 
that the public schools in Orleans Parish would open in 
September on a segregated basis through his efforts and that 
of the attorney general. However, on August 29, Judge 
Wright enjoined the state from acting under the July 29 
state court order and voided several state acts as uncon­
stitutional. Among the acts set aside were those prohibit­
ing supplies and funds to integrated schools, placing of the 
school board under the protection of the Eleventh Amendment, 
and three acts permitting the closure of public schools by 
the governor. Two days later, Judge Wright ordered a delay 
in desegregation from September to November 14, because of 
the Orleans Parish School Board's assurances of good faith 
and additional time needed in order to comply with the court 
order.33
Between June and November of I960, various groups rose 
in support of keeping the Orleans Parish public schools 
open. The Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and Episcopal 
churches stood in the forefront of opposition to closures, 
citing the immorality of segregation and the bad effect
33State of Louisiana v. Orleans Parish School Board, 5 
RRLR 656 (I960); New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 26, I960; 
Bush v. Orleans, Williams v. bavis, 187 F.Supp. 42 (E.D. La.
I960).
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closure would have on the children, the community and 
business. Also in opposition to closure were a group of 
Tulane professors, a group of white high school students, 
and small groups of white parents, such as "Save Our 
Schools, Inc." ( S O S ) . 3 4
After Attorney General Gremillion announced on 
September 1, that his office had exhausted all legal means 
to prevent desegregation in Orleans Parish, the governor 
announced that he would present a program to combat integra­
tion. Although, no action was taken for the next two 
months, a nearly endless string of special sessions began to 
meet from November until the following spring.
During the first special session (November 4-15), the 
strategy of the legislature was to "legislate and litigate." 
By enacting and re-enacting segregation laws, it hoped to 
postpone desegregation indefinitely. Once a case had been 
decided against the state, the laws would be rephrased and 
re-enacted, stalling desegregation until the next court 
battle. Most of the twenty-nine bills presented by the 
Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation, chaired by John 
Garrett, dealt with preventing desegregation of New Orleans 
schools and re-enacting laws already voided by the federal 
courts. The main opposition came from the New Orleans 
delegation itself: Representatives Maurice Landrieu and
Salvador Anzelmo, and Senator Robert Ainsworth. However,
New Orleans, Times Picayune, June 23, I960.
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their efforts were unsuccessful in preventing overwhelming 
passage of the segregationist package.
To prevent the immediate desegregation of Orleans 
Parish, the legislature removed "certain powers, duties, and 
functions of all parish school boards in parishes of over 
300,000 population," transferred its powers to the legisla­
ture, and made its employees subject to the exclusive con­
trol of the legislature under Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Then, the lawmaking body created a special Board of Trustees 
to take custody of all funds accruing to a defunct school 
board (which the Orleans Parish School Board had been desig­
nated), and established grounds on which it could remove any 
board member who failed to carry out the wishes of the state 
or of the State Board of E d u c a t i o n . 35
On November 8, I960, Governor Davis approved all 
twenty-nine pieces of legislation that emerged from the 
first special session. Two days later, Judge Wright 
enjoined the enforcement of seventeen of the acts. Not to 
be outdone, State Superintendent of Public Schools Shelby 
Jackson (a supporter of the movement to abolish the public 
school system) announced a state public school holiday for 
November 14, the scheduled date of integration of New 
Orleans schools. However, on November 13, the governor 
called the closing of the schools "a scorched earth policy,"
35Acts of Louisiana, I960, 1st Extraordinary Session, 
no. 17, no. T87-noT—2TI
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and declared that the state should use legal remedies to 
regain control of the public schools but avoid the use of 
force. On the same day, Judge Wright enjoined the closing 
of schools in Orleans Parish and restrained the state from 
interfering with the duties or officers of the school
board.36
All schools in Louisiana were closed on November 14, 
I960, except those in Orleans Parish, where desegregation 
proceeded after nearly a decade of litigation. The state's 
de jure system of segregation in its public elementary and 
secondary schools had suffered a fatal blow. Instead of a 
prolonged court battle, the special session of the legisla­
ture had seen its resistance program voided in less than 
forty-eight hours, and state leaders enjoined from further 
interference in the desegregation of Orleans Parish. Having 
used every means at its disposal, the state could not pre­
vent the transfer of black students to previously all-white 
schools any longer.
Neither the governor nor the state legislature were
ready to admit defeat, yet. Five more special sessions were
held during the next four months to try to reverse the
desegregation of New Orleans schools. In mid-November,
Governor Davis appealed for calm in the city, requesting
37
that the state legislature "be the battlefield." In the
New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 14, I960; Bush v. 
Orleans, Williams v. Davis, lob F.Supp. 916 (E.D. La. I960).
*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 17, I960.
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end, though, all were forced to admit that segregated 
schools would not withstand negation by the federal judi­
ciary. Therefore, the state's leaders changed to tactics 
which would bring a delay in the implementation of integra­
tion and minimize the impact of desegregation on formerly 
all-white schools where segregation could not stand.
The desegregation of two New Orleans schools (Frantz 
and McDonough No. 19) led to racial violence and tension in 
the last two weeks of November I960, and a lengthy white 
boycott of the two schools. It also created one of the 
worst economic slumps to hit New Orleans in the twentieth 
century. Stores reported sales down from 35 to 40 percent, 
and restaurant and entertainment establishments reported a 
decline of at least 20 percent. Despite their concern, 
though, business leaders were afraid to speak out lest they 
incur the wrath of the local Citizens' Councils and other 
segregationist groups.38
During the second special session (November 16 to 
December 15, I960), the legislature attempted to abolish the 
old Orleans Parish School Board and to create another under 
its own authority. It also took this opportunity to exco­
riate Judge Wright for his actions in bringing about deseg­
regation, and to accuse him of bias toward the state and 
its leaders. The judge's response came on November 30, when
^New York Times, Nov. 28, I960.
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he declared void twenty-three legislative acts and resolu­
tions that interfered with the implementation of his 
desegregation orders in New Orleans. Any lingering hopes 
that integration might be reversed were dashed in December 
when the United States Supreme Court upheld the lower 
federal court's desegregation orders.39
Lawmakers met in a third special session (December 17 
to January 15, 1961), consuming most of the time venting 
their frustration against the Orleans Parish School Board, 
but powerless to reverse the court's actions. One legis­
lator suggested lynching to solve the problem of white par­
ents who insisted on sending their children to integrated 
New Orleans schools. Although later declaring that he was 
just joking, his statement betrayed legislative frustration 
at being unable to restrain the federal courts.40
By the beginning of 1961, opposition to segregationist 
measures in the state legislature had waned. Attempts to 
curb, minimize, or alter the course of the extremists or to 
circumvent federal authority had been futile. Besides, 
further opposition to the racial extremists was politically 
damaging, and the extremists had already demonstrated their 
inability to do any serious damage. Meanwhile, Governor
39 Acts of Louisiana, I960, 2nd Extraordinary Session, 
no. 2, 4; House Concurrent Resolution no. 3, no. 5, no. 6, 
no. 7, no. 26; Bush v. Orleans, 188 F.Supp. 916 (E.D. La.
I960).
^^Baton Rouge State Times, Dec. 22, I960.
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Davis began concentrating on other state issues, particu­
larly repairing state relations with the national government 
in order to secure funding for various state projects and a 
favorable settlement of the lucrative tidelands oil dispute.
Establishing Freedom of Choice, 1961-1962
Three special sessions were held during the first quar­
ter of 1961, but fiery resistance was absent, along with 
attempts to erect a wall of legislation to check the federal 
courts. In February, the legislature turned its attention 
toward halting the spread of integration to the parishes of 
St. Helena and East Baton Rouge. By then, the issue of 
maintaining segregated schools in Orleans Parish was dead, 
and the new position was to keep it token integration under 
a freedom of choice plan of operation. Under this plan, 
students were permitted to select the school closest to 
their home on a non-racial basis, "if space was available."
In February of 1961, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed a lower court order to St. Helena Parish to deseg­
regate its public schools, and a similar ruling against East 
Baton Rouge Parish was pending. Once again, the legislature 
attempted school closing measures to forestall integration. 
This time, it provided for a local option closing law, under 
which a school board was authorized to conduct a referendum 
on school closing. If successful, the board could suspend 
or close all parish public schools. To counter the possi­
bility of desegregation of schools in Baton Rouge, the
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legislature packed the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board 
with four additional members appointed by the governor.
Since the board already included two avowed segregationists, 
the addition of four more would avoid the recurrence of a 
board complying with federal orders in defiance of state 
authority.41
At this same time, President John F. Kennedy proposed 
federal aid to the public schools. Under his proposal, 
Louisiana would receive $15 million in 1962, $17.5 million 
in 1963, and $20 million in 1964. However, Superintendent 
of Education Shelby Jackson ridiculed it as "not even a drop 
in the bucket," while the South Louisiana Citizens' Council 
opposed all federal aid because it would be a "smokescreen" 
by the national government to gain control of education by 
interfering with Tenth Amendment guarantees reserving the' 
control of public schools to the states. In May, the state 
legislature overwhelmingly adopted a resolution calling on 
the Louisiana delegation in Congress to oppose the federal 
aid to the schools bill.42
In March of 1961, the federal courts enjoined the state 
from additional interference with the operations of the 
court-approved "old Orleans Parish School Board," accused
41St. Helena Parish School Board v. Hall, 287 F.2d 376 
(5th Cir. 1962); Acts of Louisiana, 1961, 2nd Extraordinary 
Session, no. 5, no. 7.
^2Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 20, May 16, 1961; New 
Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. T8, 1961.
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the state superintendent of public schools of contempt, and 
began discussing local option school closing in St. Helena 
Parish. By now, the legislature realized that it could not 
replace the board in New Orleans with one of its own design, 
and Superintendent Jackson was compelled to agree not to 
interfere with the operation of schools there any longer. 
However, federal courts were reluctant to prevent St. Helena 
school officials from conducting an election on the issue of 
closing public schools to prevent desegregation.^
In April, St. Helena Parish voters opted to close 
schools by a vote of 1147 to 56, in the first referendum on 
the state's local option law. Although over 80 percent of 
registered voters had turned out, the total reflected a 
voter registration list of only 1572 (111 blacks) in a 
parish with over 9000 residents (4700 blacks). Therefore, 
in August, the federal courts voided the results of the 
election, referring to the local option school closing act 
as a means of continuing s e g r e g a t i o n . ^
During the 1961 fiscal session of the state legisla­
ture, administrative support for measures to defy desegrega­
tion orders was lacking. Perhaps, one calming influence was 
the fact that of one hundred thirty-four black applications
^Bush v. Orleans, 191 F.Supp. 871 (E.D. La. 1961); 
Baton Rouge State Times, Mar. 4, 1961; Hall v. St. Helena 
Parish School"Board, ~F~RRLR 416-17 (1961).
^New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 23, 1961; Hall v.
St. Helena Parish School Board, T97 F.Supp. 649 (E.D. La.
1961).
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for admission to all-white schools in Orleans Parish in 
I960, only five had been accepted to attend two schools.
A sustained boycott of the two integrated schools since 
November had nearly shut them down, and only sixty-six 
applications were submitted by blacks for admission to white 
schools in the next school year. When schools opened in 
September of 1961, only twelve black students were attending 
schools with whites in six previously all-white schools in 
New Orleans. Peace and quiet prevailed, but the boycott of 
integrated schools continued, as many of the students 
transferred to parochial and nearby St. Bernard Parish 
schools.45
When the regular session of the state legislature met 
in 1962, there was a noted absence of the type of defiance 
present in the regular and special sessions of I960, and 
business was conducted peacefully. The consensus among 
legislators was to preserve white supremacy, while embracing 
freedom of choice as a defense against stronger measures by 
the federal courts when complete segregation had become 
untenable. The administration was most concerned in 1962 
with fiscal matters and preventing a resumption of discord 
with the national government. Governor Davis felt that 
defiance would endanger Louisiana's chances for securing a 
favorable resolution of the tidelands issue, by which the
^McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 195-96; 
Baton Rouge State Times, Jan. 30, 1961; New Orleans Times 
Picayune, Sept. 8"J 1961.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
206
state stood to gain millions of dollars in needed revenue.
In addition, a new missile plant and investments by private 
industry in the state would be placed in jeopardy. There­
fore, race was relegated to a subordinate position and 
primary attentidn was focused on other i s s u e s . 46
Although the Davis Administration shied away from overt 
racial measures, legislators continued to enact laws which 
assisted parents who sought alternatives to desegregated 
schools. The compulsory school attendance law was repealed; 
procedures were established for tuition grants for children 
attending non-profit, non-sectarian, private schools; provi­
sion was made for a tuition grant program through the 
Louisiana Financial Assistance Fund; children were protected 
from being compelled to attend a school in which members of 
their race constituted less than half of the total student 
body; and funds were provided to St. Bernard Parish for the 
education of Orleans Parish students fleeing desegregated 
schools.47
In April, Judge Wright left New Orleans for a new 
appointment and was replaced by Frank B. Ellis, who quickly 
rescinded Wright's order requiring desegregation of the 
first six grades in Orleans Parish in the fall. In late 
May, Judge Ellis substituted a "grade-a-year" plan by which
^McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 199-02.
/ 7
Acts of Louisiana, 1962, Regular Session, no. 128, 
no.147, no. 148, no. 196, no. 342.
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students would be allowed to attend formerly all-white or 
all-black schools nearest their homes under freedom of 
choice. Beginning in September 1963, dual geographic 
attendance districts in first and second grades would be 
abolished, with an additional grade being desegregated each 
succeeding year thereafter.^®
When the new school year began in September of 1962, 
the only desegregated public school system in the state was 
still that of Orleans Parish. At that time, a major step in 
desegregation was taken with the integration of Roman 
Catholic parochial schools in the New Orleans archdiocese.
In early 1956, Archbishop Francis Rummel had announced plans 
to desegregate schools of the New Orleans archdiocese (com­
prising twenty-three Louisiana parishes at the time). His 
announcement placed the state school hot lunch program in 
jeopardy in Catholic schools, as well as its sports pro­
gram's affiliation with the Louisiana High School Athletic 
Association (LHSAA). To add to his problems, a lay Catholic 
organization (the Association of Catholic Laymen) was formed 
to keep the Catholic schools segregated and appealed to the 
Pope to halt racial integration. In addition, following a 
Citizens' Council rally which booed the name of the arch­
bishop, a cross was burned on the lawn of his residence. 
Rummel finally decided to postpone integration until
/ o
Bush v. Orleans, 204 F.Supp. 568, 205 F.Supp. (E.D. 
La. 1962); 7 RRLR 19, 349, 354 (1962).
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September 1957 at the earliest because of "certain diffi­
culties . "49
Not until 1962 was action taken by the Catholic Church 
on the desegregation of its schools. In I960, a spokesman 
for the archbishop announced that desegregation of New 
Orleans archdiocese Catholic schools would not occur until 
after public schools were actually desegregated. The church 
then waited nearly two years after Orleans Parish was deseg­
regated before undergoing its own integration. In March of 
1962, Archbishop Rummel announced that all schools in the 
archdiocese would be open to anyone. At the time, total 
archdiocesan enrollment was 75,907 students in 153 elemen­
tary and secondary schools (10,851 blacks were enrolled in 
30 all-black schools). A church spokesman stated that black 
students were already enrolled in several former all-white 
parochial schools, but would not elaborate.50
Following the announcement by Rummel, the public outcry 
among Catholics and non-Catholics alike condemned his deci­
sion. The South Louisiana Citizens' Council called it 
"tragic" and predicted that it would turn New Orleans white 
Catholic schools into black ones. Several persons picketed 
the archdiocesan chancery to protest against desegregation, 
while many predicted a mass boycott of Catholic schools in
^New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 8, Aug. 26, 1957.
50Ibid., Sept. 1, Nov. 17, I960, Apr. 29, 1962.
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the fall. Despite the threats and protests, spring enroll­
ment figures demonstrated that 73,514 students were 
registered for the fall.51
When the new school year began in the fall of 1962, 
there were few major incidents as sixty black students began 
attending twenty formerly all-white Catholic schools in the 
New Orleans archdiocese for the first time since 1895. The 
most serious trouble occurred at schools in Buras in 
Plaquemines Parish and in Westwego near New Orleans.
Leander Perez led a boycott at the Buras school, which 
opened with only thirty-eight white students (three hundred 
forty in 1961-62) and none within a week because of threats 
of violence. At a Westwego elementary school, two hundred 
persons milled around the school protesting desegregation 
for a few days. In addition, about a hundred persons pick­
eted the residence of the new archbishop (John Cody) in New 
Orleans. In November, the New Orleans archdiocese reported 
a 3 percent increase in enrollment in desegregated schools 
over that of 1961, and that one hundred seven blacks were 
attending twenty formerly all-white public schools (in the 
parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Tammany and St. Mary). 
With the exception of a few minor incidents, desegregation 
was proceeding quietly along freedom of choice l i n e s . 52
•**Ibid., Mar. 28, Mar. 29, Apr. 20, 1962.
•^Ibid., Aug. 30, Sept. 5, Nov. 18, 1962; Washington 
Post, Sept. 1, 2, 1962.
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Although lauding the actions of Rummel and Cody in the 
New Orleans archdiocese, the bishops of the dioceses of 
Baton Rouge, Lafayette and Alexandria would not follow their 
examples, yet. The bishop of Baton Rouge declared that the 
desegregation of the schools in his diocese (under the 
authority of the New Orleans archdiocese until November 8,
1961) was not imminent, while the bishop of Lafayette 
responded that desegregation would occur "sometime after the
next school year." The bishop of Alexandria also had no 
timetable.53• jn essence, they were all waiting for the 
federal courts to integrate the public schools within their 
dioceses before moving to implement their own desegregation 
plans.
By the end of 1962, the state’s public and parochial 
schools were still segregated, with the exception of twelve 
blacks attending six schools with whites in Orleans Parish 
and one hundred seven blacks attending twenty parochial 
schools with whites in the Archdiocese of New Orleans. Out­
side of Orleans Parish and the archdiocese, no blacks 
attended any school with white students.
Between 1954 and I960, leaders of Louisiana fought hard 
to maintain the de jure system of total segregation, with 
their efforts peaking in the New Orleans desegregation 
crisis of I960. After six special sessions between November 
I960 and March 1961, and contempt orders against various
Baton Rouge State Times, Mar. 31, 1962.
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state officials, both legislative and executive leaders 
admitted defeat over New Orleans, and adopted a new 
tactic— freedom of choice— to keep public schools as white 
as possible, if they could not be kept totally white. Their 
strategy turned to fighting to retain total segregation on a 
parish-by-parish basis until they were no longer able to 
prevent integration. Then, their approach was to allow only 
a limited number of token blacks to transfer to predomi­
nantly white schools in order to appease the federal govern­
ment. However, the state's leaders were incapable of 
repairing the breach in the segregation facade. As 1962 
came to an end, the federal courts had struck down all 
arguments aimed at keeping the public schools of East Baton 
Rouge and St. Helena Parishes totally segregated, and it 
was but a matter of time before they underwent some form of 
desegregat ion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter VI
DESEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1963-1974
Introduction
Despite the passage of nine years since the first Brown 
decision, sixty-five school districts in Louisiana continued 
in 1963 to maintain totally segregated dual public school 
systems. It was not until the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 that major changes became evident in the state.
Under the various provisions of the Civil Rights Act, 
pressure was brought to bear on school districts to deseg­
regate in order to continue receiving federal funds. Using 
Title VI of the act, HEW nudged school districts toward 
minimum desegregation on the basis of freedom of choice, 
then enforced strict application of freedom of choice to 
move districts closer to the goal of disestablishing dual 
school systems. Under freedom of choice, students were 
theoretically able to select their schools, but it tended to 
perpetuate the dual system.
Not until 1965 did a majority of the school systems of 
Louisiana submit to any type of desegregation. Even then, 
it was only token integration in the form of freedom of 
choice, which left all-black schools intact and with only a
212
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few black students admitted to formerly all-white schools. 
Once again, local and state officials in the state employed 
the strategy of delay, circumvention and litigation to keep 
massive integration at bay. However, the federal courts 
became increasingly suspicious of local intentions, adopting 
a progressively harder line toward integration within the 
framework of freedom of choice. While the local school 
districts saw freedom of choice as the solution to federal 
demands for desegregation, the courts saw it as a means 
toward reaching the final goal of a unitary school system 
free of racial discrimination. Beginning in 1967, the 
federal judiciary began to abolish freedom of choice plans 
that did not promise to bring about a unitary system 
quickly.
By 1969, the host of impediments to creating unitary, 
nondiscriminatory school systems were swept away when both 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States 
Supreme Court decided that time had run out, and that 
remaining dual systems based on de jure segregation had to 
be eradicated immediately. However, the segregationists 
were still not totally vanquished, resorting now to alter­
nate means to further thwart the intentions of the federal 
courts. Their machinations compelled the judiciary to 
closely monitor every aspect in the conversion to unitary 
systems. Unfortunately, just as the courts were able to 
glimpse the conclusion to discriminatory operation of the 
public schools, the executive branch under the Nixon
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Administration instituted a "go-slow" policy in the early 
1970's that had the effect of decelerating the entire 
desegregation process.
Despite major opposition in many areas of the state 
when court-ordered dissolution of the dual system of educa­
tion was imposed in the fall of 1969, the courts prevailed. 
By the end of the 1970-71 school year, all of the state's 
local school systems were under a unitary system and the de 
jure system of segregation had ceased to operate. However, 
the thornier issue of de facto segregation reared its head, 
proving to be a formidable challenge for the federal courts 
in the South as well as in other parts of the nation during 
the 1970's.
Desegregation by Freedom of Choice, 1963-1964
During 1963, negligible progress was made toward deseg­
regating the sixty-seven public school systems of Louisiana. 
The fiscal session of the 1963 state legislature was rela­
tively quiet on segregation, with only one education law 
enacted to increase funding for tuition grants to $300,000.1 
During the year, though, race once more intruded into the 
gubernatorial elections as DeLesseps S. Morrison was again 
accused of being soft on segregation and lost to John J. 
McKeithen in a campaign reminiscent of that of 1959-60.
^Acts of Louisiana, 1963, Regular Session, no. 27.
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The desegregation of East Baton Rouge Parish public 
schools became the focus of the state's attention in 1963, 
although it did not produce anything approaching the emo­
tional upheaval that the desegregation of Orleans Parish had 
prompted three years earlier. In March, the parish was 
ordered by the federal courts to submit a desegregation plan 
by July. Since student assignments were already made by 
then, the courts allowed only twenty-eight blacks to enroll 
in the four parish high schools during the 1963-64 school 
year. Thereafter, beginning in 1964, a grade-a-year plan 
would operate on the basis of freedom of choice until all 
grades had been desegregated.2
In May of 1963, the federal courts approved a long- 
range plan for Orleans Parish, which established a single­
zone attendance system for first and second graders for the 
1963-64 school year, with the addition of one grade each 
year thereafter. The courts also approved transfers of 
black third and fourth graders who had previously applied 
for admission or transfer to white schools under the I960 
court order, and ordered the desegregation of a special 
school for gifted students in the 1963-64 school year and of 
kindergartens in the following year. However, the courts 
delayed the desegregation of faculties until the school 
system had made the transition to a single-zone system.3
2
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 214 F. 
Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1963), 219 F.Supp. 876 (E.D. La. 1963).
^Bush v. Orleans, 8 RRLR 533-34 (1963).
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Two other desegregation cases arose over Bossier and 
Terrebonne Parishes in 1963. In Bossier Parish, federal 
money had been provided for the construction of schools that 
the children of military personnel stationed at Barksdale 
Air Force Base would attend, and these schools were being 
operated on a racially segregated basis. However, the fed­
eral court in the Western District of Louisiana dismissed 
the suit for lack of jurisdiction.^ In Terrebonne Parish, 
children were being segregated on three levels: white,
black and Indian. The federal district court in New Orleans 
enjoined the Terrebonne Parish School Board from denying 
Indian children equal access to the white public schools, 
and gave Indian students in the eleventh and twelfth grades 
the option immediately to attend the formerly white or 
Indian school nearest their homes. In addition, the board 
was ordered to determine the feasibility of desegregating 
the tenth grade, and to submit a plan to the court in August 
of 1964, for the "orderly and timely" desegregation of all 
other grades.5•
Thus far, desegregation of Southern schools had not 
been very successful. As is demonstrated in tables 10 and 
11, only 1.17 percent of blacks residing in the eleven 
former Confederate States were attending schools with whites
^United States v. Bossier Parish School Board, 220 F. 
Supp. 243 (W.D. La. 1963).
c
Naguin v. Terrebonne Parish School Board, 8 RRLR 1421 
(1963); New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 29, 1963.
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Table 10
Blacks in Southern Schools with Whites, 1954-1964
School Year Percentage School Year Percentage
1954-55 .001 1959-60 .160
1955-56 .115 1960-61 .162
1956-57 .144 1961-62 .241
1957-58 .151 1962-63 .453
1958-59 .132 1963-64 1.170
Source: 5 Race Relations Reporter 21 (May 1974).
Table 11
Percentage of Blacks in Schools with Whites, 1959-1964
School Year South Border Region
1959-60 .160 45.4 6.4
1960-61 .162 49.0 7.0
1961-62 .241 52.5 7.6
1962-63 .453 51.8 8.0
1963-64 1.170 54.8 9.2
Source: 1 Southern Education Report 29 (July/August 1965).
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during the 1963-64 school year, while the border states 
(Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma and West 
Virginia) had 54.8 percent and the entire region 9.2 per­
cent.^ Therefore, it would take only drastic and sustained 
action by the federal government to bring down the dual edu­
cation systems of the South.
Impact of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal govern­
ment adopted a more active stand against segregated schools, 
with all three branches of government coalescing to break 
the grip of de jure segregation. Title IV and Title IX 
brought the Justice Department into active desegregation 
efforts, while Title VI brought the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW) into the desegregation struggle 
through federal funding of education programs.
Under Title IV, the United States Commissioner of 
Education was authorized to provide assistance for school 
districts that had difficulty in desegregating. Aid could 
be rendered by providing information and personnel to assist 
in the preparation and implementation of a desegregation 
plan, by establishing special training centers on desegrega­
tion for school personnel, and by providing funds for school 
boards to conduct in-service training or to employ special­
ists to advise the school system on desegregation problems.
^1 Southern Education Report 29 (July/August 1965).
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In the latter part of the 1960's, Title IV came under 
increasing attacks by civil rights groups because of its 
lack of comprehensiveness and failure to work for the estab­
lishment of completely unitary school systems, while encour- 
aging "tokenism" through freedom of choice desegregation 
plans. In addition, both HEW and the Justice Department 
viewed Title IV as a "by request" service that could only be 
provided to school districts and state agencies requesting 
assistance.?
Title IX authorized the Attorney General to intervene 
in private suits that were brought to desegregate public 
schools. It also permitted the Justice Department to 
initiate suits on the behalf of blacks who were fearful of 
inaugurating the suits themselves.&
Title VI had the most impact on school systems since 
most of them had begun to rely upon federal funding for 
numerous educational programs. This section of the Civil 
Rights Act prohibited racial discrimination in any program 
receiving federal financial assistance, and provided for 
"the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue 
assistance" to programs or activities that failed to com­
ply. ^ In order to continue to receive funds, a school
^Ibid., 31-32 (March/April 1966); Civil Rights Act of
1964.
®Civil Rights Act of 1964.
9Ibid.
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system was required to comply with Title VI, demonstrating 
that it was not operating a racially discriminatory school 
system or risk the loss of federal aid. Beginning in 1965, 
HEW implemented Title VI through annual guidelines..
In its first guidelines issued for the 1965-66 school 
year, HEW (through the Office of Education) established 
three methods by which a school district could comply with 
Title VI. The district could meet federal requirements by: 
(1) signing an "Assurance of Compliance" ("HEW-441") form 
pledging nondiscriminatory operation; (2) by voluntarily 
adopting a plan to desegregate at least four grades per 
year; or (3) if it was under a federal court order to 
desegregate.*0
By August of 1965, 71 percent of school districts in 
the Southern and border states had met federal requirements 
and were eligible for a continuation of federal aid. Of the 
5135 school districts in the region, 2722 signed "HEW-441" 
forms, 838 voluntarily agreed to desegregate four grades per 
year, and 96 were under court orders to desegregate. Of the 
school districts submitting voluntary plans, half were under 
freedom of choice, while the remainder used geographic zon­
ing, closed black schools or ended student transfers outside 
of districts. Under HEW regulations, these school districts 
had three years to achieve full desegregation.^
*®1 Southern Education Report 31 (July/August 1965).
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In Louisiana, school officials declared that they would 
not submit voluntary desegregation plans, pending the out­
come of litigation. On February 1, 1965, Attorney General 
Jack P. F. Gremillion announced that the State Board of 
Education was permitted under state law to sign HEW compli­
ance orders if it desired to do so. However, the board 
declined to sign them, leaving the decision to individual 
school boards on whether to accept federal funds. In July, 
Governor John J. McKeithen declared that the state was 
financially unable to replace federal money that might be 
lost due to noncompliance with HEW guidelines, and the State 
Board of Education offered to serve "as a pipeline through 
which federal money will be sent to schools." Thus far, 
every school system except that of Plaquemines Parish 
received some form of federal funding, and the state was ‘in 
jeopardy of losing as much as $42 million. By mid-August, 
none of the state's sixty-seven school districts had filed 
an "HEW-441" but nineteen court orders had been submitted on 
behalf of twenty-five school districts under prior desegre­
gation orders.
In September of 1965, the Vernon Parish School Board 
was prompted to desegregate because of financial considera­
tions. It prefaced its decision by declaring that it could 
lose $330,000 in federal funds, which comprised 20 percent 
of its 1965-66 operating budget. At the same time, Rapides
*^10 RRLR 454 (1965); 1 Southern Education Report 
32-33; New Orleans Times Picayune, July 2, 1965.
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Parish voted against compliance, placing $265,000 per year 
in federal funds in jeopardy. Bossier Parish was ordered to 
desegregate at this time, partially because of its accep­
tance of federal funds to build schools for the use of chil­
dren of military personnel stationed in the parish, and had 
violated Title VI by segregating those schools.*3
The federal government initiated cut-off action against 
sixty-five Southern school districts in October for noncom­
pliance with HEW guidelines. Thirty-one of the districts 
were located in Louisiana. James D. Prescott, executive 
secretary of the Louisiana School Boards Association, 
responded that the loss would result in the curtailment of 
some programs, but that most parishes would "get by with 
relatively little discomfort." However, by the end of 1965, 
thirty-three school districts in the state were in compli­
ance with Title VI, while thirty-four were not and faced 
termination of federal funding. Among the reasons cited for 
noncompliance were that the districts did not want federal 
aid, did not want it on HEW compliance terms, or challenged 
HEW guidelines on constitutional grounds.^
In March of 1966, HEW issued new guidelines for deseg­
regation, including the suggestion that a plan for faculty
131 Southern Education Report 33 (September/October 
1965); New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. A, 1965; Lemon v. 
Bossier Parish School Board, 349 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1965).
*^1 Southern Education Report 30 (November/December 
1965).
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desegregation be adopted. Simply allowing blacks to choose 
to transfer to all-white schools within a dual education 
system did not overcome the discriminatory effects of segre­
gation, while the very existence of all-black schools was 
inconsistent with a valid desegregation plan. The new 
guidelines brought freedom of choice plans under closer 
scrutiny by HEW, requiring more actual student and teacher 
desegregation within the classroom.
No school districts had all federal funds terminated 
during the 1965-66 school year, but some failed to receive 
allotments under new programs such as the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA). As the 1966-67 school year 
commenced, seventeen districts in Louisiana lost funds, four 
had funds deferred because of failure to fully comply with 
HEW guidelines, and forty-six were in compliance. In 
December of 1966, the Commissioner of Education reported 
that freedom of choice plans presently in operation were "an 
interim arrangement which is bringing us toward desegrega­
tion but is not the ultimate s o l u t i o n . "I®
With this in mind, in the spring of 1967, HEW created 
the Office for Civil Rights to oversee school districts in 
order to assure that they were in compliance with the 
demands of Title VI. Existing freedom of choice plans were 
allowed to continue, but only if they were achieving the
1 C
2 Southern Education Report 31-32 (July/August 1966), 
31 (January/February 1967).
2 Southern Education Report 31 (January/February
1967), 30 (March 1967).
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goal of bringing about a unitary system. Nine Louisiana 
school districts began the 1967-68 school year without 
federal funds. However, limited progress was made in 
faculty integration because 323.8 black and 254.7 white 
teachers in the state were teaching in schools predominantly 
attended by children of another race.*7
Under Title VI, HEW had moved gradually from requiring 
minimum desegregation of students on the basis of freedom of 
choice in 1965, to strict application and scrutiny of free­
dom of choice plans, forcing school districts to move ever 
closer toward disestablishing their dual systems in order to 
continue to receive federal funds. In the ten years follow­
ing the 1954 Brown decision, the gain in desegregation in 
the Southern states was a negligible 1.06 percent by 1964. 
Within four years of the application of Title VI, the fed­
eral government reported that 20.3 percent of Southern black 
students were attending schools with white enrollments of at 
least 50 percent in the 1968-69 school year.*®
Between 1964 and 1969, the State of Louisiana received 
nearly $150 million in federal funds. Money was received 
under the National Defense Education Act of 1957, Elemen­
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Smith-Hughes Act,
173 Southern Education Report 14 (January/February
1968); Southern Education Reporting Service, "School 
Desegregation in the Southern and Border States" (September 
1967).
18
4 Southern Education Report 17 (June 1969).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
225
Vocational Act and George-Borden Act. Under these various 
programs, funds were received for educational functions at 
correctional facilities and special schools, and for handi­
capped and migrant children, library resources, and voca­
tional education. During the 1968-69 school year alone, the 
state received over $40 million for education. Without 
federal assistance, most schools would have had to curtail 
or abolish programs, or seek local or state funding to 
replace them, which would have been no easy task. There­
fore, economic pressure from HEW was an inducement for 
school districts to begin at least token integration. Once 
this had been accomplished, there was no turning back, and 
annual revisions in HEW guidelines brought about more deseg­
regation until the federal courts were able to order the 
complete eradication of dual systems based on law in 1969.^
When the Nixon Administration came to power in 1969, a 
major change occurred in the use of Title VI. While the new 
administration decelerated the use of Title VI to gain 
compliance with desegregation orders, the federal courts 
became more active and overturned most freedom of choice 
plans. On July 3, 1969, in a joint statement by the 
Departments of Justice and HEW, the Nixon Administration 
announced that it would no longer use the threat of cut-offs 
in federal funding to secure the disestablishment of dual
19Louisiana, State Department of Education. One Hundred 
Twentieth Annual Report for the Session 1968-69 (1969).
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education systems, but would rely on the Justice Department 
to oversee overt efforts to maintain or to re-establish de 
jure systems.
Freedom of Choice, 1964-1968
Between 1964 and 1968, the public schools of Louisiana 
were transformed from total segregation to token integration 
under freedom of choice. As the 1964-65 school year began, 
only three of the sixty-seven school systems in the state 
were desegregated. The impact of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 was already being felt as school systems sought means 
by which to replace federal funds that would be discontinued 
if a school district failed to desegregate. By the fall of 
1965,- a majority of school systems in Louisiana were open to 
integration, and by 1967, all public school systems were 
operating under some type of desegregation plan. In 1968, 
the United States Supreme Court ended all hopes that freedom 
of choice plans might be used indefinitely to prevent mas­
sive integration. Thereafter, the explicit objective of the 
federal courts was to bring about a swift end to the dual 
system of education based on de jure segregation, replacing 
it with a unitary system free of racial discrimination.
During the summer of 1964, federal courts in Louisiana 
ordered the integration of grades eleven and twelve of the
20Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism and American Law 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) 4b7-68.
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St. Helena Parish public schools in the fall, joining the 
schools of Orleans and East Baton Rouge Parishes under a 
freedom of choice p l a n . 21 Although other suits were filed 
to desegregate Iberville and Jefferson Parish schools, the 
courts proceeded slowly and did not order their immediate 
i n t e g r a t i o n . 22 Facing the loss of millions of dollars in 
federal assistance, particularly after the enactment of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, school 
districts in the state remained obstinate and refused to 
complete "HEW-441" forms or to submit voluntary desegrega­
tion plans, opting instead to be brought under court order 
to desegregate, then becoming eligible for federal funds.
In two cases decided in 1965, the United States Supreme 
Court took a harder line on desegregation. In one case, the 
court held that delays in desegregating school systems "are 
no longer tolerable," and in another, that a school district 
being operated under a grade-a-year plan must admit black 
students to grades not yet desegregated in order to take 
courses not available at an all-black school where a student 
was initially assigned. In addition, faculty desegregation 
was held to be within the scope of the Brown d e c i s i o n . 23
21Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 233 F.Supp. 
136 (E.D. La. 1964).
^Williams v. Iberville Parish School Board, 9 RRLR 
1748 (1964); Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 10 
RRLR 1061 (1965).
23 Bradley v. School Board of Richmond 382 U.S. 103 
(1965); Rogers v. Paul 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
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During the summer of 1965, the federal courts in 
Louisiana accelerated the pace of desegregation. Twenty-one 
new school districts were scheduled to be integrated in the 
fall. As each case was heard separately, the defendant 
board admitted that it was operating a biracial system and 
had taken no action to grant the relief sought by black 
plaintiffs to allow them to attend schools on a nondiscrimi- 
natory basis. Then, the court ordered the board to submit a 
desegregation plan on the basis of recent federal court 
decisions. All of the plans that were approved before 
June 22, 1965, provided for gradual desegregation beginning 
with two grades in the fall of 1965, two in 1966, and four 
each in 1967 and 1968. Pupil transfers and assignments were 
to be made on a nondiscriminatory basis, with dual atten­
dance zones to be abolished as grades became desegregated. 
However, the plans left the dual system of education virtu­
ally intact.
On June 22, 1965, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School 
District that school districts must be fully desegregated by 
the fall of 1967. The two Louisiana cases of Lemon v. 
Bossier Parish School Board and Valley v. Rapides Parish 
School Board, decided by the Fifth Circuit Court in August, 
became the standards for desegregating a school system in 
Louisiana. Both cases were placed under the Singleton 
decision, ordering that a minimum of four grades per year be 
desegregated, and that freedom of choice plans be completed
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by the fall of 1967. In general, grades 1, 2, 11 and 12 
were to be desegregated in 1965-66; 3, A, 9 and 10 in 
1966-67; and 5, 6, 7 and 8 in 1967-68. Applications for 
transfers would be granted or denied on the basis of student 
requests, scholastic record and aptitude, and space avail­
able in the school requested or in a comparable school that 
was geographically nearer the student's residence. As 
grades were integrated, dual attendance districts were to be 
abolished. Faculty desegregation was deferred until sub­
stantial progress had been made in pupil integration. All 
schools beginning operation under a court-ordered desegrega­
tion plan in the fall of 1965 were placed immediately under 
the Lemon and Valley d e c i s i o n . ^A
Nine school systems came under court orders to inte­
grate too late to implement desegregation plans in the fall 
of 1965, and were ordered to adopt freedom of choice at the 
beginning of the spring semester in January of 1966. In 
order to catch up with other school systems and complete 
desegregation by the fall of 1967, they were ordered to 
desegregate at least four grades at that time.
In the summer of 1965, several black plaintiffs 
attempted to prevent the tedious process of parish-by-parish 
litigations to disestablish dual systems of education by
2 LSingleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School 
District, Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 10 RRLR 
107A, 1077; Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 3A9 P.2d 
1020 (5th Cir. 1965).
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initiating a class action suit to bring about immediate 
desegregation of all public schools under the jurisdiction 
of the State Board of Education. However, the federal 
courts found that there was no longer any state constitu­
tional requirement for segregation in the public schools, 
and that the Board of Education was prohibited in the state 
constitution from controlling the business affairs of local 
school boards. If segregation was being practiced, it was 
being directed by individual school boards, which were the 
only agencies that could be held accountable to the charge 
of operating a discriminatory school system. Therefore, it 
was necessary to initiate suits against each individual 
board.^5
As the 1965-66 school year began, no desegregation 
suits were filed against thirty-three school districts, 
fourteen districts had two grades desegregated, one had 
three grades desegregated, three were awaiting orders to 
desegregate four grades, no action had been taken in suits 
against five districts, three districts had four grades 
desegregated and Orleans Parish had kindergarten through 
grade five desegregated. In addition, Iberia, St. Martin 
and Beauregard parishes decided to desegregate all grades 
immediately on a freedom of choice basis. Throughout 
Louisiana, only 0.69 perceent of black students attended
2S
LeBeauf v. State Board of Education, 244 F.Supp. 256 
(E.D. La. 1965).
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schools with whites. By contrast, 6.01 percent of blacks in 
the entire South and 68.90 percent of blacks in the border 
states were enrolled in schools with whites. 6^
In the spring of 1966, the Justice Department and 
federal courts brought the remainder of parishes still 
operating segregated school systems under freedom of choice. 
Most often, the courts ordered the desegregation of grades 
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 12 in the fall of 1966, and the rest 
in the fall of 1967, so that all school systems were fully 
integrated by 1967. Also, any previously issued court order 
was amended to reflect the Singleton decision.
During the summer of 1966, the federal district court 
in New Orleans issued an opinion in Jenkins v. City of 
Bogalusa which was applied to other cases heard by this 
court. Under the decision, every student was required to- 
submit an annual freedom of choice form, and school offi­
cials and teachers were prohibited from influencing any 
student in making his choice of schools. If no choice was 
made, the student was to be assigned to the school nearest 
his home where there was available space. Prior attendance 
at a certain school was not to be considered for assign­
ments, and no choice could be denied except for the reason 
of overcrowding. Bus transportation was to be provided to 
students who lived in excess of one mile from the school 
they would attend, and no student was to be subjected to
261 Southern Education Report 31 (January/February
1966).
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racial discrimination in any services, facilities or activ­
ities conducted or sponsored by his school. All school 
facilities, conditions and instruction were to be equalized, 
while schools not meeting these requirements were to be 
closed. To assist black students in adjusting to formerly 
all-white schools, remediation programs would be provided 
because of past inequities between white and black schools. 
Employment, promotion and retention of professional school 
personnel were to be made on a non-racial basis, and 
teachers were to be encouraged to transfer to schools where 
most of the faculty members were of a different race. In 
order to assure that the court's orders were being carried 
out, the board was required to file reports stating the 
number and disposition of freedom of choice applications, 
the names of students requesting withdrawal of their appli­
cations and reasons for such action, the manner of faculty 
assignment, and a description of steps taken to equalize 
schools.27
During the 1966-67 school year, 16.8 percent of black 
students in the South were in schools with whites. In 
Louisiana, only 3.5 percent of its black students were 
attending integrated schools. Only Mississippi had a more 
dismal record of desegregation.2® Although desegregation
27 Jenkins v. City of Bogalusa School Board, 11 RRLR 
1751-52 (1966).
28
2 Southern Education Report 31 (January/February
1967).
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under freedom of choice was little more than tokenism, it 
excited emotional responses in several areas of the state in 
the fall of 1966.
Only minor problems were experienced at most of the 
schools integrated in 1966, except for a brief period of 
picketing at a high school in St. Bernard Parish and a black 
boycott of a high school in Pointe Coupee Parish. The most 
successful protest was held in Plaquemines Parish, where 
several formerly all-white schools were boycotted by whites. 
Of 5400 whites expected to enroll in public schools, over 
5000 joined the boycott. When whites refused to attend 
Woodlawn High School with twenty-eight blacks, Leander 
Perez, Sr. offered his former residence as the site for a 
private school. All students and teachers of the public 
high school promptly moved to the new school, while the 
black students attending Woodlawn High under court order 
were allowed to return to their former schools. The 
Plaquemines Parish School Board was then authorized by the 
federal courts to close the abandoned high school as well as 
another school in Belle Chasse which was plagued by low 
student attendance and faculty resignations.^9
As private schools for whites sprang up in Plaquemines 
Parish as replacements for the public schools, a critical 
need for money was identified. Over 5000 applications for
29 2 Southern Education Report 30, 32 (December 1966); 
New Orleans Times Picayune  ^ Sept. 1, Sept. 4, 1966.
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state tuition grants were distributed throughout the parish, 
which would have cost the state an additional $1.8 million. 
Since there were already 11,000 persons receiving grants at 
the cost of $3.8 million, the influx of these new applicants 
placed a serious financial strain on the tuition program.
In addition to tuition, the new segregated private schools 
were entitled to the use of free textbooks, supplies and 
transportation. When asked to intervene in the plight of 
the grant program, Governor McKeithen responded that he 
would not divert funds from the public schools to the 
financially distressed Louisiana Financial Assistance 
Commission, which handled the state grants-in-aid tuition 
program. Instead, he would let nature take its course.30
After consolidating seven cases (including those of 
Caddo, Bossier, Jackson and Claiborne parishes), the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a new ruling in United 
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education in late 
December of 1966. The court determined that the freedom of 
choice plans in operation in the seven school districts 
under study had promoted resegregation, and that the only 
acceptable desegregation plan was one that achieved the goal 
of a unitary, nonracial school system. A segregated school 
system was required to desegregate regardless of whether it 
received federal funds; school boards had an affirmative 
duty to integrate their student bodies, faculties,
30New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 1, Sept. 4,
Nov. 23, 1966.
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facilities and activities; school systems had to convert to 
a unitary attendance zone system; and boards were to refrain 
from using pupil assignment laws while in the process of 
converting to a unitary system. Any school system that had 
a history of segregated faculties or token integration had a 
duty to adopt an alternative desegregation plan, such as 
geographic attendance plans, the Princeton Plan (assigning 
students to schools by grade rather than by location of 
residences) or a combination of plans.31
Between May and September of 1967, the district courts 
in Louisiana attempted to apply the Jefferson case to all 
school districts under their jurisdiction. Although the 
court attempted to implement a new, comprehensive desegre­
gation plan, adjustments had to be made for special circum­
stances. In Plaquemines Parish, where the public school 
system was on the verge of collapse, the school board was 
halted by the federal courts from taking additional steps 
toward the dissolution of the public schools. It was then 
ordered to restore bus transportation, lunch programs and 
books, equipment and supplies to the schools from which they 
had been withdrawn. In addition, school officials were 
enjoined from permitting any public school property to be 
used in private schools, discouraging students from attend­
ing public schools and encouraging them to attend private
31United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
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schools, and from interfering with the board's attempts to 
comply with desegregation o r d e r s . 32
Just prior to the beginning of the 1967-68 school year, 
private segregated schools across the state were dealt a 
major blow when the federal courts struck down the tuition 
grant law of 1962. Fearing a negative ruling on its opera­
tions, the Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission (LFAC) 
had attempted to validate its operations in 1966 by prohib­
iting the payment of tuition grants to children attending a 
private school that was primarily maintained by state grant- 
in-aid payments. In the spring of 1967, the state legisla­
ture established a backup system of tuition grants in the 
event that the courts invalidated the present program. A 
new scheme created the "Louisiana Education Commission for 
Needy Children" which would administer a new system of 
grants for the aid of "needy" children attending private, 
non-sectarian schools. To pass the scrutiny of the courts, 
the amount of payments would be based on family income and 
the number of dependents, with a maximum payment of $350 per 
child per school year. However, in August of 1967, a three- 
judge federal court called the state tuition program a link 
in a century-old chain of de jure segregation of the white 
and black races. The court felt that unless the tuition 
grant system was eliminated, it would destroy the public 
school system. The LFAC had made the state "a party to
32United States v. Plaquemines Parish School Board, 12 
RRLR 220, 1299-00 (1967).
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organized private discrimination," and its grants had dam­
aged blacks by draining students, teachers and funds from 
the desegregated public system. The court also cited evi­
dence of tuition grant schools having substandard facili­
ties and inferior educational programs. The 1967 tuition 
program was declared a sham by the federal courts and voided 
in March of 1968.33
When the new school year began in 1967, new HEW guide­
lines took effect, allowing only those freedom of choice 
plans to continue that were achieving meaningful desegrega­
tion and were bringing an end to the dual education system. 
Failing plans were to develop a more effective plan that 
resulted in substantial faculty desegregation, at least 30 
percent of schools desegregated by 1968, and complete deseg­
regation by 1969. M. Hayes Mizell, an advisor to the Office 
of Education, summed up the effect of freedom of choice on 
blacks in a public statement condemning this policy. He 
declared that freedom of choice for Southern blacks meant 
"the freedom to risk social isolation and academic failure, 
and the freedom to be denied equality of educational oppor­
tunity." It would not and could not attain the goal of a 
unitary system because it was "dependent upon the courage, 
inclination and determination of the Negro citizen to throw 
off the psychological and social restraints placed upon him
33Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance 
Commission, 12 RRLR 1386-87 (1967), 296 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. 
La. 1968); Acts of Louisiana, 1967, Regular Session, no. 99.
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by generations of slavery, legally enforced segregation and 
prejudice."34
Freedom of choice placed the burden for ending the dual 
education system on blacks, whose own schools had a stigma 
of inferiority to white schools. Therefore, few whites 
would choose to attend them under a freedom of choice plan. 
Black pride and heritage was dealt a serious blow by black 
children opting to enroll in the "better" white schools, 
where they were subjected to enormous social and emotional
pressures.35
In October of 1967, Washington Parish became the first 
school district in Louisiana to have its freedom of choice 
plan abolished and its schools ordered by federal courts to 
operate on a unitary system of geographic attendance zones. 
The courts declared that the justification for freedom of 
choice as an interim plan was removed once all grades had 
been desegregated. The next step was the assignment of 
students to the school nearest to their homes on a nonracial 
basis by geographical zoning. Complete desegregation was to 
be extended to all school-related services, facilities, 
activities and programs, transportation, and faculty and 
administrative staffs. In addition, the school system was 
to equalize facilities, equipment and instruction; provide
O /
3 Southern Education Report 14, 19 (January/February
1968).
35Ibid., 21.
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remediation programs to overcome inadequacies brought about 
by the effects of segregation; adopt measures to prevent 
abuse and harassment of blacks by school employees; and plan 
new schools without regard to the old dual system.36
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court ended any 
faint hopes in Louisiana that freedom of choice could be 
used indefinitely to delay the disestablishment of the dual 
education system. In Green v. County School Board of New 
Kent County, the high court adopted the view of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, declaring that freedom of choice 
would only be acceptable if it was effective in promptly 
bringing about unitary school systems. School boards had 
the obligation of devising a plan that "promises meaningul 
and immediate progress" toward ending de jure segregation.37 
In August of 1968, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
remanded nineteen Louisiana school cases for rehearings in 
Adams v. Mathews. Lower courts were ordered to conduct 
hearings by November to determine whether present desegrega­
tion plans in these cases "promise realistically to work 
now." It was presumed that a school district had failed the 
test established by Green if it had predominantly black or 
white schools with few members of the opposite race attend­
ing them, or if it had no substantial integration of its
Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 276 F.Supp. 
834 (E.D. La. 1968).
37Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 
U.S. 430 (1968).
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faculties and school activities. Such school districts were 
to take "affirmative action" toward effective desegregation 
before the beginning of the 1968-69 school year or shortly 
thereafter, adopting new alternatives to freedom of choice. 
Their options included consolidation of schools, pairing of 
schools and implementation of majority-to-minority transfers 
to bring about a truly unitary and nonracial school sys­
tem. 3® However, the federal courts realized the problems 
inherent in disestablishing the dual system, and granted 
school districts additional time to comply with Green and 
Adams. Unfortunately, many school districts used this 
reprieve once again to hinder the desegregation process.
By 1968, only a very small percentage of the black 
student population was enrolled in schools with whites, 
while the overwhelming majority attended all-black schools. 
Local school officials in Louisiana continued to cling 
desperately to freedom of choice and refused to take any 
forward steps that would appear to be cooperating too 
closely with the federal courts, or that would bring about 
an end to the dual system.
In some parishes, high schools kept social contact with 
black students to a minimum by providing few opportunities 
outside of class for racial mixing, such as cancelling 
dances and other social activities. Black students were 
sometimes segregated within the school itself in classrooms,
^^Adams v. Mathews, 403 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968).
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dressing areas and lunchrooms, and were frequently ignored 
in class by teachers who were unwilling to deal with them. 
Many blacks found themselves inadequately prepared for the 
transition to formerly all-white schools, often due to the 
inequitable de jure system of segregation that had resulted 
in the creation of inferior black schools. Black students 
were often taunted, teased, physically and mentally har­
assed, and socially ostracized by whites. Therefore, it 
was not surprising that many blacks transferred back to 
their former schools during the school year or did not 
return in the fall. In this respect, freedom of choice was 
a monumental failure, since it did nothing to encourage 
blacks to attend schools on a choice basis because "choice" 
actually meant daily harassment and emotional and social 
problems.
Freedom of choice was a success as a short-term deseg­
regation plan, but a failure as a long-term one. It had 
been successful in that it was a beginning and had brought 
less social and emotional upheaval than an immediate end to 
the dual system by massive integration would have brought.
It was a compromise situation since it rested on the prin­
ciple of gradualism, with few blacks willing to challenge 
the all-white public school system. Whites were willing to 
accept a few black students in order to continue receiving 
federal funds. However, local school officials used freedom 
of choice as yet another weapon in their arsenal to delay 
action on desegregation. Nowhere in the state did public
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officials agree to dismantle their dual systems immediately 
and voluntarily. Instead, they did only what they were 
compelled to do and no more.
By the end of 1968, the federal courts and the Justice 
Department realized that freedom of choice had failed as a 
viable desegregation plan for bringing about a unitary sys­
tem. The final blow was delivered to the dual system by the 
Supreme Court, which tardily arrived at a view similar to 
that of the Fifth Circuit Court, declaring that freedom of 
choice was not an end in itself but merely an interim plan 
to be used to bring about the final goal of a totally uni­
tary system where there would be no separate all-white or 
all-black schools based on the past effects of de jure 
discriminat ion.
End of the Dual Education System, 1969-1971
Federal pressure brought to bear on school boards to 
adopt alternative desegregation plans to freedom of choice 
resulted in the collapse of several dual school systems in 
Louisiana in the fall of 1969> and of the remainder by the 
end of the 1970-71 school year. However, the emphasis was 
on terminating the de jure system and its lingering effects 
on public education, not on the de facto system that was the 
product of legitimate neighborhood schools. It was more 
difficult for the Southern states to draw a distinction 
between what had resulted from a de facto situation and what 
had emerged as a result of decades of segregation by state
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and local decree. The local school boards had the burden of 
offering substantial proof that virtually one-race neighbor­
hood schools were constitutional. In the Northern and 
Western parts of the nation, which had only traces of segre­
gation by law in public education, it was more difficult to 
levy charges of discrimination and easier to defend an 
alleged practice of segregation.
In 1969, the Johnson Administration, which had exer­
cised strict supervision over public school systems with a 
history of racial discrimination, yielded to a less vigilant 
Nixon Administration. During the 1968 Presidential cam­
paign, Richard Nixon had pledged to decelerate the desegre­
gation process, though adopting a stand opposing the South's 
de jure system. Although the federal courts would have 
benefited from the assistance of a strong ally in the White 
House, the machinery was in place to bring about an end to 
the all-black and virtually all-white schools of the South. 
The federal courts were poised and prepared to deliver the
last blows to a system already on the verge of collapse. It
was the ruling by the United States Supreme Court in the 
case of Alexander v. Holmes (1969) that strengthened the 
resolve of the lower federal courts to bring a swift and 
timely end to the dual system of education based on de jure 
segregat ion.
On May 28, 1969, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed a lower court decision in Hall v. St. Helena, which
had upheld freedom of choice plans in eight parishes.
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Applying its ruling to thirty-eight school systems in 
Louisiana, the appellate court instructed school boards that 
they had an affirmative duty to abolish all vestiges of 
state-imposed racial segregation in the public schools. Any 
system that had schools with no whites or with less than ten 
percent of the total black student population was prima 
facie evidence that its desegregation plan was not working, 
and the board had an obligation to adopt a new plan. Empha­
sis was also placed on fully integrated faculties, staff, 
facilities, transportation and school activities.39
Less than a month later, the federal district court for 
the Western District in Louisiana implemented this decision 
in thirty-four school districts under its jurisdiction. All 
boards were ordered to promptly submit their existing plans 
for review by the Office of Education, and to submit a new 
plan of operation to the court for the 1969-70 school year 
within thirty days. If any board failed to submit a plan, 
one would be recommended by HEW. Pursuant to additional 
requirements by the appellate courts, all plans had to be 
approved by the district court by July 25, 1969.^® State 
Superintendent William J. Dodd referred to the HEW desegre­
gation plans as "crackpot social experiments" drawn up and 
forced on the state by "a host of Northern bureaucratic
'IQ
Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 303 F.Supp. 
1224 (E.D. La. 1969); 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969).
^Conley v. Lake Charles School Board, 303 F.Supp. 394 
(W.D. La. 1969).
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carpetbaggers and local scalawags" intent upon allowing HEW 
to seize control of the public schools.41
As the 1969-70 school year approached, the most serious 
trouble occurred in the state since the New Orleans desegre­
gation crisis of I960. Since 1954, massive integration had 
been merely conjecture, but now, talk and litigation were at 
an end and the destruction of the dual system was at hand as 
forty-four school systems were ordered to accomplish sub­
stantial desegregation. During the summer of 1969, branches 
of the Citizen's Committees for Quality Education (CCQE) 
sprang up around the state to unite whites in opposition to 
court orders that would bring about massive integration.
Led by Dr. Donald Roberts, the CCQE sponsored a demon­
stration of several thousand whites in a march to the State 
Capitol Building in Baton Rouge on August 16, 1969. There, 
Roberts called for a special session of the legislature to 
repeal the compulsory school attendance law, to grant public 
aid for private education, to file a suit against HEW due to 
its violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition of 
the use of busing to overcome racial imbalances in the 
schools, to establish ability grouping in the high schools, 
and to utilize the National Teachers Examination to deter­
mine competency of teachers in their subject areas and to 
replace "substandard teachers." The crowd booed the gover­
nor's executive secretary when he tried to explain that
^  New Orleans Times Picayune, July 11, 1969.
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everything possible had already been done at the state level 
to prevent massive integration, and that the governor was 
working with others for a return to freedom of choice.42
About this time, a Gallup Poll was released revealing 
that 44 percent of Americans felt that desegregation was
proceeding "too fast," 22 percent that it was "not fast
enough," and 25 percent that it was proceeding "about 
right." Most of those in the 44 percent category felt that 
quickened desegregation would promote racial strife and that 
a gradual approach was the best method by which to proceed. 
Among Northern white parents polled, 54 percent were opposed 
to sending their children to a school that was over half 
black, while 64 percent of Southern white parents were 
similarly opposed. The poll revealed that nearly half of 
Southern whites had finally accepted the principle of mas­
sive school integration, and that only 21 percent of them
were opposed to sending their children to a school with even
a few black students. Also, 47 percent of Southern whites 
did not object to schools with half black enrollment. By 
contrast, a similar poll conducted in 1963 had shown that 
61 percent of Southern whites were opposed to sending their 
children to schools with any blacks, and 78 percent were 
opposed to the idea of a school with half black enroll­
ment . 43
/ 2
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Aug. 17, 1969.
^ Ibid. ; New York Times, Sept. 2, 1969.
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Scattered trouble arose across Louisiana as the new 
school year approached. The most serious problems occurred 
in Iberia, Evangeline and St. Landry parishes in the south­
western part of the state. Violence at a high school and a 
march by black students in New Iberia to protest the closure 
of the black high school resulted in the closure of the 
city's only high school and imposition of a strict curfew 
for the following two nights. Hostile crowds in Evangeline 
and St. Landry Parishes forced school boards to close the 
schools indefinitely, and suits were filed in state court to 
force the boards to return to freedom of choice. However, 
on September 11, 1969, the federal courts ordered the two 
parishes to reopen their schools. When they reopened on the 
following day, a white boycott left them virtually all­
black. ^  Organizers in both parishes then set up private 
schools as alternatives to integrated public schools. By 
the end of the year, approximately 1800 of the 2000 white 
children in the Ville Platte area of Evangeline Parish were 
attending private schools. In November, about 4000 whites 
attended a rally in Opelousas in St. Landry Parish, with 
Governor McKeithen and several other state officials in 
attendance. The governor informed the crowd that if HEW 
plans were ordered in all of the schools, that the legisla­
ture would refuse to "vote a dime for public education," and
^Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Aug. 28, Sept. 3, 5,
13, 1969.
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called upon the federal government to treat Louisiana like 
the Northern states, where segregation existed legally.45
Scattered violence, boycotts and picketing occurred at 
several schools in parishes in the southeastern part of the 
state. Violence, street demonstrations and a few firebomb- 
ings occurred in Gonzales and Plaquemine in the parishes of 
Ascension and Iberville. In these areas, as well as in the 
parishes of St. John, St. James and West Baton Rouge, boy­
cotts and picketing significantly reduced the number of 
white students attending public schools. Because of contin­
ued violence, classes in Ascension and West Baton Rouge 
Parishes were suspended briefly.46
In the Florida Parishes area, problems were encountered 
mainly in Washington and Tangipahoa Parishes. In Washington 
Parish, federal marshals escorted black teachers and stu­
dents to some schools because of the threat of violence, and 
pickets and a small boycott plagued attendance at a few 
schools. In Tangipahoa Parish, boycotts and pickets were 
conducted and one school burned, with a strong suspicion of 
arson being the cause.47
Most areas in the central and northern part of the 
state were quiet. A rally in support of a boycott was 
staged in Concordia Parish, followed by a modest boycott on
^Read, Let Them Be Judged, 508-09.
^Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Aug. 26, 29, 30, 31, 
Sept. 3, 7, 10, 196$:
^ Ibid., Aug. 26, Sept. 7, 1969.
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the first day of school. In Grant Parish, blacks boycotted 
several schools because of the use of busing to achieve 
integration there. In North Louisiana, there was much talk 
of boycotts, picketing and the creation of private acade­
mies, but no serious incidents were reported.
Although several organized attempts were made by vari­
ous groups, including local chapters of the CCQE, to prevent 
the dissolution of the dual system, desegregation proceeded 
with surprising success. In most areas, members of the 
community realized that the fight to retain segregated 
schools was over and that widespread fears of racial vio­
lence were unfounded. Therefore, they decided to get on 
with the business of educating their children. Except for 
an occasional racial incident at a secondary school, the 
transition to a unitary system had been accomplished with a 
minimum of violence.
Despite all of the talk about the creation of private 
schools as alternatives for the desegregated public schools, 
few were actually established. In areas where parochial 
schools existed, they were filled to capacity and inundated 
with requests for new applications. The greatest increase 
in white private school enrollments came in the 1969-70 and 
1970-71 school years, when an additional 15,158 and 11,716 
students respectively entered nonpublic schools, while the 
public schools lost nearly 25,000 (4.5 percent) of their
*8Ibid., Sept. 8, 9, 1969.
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white students (table 12) during these two years. Between 
1969 and 1971, the largest number of new nonpublic schools 
were opened in Caddo (fourteen) and Ouachita (ten)
Parishes.49 However, once the initial reaction to 
desegregation had passed and economic pressures began to 
outweigh unfounded fears, whites returned to the public 
schools, resulting in the collapse of most of the hastily 
formed private schools and returning the parochial schools 
to their former enrollments. Exceptions were in areas where 
the only educational alternative was a predominantly black 
school or in primarily Catholic parts of South Louisiana.
On October 29, 1969, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Alexander v. Holmes, in which it 
declared that the standard of "all deliberate speed" set in 
the second Brown decision in 1955, was "no longer constitu­
tionally permissible." School districts were ordered to 
"terminate dual school systems at once and . . . operate now 
and hereafter only unitary schools." The major significance 
of this decision was that it vindicated the actions of lower 
federal courts exercising jurisdiction over Louisiana, and 
extinguished the last hopes by intransigent school systems 
that desegregation could be delayed long enough that the 
federal government might abandon its determination to bring 
about unitary school systems.
^Louisiana, State Department of Education. Louisiana 
School Directory Session 1970-71, 266.
■^Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 1218 (1969).
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Table 12
Louisiana School Enrollment, 1960-1976
Year
Public Nonpublic
White Black White Black
1960-61 429,078 279,899 113,541 24,828
1961-62 442,112 290,533 116,446 24,657
1962-63 460,589 301,433 118,466 24,689
1963-64 473,917 311,380 123,897 24,774
1964-65 487,039 318,966 125,428 24,420
1965-66 498,781 325,082 127,233 24,133
1966-67 510,965 331,040 131,162 23,188
1967-68 525,813 337,225 125,441 21,682
1968-69 545,829 344,482 118,276 20,266
1969-70 535,996 348,473 133,434 20,186
1970-71 521,146 349,470 145,150 20,528
1971-72 522,965 351,522 140,804 19,278
1972-73 — — — —
1973-74 518,327 352,140 136,408 20,258
1974-75 513,717 348,961 134,807 20,886
1975-76 521,152 350,081 134,808 21,563
Source: Louisiana, State Department of Education.
Louisiana School Directory, Sessions 1960-76.
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In November of 1969, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected Louisiana's request that it be allowed to return to 
freedom of choice, but took no action on a desegregation 
timetable for thirty-eight school systems, which had until 
the fall of 1970 to complete the transition to a unitary 
school system. As a result of this decision, seven members 
of the state's Congressional delegation sponsored a House 
bill to amend the 1964 Civil Rights Act to give parents 
freedom to select which school their children would attend, 
and to prohibit the withholding of federal assistance from a 
public school because of the racial composition of its stu­
dent b o d y . However, in December, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals adopted a strict view of the Alexander v. Holmes 
decision and declared all dual systems void.
In the Singleton v. Jackson (Singleton III) case, the 
Fifth Circuit Court struck down freedom of choice plans in 
six states, including several within Louisiana. Under the 
decision, faculties and staff would be merged by February 1, 
1970, and student bodies by the fall s e m e s t e r . 52 Two weeks 
later, though, the Supreme Court revised the Singleton III 
decision in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 
ordering three school boards to plan for desegregation of
*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 11, 25, 1969.
52 Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School 
District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969).
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student bodies as veil as faculty and staff by February 1, 
1970.53
The Carter decision brought massive Integration to Deep 
South public schools and divided the courts on how to 
enforce it. Many judges became concerned about having to 
disrupt the schools in the middle of a semester, because of 
the damage it would inflict on black and white children 
alike. Reluctantly, the Fifth Circuit Court voided its 
earlier decision delaying student integration and began 
remanding active school cases to the district courts to 
comply with the Carter decision and complete the transfor­
mation to unitary systems by February 1, 1970.54
Fifteen school systems in Louisiana were given less 
than two weeks to desegregate their student bodies, facul­
ties and staffs. Eight districts closed their schools for 
several days in order to move equipment from one school to 
another and to transfer students. In a few others, the 
change was made almost overnight and near chaos ruled as 
some schools reopened with nearly half of their teachers and 
students new. Except for a few scattered boycotts and 
heated discussions about creating private schools as 
"alternatives to the federal schools," cooler heads pre­
vailed and the unitary system was brought about with
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 90 
S.Ct. 611 (1969).
5 /
J Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School 
District, 425 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
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55
relatively few serious incidents. However, a second wave 
of student withdrawals now occurred as more parents began 
sending their children to nonpublic schools in the 1970-71 
school year. Approximately 6700 students had transferred to 
Catholic schools in the 1969-70 school year, with some evi­
dence showing that segregation was part of the reason for 
many of the transferals. However, the Louisiana Catholic 
Church officially discouraged such action and all parochial 
schools were now desegregated. The New Orleans Archdiocese 
responded that it had lost 1600 students in the past year, 
which offered some proof that there were no general trans­
fers of public school students into the Catholic schools to
avoid integration.56
Between January and August of 1970, the federal courts 
in Louisiana were primarily concerned with adjusting school 
desegregation plans to bring about a truly unitary school 
system as quickly as possible. Any remaining school system 
having a freedom of choice plan was ordered to adjust to 
another desegregation plan in order to complete the dissolu­
tion of its dual system. Subterfuges conducted by various 
school systems were quickly overruled. Among these was the 
transfer of all-black classes with their black teachers 
intact to previously all-white schools and continuing to
55 New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 30, 1970; Jackson 
Daily News, Feb. 4. 197b.
•^Chicago Tribune, Mar. 2, 1970.
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maintain a dual system within the schools themselves. The 
courts also exercised supervision over the integration of 
transportation, extracurricular activities, facilities, 
faculty and staff assignments, and majority-to-minority 
student transfers within the unitary system. School systems 
were also ordered to recover school equipment and books 
loaned to private schools, and to refrain from rendering any 
further assistance to private schools in the future. Mean­
while, on July 10, 1970, the director of the Internal
Revenue Service announced the beginning of a crackdown on 
private segregated schools in the S o u t h . 57
In April of 1971, the United States Supreme Court 
announced new guidelines for school desegregation in 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. The high 
court re-emphasized that its objective was "to eliminate 
from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segre­
gation," and expressed its opposition to "invidious racial
discrimination" in all aspects of the public schools. The
court upheld the setting of racial quotas for both faculty 
and student assignments when it was necessary, gerrymander­
ing of geographic attendance zones, and busing when it fos­
tered desegregation but did not harm children or the educa­
tional process, but overruled the neighborhood school
57 Johnson v. Jackson Parish School Board, 423 F.2d 1055 
(5th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Concordia Parish School Board, 3 
Race Relations Law Survey (hereinafter cited as RRLS) 174jwrur.—  ------------------  —
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concept for student assignments if it failed to bring about 
a unitary school system.58
The Swann case stirred up controversy almost immedi­
ately. Southern reaction was bitter because of the distinc­
tion being made between formerly de jure segregation in the 
South and present de facto segregation in other parts of the 
country. Lower federal courts viewed the decision with 
frustration and confusion. Instead of clarifying the situ­
ation, Swann created more problems than it attempted to 
resolve. Its vagueness on several points resulted in a 
split among the fifteen judges of the Fifth Circuit Court, 
which continued to reverse lower court rulings primarily 
because statistical evidence showed insufficient racial mix­
ing.' Swann was so perplexing that it became all things to 
all parties and became universally misunderstood, resulting 
in further litigation being filed in the overburdened fed­
eral courts. The Supreme Court was particularly remiss in 
failing to provide guidelines specifically outlining the 
limits of permissible busing, leaving the problem for the 
lower courts to determine what the outer boundaries were.
As a result of its shortcomings, Swann turned many district 
judges against the higher federal courts.59
58 Swann v. Chariotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
59 Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 551; Read, Let 
Them Be Judge5~| 530-31.
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Among the chief victims of integration were black 
teachers and principals. In several cases, principals were 
demoted, becoming assistants under less qualified white 
principals, and were initially passed over for advancements 
or relegated to minor positions within the central office. 
Many black teachers were dismissed on various grounds, often 
being told no reason other than that they had been displaced 
because of desegregation. Most of the demoted or dismissed 
educators took no action against school boards because of 
their reluctance to jeopardize their future employment pos­
sibilities. Only a few stalwart blacks challenged the 
injustices rendered to them and brought suit against their 
boards.
As early as 1966, the federal courts and HEW began to 
consider faculty desegregation in earnest. In that year, 
the courts ruled that desegregation covered faculties and 
staff as well as student bodies, and new HEW guidelines 
included demands for at least token integration of faculties 
as part of the requirements for compliance with the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. The first faculty integration began in 
New Orleans in the fall of 1966, when two black teachers 
were assigned to two predominantly white schools, and two 
white teachers were assigned to a reverse situation. New 
teachers applying in Baton Rouge were informed that they 
would be assigned to any position that might become
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available regardless of the racial composition of a 
school.60
As schools underwent the transformation from dual to 
unitary systems, federal courts became increasingly vigilant 
about the treatment of black educators by their school 
boards. In various court cases, the judiciary established 
new dictums for the adjustment to integrated faculties. The 
qualifications of all teachers in a school system had to be 
taken into account and "objective standards" used to evalu­
ate them. Only the least qualified educators were to be 
dismissed, and they were to be given the first opportunity 
to be rehired when vacancies became available.6*
The Singleton decision of 1969 ordered several parishes 
to merge their faculties and staff by February 1, 1970. 
Thereafter, most school systems in Louisiana were either 
already operating under a unitary system or about to, so the 
courts increased their surveillance of the treatment of 
black educators within the single school system. Boards 
were not allowed to reassign a staff member if he received 
less pay, less responsibility or was required to exercise a 
lesser degree of skill than under his previous assignment.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit Court ruled in 1970, that a 
merit system could be used as a standard for employment,
^ Southern Education Reporting Service, "School 
Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, Louisiana"
2 (August 1967).
^Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F.Supp. 578 (W.D. La. 
1969).
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promotion and reduction of staff once a truly unitary system 
had been created. However, nondiscriminatory, objective and 
reasonable criteria had to be utilized.^
Most of the initial friction between black and white 
teachers declined substantially after the first full year of 
massive integration in a school district. However, many 
black educators continued to be subjected in the 1970's to 
racial stress, charges of incompetence from white students 
and parents, and unequal treatment by school board personnel 
and colleagues. Blacks were often bitter because of imper­
tinent white students who ridiculed their ability to teach, 
and resented snubs by white teachers in lunchrooms and 
faculty lounges. They also felt that they were being dis­
criminated against for promotions in subtle but legal ways 
as newer and tougher criteria were developed to keep most
blacks out of the upper ranks of the central office staff.
In the absence of provable evidence of racial intent and due 
to the high cost of interminable litigation against the 
school board, most problems were settled out of court, with
little feeling of vindication by b l a c k s .
On the other hand, many of the white appointees to 
predominantly black schools were young, inexperienced and 
ill-prepared for teaching black students. Having little
62Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School 
District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969); Carter v. West 
Feliciana Parish School Board, 2 RRLS 173 (1970).
^Read, Let Them Be Judged, 513; confidential 
communication.
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notion of black language, customs, deprivation and pride, 
many white teachers quit out of frustration, burn-out or 
racial animosity. Many black educators still feel that 
white teachers emerging from today's colleges are poorly- 
equipped to deal with ghetto-type situations in many inner- 
city school systems, where they are usually initially 
assigned. Not until they have gained experience and tenure 
are they transferred to "better" schools, which has resulted 
in an extremely high turnover in teaching positions in 
schools where a large black enrollment predominates due to 
center city decay and white flight to the s u b u r b s . ^
Public School Desegregation after 1971
By the end of 1971, a unitary student body and faculty 
had been achieved in most of the state's sixty-six public 
school districts (the separate Lake Charles district had 
merged with the Calcasieu Parish school system). However, 
the courts were still compelled to consider other public 
school areas in order to remove the lingering effects of the 
dual system provided under de jure segregation. Among the 
areas examined were the issues of testing, continued use of 
racist symbols within desegregated schools, rules of disci­
pline, busing, new school construction and abandonment, 
private schools and reapportionment of school districts.
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Among the devices employed by several school systems 
after the establishment of the unitary system was the admin­
istration of various testing procedures to assess and place 
students. Admittedly, some systems legitimately desired to 
place students in classes that would impart maximum benefits 
and assistance in the transformation from all-black to 
integrated schools. For various reasons many black children 
performed poorly on standardized tests and were academically 
behind the average white student, resulting in their inordi­
nate assignment to lower classes based on their achievement 
scores. The federal courts decided that this was another 
stigma imposed on black children and ordered the discontinu­
ation of all such testing and placement until the demonstra­
tion of proof that the unitary system was being operated on 
a nondiscriminatory basis. Realizing the disparities 
between white and black children, the court ordered the 
implementation of remedial programs so that blacks could 
receive guidance and the opportunity to advance to their 
natural level of performance. Otherwise, all students were 
to be assigned to "heterogeneous, racially integrated 
classes."^5
Another problem encountered by many black children was 
the continued use of indicia of white supremacy and segre­
gation at desegregated formerly all-white schools. When a
65Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 3 RRLS 92 
(1971); Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 330 F.Supp. 
1340 (E.D. La. 1971).
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St. Tammany Parish principal of an integrated high school 
continued to display a Confederate battle flag beside 
American and Louisiana flags, a federal district court in 
1970 ordered that "all Confederate flags, banners, signs 
expressing the board's or its employees' desire to maintain 
segregated schools, and all other symbols or indicia of 
racism shall be removed from the schools and shall not be 
officially displayed at school functions of any kind." In a 
similar case decided in early 1971, a state district court 
dismissed a suit to void the decision by the Orleans Parish 
School Board to discontinue the use of the Confederate flag 
as the school banner at a local integrated high school and 
the term "Rebels" for its athletic teams. The board had 
taken such action at the request of the parish superinten­
dent, who had been petitioned by black students to do so.
The state court found the board's procedure to be within its 
powers.
With the establishment of unitary school systems, a 
degree of trouble could be expected from both black and 
white students, who were not yet acclimated to the new 
situation. When violence broke out at some of the high 
schools in the early 1970's, the application of disciplinary 
rules was called into question. In a case brought by black 
students challenging the constitutionality of Louisiana's
^Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 316 F.Supp. 
1174 (E.D. La. 1970); Gaillot v. Orleans Parish School 
Board, 3 RRLS 51 (1971).
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school district disciplinary statutes, rules and regula­
tions, the federal courts strengthened the stand of the 
schools on discipline in early 1973. The courts held that 
the disciplinary statutes were not so vague as to infringe 
upon the First Amendment rights of students, despite the use 
of such phrases as "willful disobedience," "intentional 
disruption," "immoral or vicious practices" or "disturbs the 
school." The judiciary would not interfere with high school 
regulations involving the dress code and would leave some 
discretion to school authorities concerning school behavior. 
Although a student did not surrender his rights upon enter­
ing a school, neither was he allowed to openly disrupt the 
educational process to express a grievance.^7
One of the most controversial desegregation issues to 
strike the nation in the 1970's was the use of busing for 
the purpose of equalizing racial numbers. Several areas of 
Louisiana came under court-ordered busing because of the 
ineffectiveness of alternative desegregation plans to bring 
about a valid unitary school system. Among the first school 
districts to be required to implement busing of students was 
Jefferson Parish. In the summer of 1971, the school board 
was ordered to draw up a new desegregation plan in accor­
dance with Swann, with the possible use of busing to enhance 
greater integration of students. Although the board
67
Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 472 
F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973).
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submitted a plan, it did not recommend its adoption. Its 
scope entailed busing 3000 students (90 percent of whom were 
black), who had previously walked to neighborhood schools, 
to more distant schools with an average daily round trip of 
seven miles. Holding that some short-term disadvantages 
would have to be endured in order to achieve the long-term 
goal of a unitary system, the court ordered the plan imple­
mented for the 1971-72 school year.®®
By 1972, the vast majority of people in the country 
were opposed to court-ordered busing to desegregate the 
public schools. A Gallup Poll taken in 1972, showed that 
two-thirds of those polled approved of integrated schools, 
but that 69 percent were opposed to busing as a means for 
achieving that goal. Earlier in the year, President Richard 
Nixon addressed Congress on his plan to curtail court- 
ordered busing. His proposals included placing an immediate 
moratorium on busing pending a congressional investigation 
to establish judicial guidelines, prohibiting busing below 
the seventh grade, and allowing busing only if other reme­
dies failed. Although Congress did not adopt his recommen­
dations, its 1972 Amendments to the Higher Education Act 
included provisions which slowed the desegregation process 
and limited the use of federal funds for busing students to 
"overcome racial imbalance" or to "carry out a plan of
68Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 3 RRLS 
134 (1971).
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racial desegregation." All further court-ordered busing 
would be stayed until all current appeals were exhausted or 
until January 1974, federal funds would be used to finance 
busing only at the request of local school officials, and no 
federal official could require or encourage using busing 
unless "constitutionally required."69
Another area in which the federal courts took a harder 
line was on school construction, abandonment, consolidation 
and site selection. The school board in Jefferson Davis 
Parish closed two formerly all-black schools on the presump­
tion that whites would refuse to attend them and to support 
the school system. The courts ruled that boards were justi­
fied in closing old schools and constructing new ones in 
order to eradicate state-imposed segregation, but not for 
suspect reasons. In another case, the Fifth Circuit Court 
held that all future abandonment, consolidation, construc­
tion and site selection for new school buildings had to "be 
accomplished in a manner which will prevent re-establishment 
of the dual school system."70
When the Lafayette Parish School Board proposed to 
spend $5 million on improvements on schools, federal courts 
overruled it in 1973» on the grounds that the school board
69 Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 512-14; New York 
Times, Mar. lB"J 1972; 4 Race Relations Reporter 29-31 
(Nashville; Race Relations Information Center, January 
1973).
70 Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, 446 
F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1971); Dunn v. Livingston Parish 
School Board, 445 F. 2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
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had failed to establish "by preponderance of evidence" that 
its actions would not result in the resegregation of the 
school system. Before the board could approve school con­
struction proposals, it had to consider the extent to which 
existing facilities could be utilized, the inequities in the 
present plan of operation, the racial composition of the new 
schools, and whether the growth of an area to be served by 
new schools was the result of white flight from existing
schools.
White flight from the public schools was not as serious 
of a problem as the courts had earlier feared that it might 
be, except in areas where viable private alternatives 
existed. Between 1968 and 1971, major shifts occurred from 
public to nonpublic schools in the parishes of Caddo, 
Evangeline, Pointe Coupee, St. John and Tangipahoa (table 
13). Outside of these areas, there was no spontaneous and 
sustained decline in public school enrollment across the 
state as a reaction to massive integration (table 14). 
Instead, there was more often a gradual decline of white 
students in heavily black schools. After desegregation, 
many public schools experienced progressive losses of white 
students, as their families moved out of black school dis­
tricts and into predominantly white neighborhoods. Systems 
were then restructured so that schools with large black
71Trahan v. Lafayette Parish School Board, 362 F.Supp. 
503 (W.D. La. 1973).
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Table 13
Public and Private School Enrollment, 1968-1972
1968--69 1969--70 1970--71
Parish Public Private Public Private Public Private
Caddo 62,613 4,012 61,217 5,675 57,401 8,406
Evangeline 9,088 699 6,309 3,198 6,508 2,620
Pointe Coupee 6,078 868 4,206 1,755 5,137 1,661
St. James 6,718 1,118 6,500 1,379 5,958 2,218
Tang ipahoa 17,695 1,438 16,340 3,111 15,122 3,491
Source: Louisiana School Directory, Sessions 1969-71.
concentrations became even "blacker" with only a token num­
ber of whites in their enrollment, while suburban schools 
became essentially all-white. In New Orleans, which already 
had a we11-developed Roman Catholic parochial school system 
by I960, the process resulted in de facto establishment of 
several all-black, inner-city schools. A similar situation 
occurred in other cities which had sufficient private 
schools to serve as alternatives to the public schools, so 
that many central city schools were left virtually all-black 
by the 1970's.72
^Boyd v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, 505 F.2d 
632 (5th Cir. 1974); confidential communications.
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Table 14
















1967-68 1,010,161 863,038 85.4 147,123 14.6
1968-69 1,028,853 890,311 86.5 138,542 13.5
1969-70 1,038,093 884,473 85.2 153,620 14.8
1970-71 1,036,294 870,616 84.0 165,678 16.0
1971-72 1,034,570 874,488 84.5 160,082 15.5
1972-73 — — — — —
1973-74 1,026,726 870,468 84.8 156,258 15.2
1974-75 1,018,378 862,678 84.7 155,693 15.3
1975-76 1,027,604 871,233 84.8 156,371 15.2
Source; Louisiana School Directory, Sessions 1967-76
To counter the effects of white flight, federal courts 
ordered busing to equalize the black and white population 
within several school districts. Busing was implemented in 
several school systems of the Western District of the fed­
eral courts in Louisiana to arrive at an equitable racial 
balance due to changing residential patterns as whites 
migrated to the suburbs.
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Another problem that concerned the federal courts in 
the early 1970's was the issue of reapportionment and redis- 
tricting of school board election districts. The court's 
primary concerns were that the ideal goal of "one man, one 
vote" be attained and that all traces of de jure influence 
be removed. However, district courts tended to take local 
conditions and geography into consideration before deciding 
to approve or reject a redistricting plan. In general, they 
rejected any plan that deviated more than 2.5 percent from 
the "one man, one vote" principle. Although the courts pre­
ferred single-member districts, they were not averse to 
approving multi-member districts if they did not discrimi­
nate against or significantly dilute the voting power of
minorities.73
Desegregation of Trade and Vocational Schools
Trade and vocational schools were brought under 
desegregation orders prior to the integration of public 
elementary and secondary schools. As with the public 
schools, the state legislature established a separate system 
of white and black trade and vocational schools, then 
attempted to prevent the collapse of the de jure system of 
technical institutions. However, they eventually came under 
court orders to desegregate and complied reluctantly.
7 0
'^London v. East Feliciana Police Jury, 347 F.Supp. 132 
(E.D. La. 1972); Panior v. Iberville Parish School Board,
359 F.Supp. 425 (M.D. La. 1973); Chargois v. Vermilion 
Parish School Board, 348 F.Supp.498 (W.D. La. 1972).
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The first case to reach the courts concerning these 
institutions was that of Angel v. Louisiana State Board of 
Education. In May of I960, the federal district court in 
Baton Rouge enjoined the state from refusing to admit quali­
fied black students solely because of their race and color 
to trade schools in Crowley, Natchitoches, Greensburg, Lake 
Charles and Opelousas. A companion case, Allen v. State 
Board of Education, was also settled at this time, enjoining 
the state from refusing to admit black students to a trade
school in Shreveport.
During the I960 regular session of the state legisla­
ture, a series of laws were enacted in an effort to prevent 
the desegregation of the state's trade schools in the fall. 
One act directed the governor to close any state trade or 
special school "in case of disorder, riots, or violence," or 
that "he deemed necessary to prevent" such turmoil. Another 
act provided for the classification of extant state trade 
and special schools for the exclusive use by "non-negro and 
negro students," granted the legislature exclusive power to 
reclassify such schools, and placed them under the "exclu­
sive control, management and administration" of the governor 
if they came under a court order to segregate. Two other 
acts prohibited furnishing school supplies or funds or
^Angel v. State Board of Education, 5 RRLR 652-53 
(I960); Allen v. State Board of Education, 287 F.2d 32 (5th 
Cir., 1961); New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 30, May 26, 
I960.
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recognition to desegregated state trade and special schools, 
and empowered the governor to alienate their property to 
private persons if they were closed.75
Following the Angel and Allen decisions of I960, the 
state appealed on the grounds that the State Board of 
Education, which operated the trade schools named in the 
suits, was an agency of the state and could not be sued 
without the state's consent. However, the Fifth Circuit 
Court overruled this argument and ordered desegregation of 
the vocational schools to proceed. When the Shreveport 
facility had not desegregated by the summer of 1962, a fed­
eral district court ordered the defendants to show cause why 
they should not be held in civil and criminal contempt for 
their refusal to obey the court's order. In September, the 
State Board of Education declared that it would admit all 
students requesting admission to these schools "without 
regard to race or color." However, more than twenty public 
trade and vocational schools not named in court suits still 
remained segregated.7®
Not until the middle of the 1960's was de jure 
operation of the state's trade and vocational schools 
brought to an end. In October of 1964, the courts prohibited
75Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 579, 
no. 580, no. 581, no. 582.
^State Board of Education v. Allen, 287 F.2d 32 (5th 
Cir. 1961); State Board of Education v. Angel, 287 F.2d 33 
(5th Cir. 1961); 8 RRLR 1075 (1963).
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discrimination against blacks seeking admission to Delgado 
Trades and Technical Institute in New Orleans. Five more 
facilities were ordered to desegregate in the following 
February, and the remaining eighteen in May of 1965. The 
Louisiana State Board of Education admitted the allegations 
and offered no defense. Therefore, the court enjoined it 
from refusing to accept applicants on the basis of race, 
refusing to enroll blacks because of their race, denying 
blacks the "full and equal use" of facilities, applying 
different admission procedures to blacks than for whites, 
and practicing racial discrimination in the operation of the 
trade schools. All of the state’s public trade and voca­
tional training schools were now under desegregation 
orders.
The school systems of Louisiana had come a long way 
since 1963. Nine years after Brown had ordered an end to de 
jure segregation in the public schools, only one school 
district in the state had undergone even limited desegrega­
tion. It took a combination of efforts by Congress, the 
executive branch and the federal courts to end the dual 
system of education. The impetus for modified integration 
of the state's public school systems was judicial action, 
with the reward of continued and expanded federal funding.
^Williams v. Board of Managers of the Delgado Training 
Institute, 9 RRLR 1783 (1964); United States v. State Board 
of Education, 10 RRLR 1205 (1965); New Orleans Times 
Picayune, Oct. 10“ T?64, Feb. 19, May 8, 1965.
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However, not until 1965 did a majority of school systems 
submit to any form of desegregation.
Under the guise of freedom of choice, school systems 
bridged the gap between compliance and noncompliance with 
the guidelines of HEW and the dictates of the federal 
courts. Freedom of choice succeeded to the extent that it 
brought about initial integration gradually and with a modi­
cum of violence. Most probably, if massive integration had 
come about suddenly, it would have spurred violent opposi­
tion that may have wrecked public education and taken a toll 
in lives and property. Nevertheless, freedom of choice 
failed because it gave whites a respite in disestablishing 
the dual education system, and placed the burden for inte­
gration on the backs of black parents who were products of a 
century of oppressive measures that stifled any intention to 
cross the color line. Since state and local officials would 
do only what was required of them, only by the heavy hand of 
the federal government could the segregated system be swept 
away.
Mainly through the actions of the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and a tardy Supreme Court, the dual education 
system was finally brought to an end in Louisiana. After 
every grade had been opened to integration and freedom of 
choice plans had been fulfilled, federal courts began to 
order school systems to adopt alternate plans which would 
bring about a unitary system more quickly and effectively. 
What had been considered impossible to do between 1954 and
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1969* was now accomplished from 1969 to 1971, as unitary 
systems replaced dual systems. Although there was serious 
opposition in scattered parts of the state, fears of a 
wholesale white retreat from the public schools and wide­
spread violence did not materialize. Most parents begrudg­
ingly accepted a situation over which they had no control, 
and allowed the education of their children to proceed.
With the attainment of unitary school systems by the 
end of 1971, the courts turned to eradicating the remaining 
traces of the de jure system of segregation. To prevent 
the resegregation of school systems, the judiciary became 
vigilant over testing and placement procedures, transporta­
tion and school assignments, faculty assignment and dis­
placement, school construction and closings, and school dis­
trict reapportionment. Particularly troubling for the 
courts in Louisiana, as elsewhere in the nation, were chang­
ing residential patterns resulting from white migration to 
the suburbs. A de facto system of racial and economic 
segregation was created as neighborhood schools in the inner 
cities became virtually all-black and suburban schools 
essentially all-white. The most effective means for resolv­
ing this problem was through busing. However, there was a 
noted lack of support among two-thirds of Americans or from 
more conservative Presidential administrations, Congresses, 
and Supreme Court Justices in the 1970's. Although busing 
was considered to be an impractical solution, no other plan 
surfaced which had a more realistic chance for success.
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Chapter VII 
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 
Introduction
The foundations of racial segregation in government- 
operated, maintained and leased public facilities derived
from de jure origins, and were, therefore, easier to
eradicate than segregation in areas such as housing or 
employment, which had primarily de facto origins. Among the 
facilities funded or maintained by the state, parishes or 
municipalities were government buildings, medical facili­
ties, correctional institutions, auditoriums and recrea­
tional facilities.
Most of the steps taken to erase segregation from the
operation of government-sponsored facilities were initiated
by the federal courts. Since discrimination in public 
facilities was often based on law, it was easier to prove 
state discrimination and to void artifices employed to 
continue the segregated system. The Civil Rights Act of 
1964 capped the activities of the federal courts and removed 
any uncertainty about the intentions of the federal govern­
ment toward de jure segregation in public facilities. 
However, more intricate maneuvers continued to provide a 
means for continuing covert separation of blacks and whites.
275
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Arbitrary discrimination in the use of public facili­
ties by the State of Louisiana and its political subdivi­
sions rested upon a network of laws dating to the first 
quarter of the twentieth century, then bolstered by new 
legislation enacted during the desperate days of massive 
resistance in the mid-1950's. By 1963, the entire system of 
de jure segregation was tottering on the brink of collapse. 
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
assault on segregated public facilities was complete, and 
only a few isolated cases surfaced in the courts thereafter. 
In most instances, the federal judiciary had established 
precedents elsewhere within the nation, so that federal 
district courts or the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had 
simply to re-apply earlier desegregation decisions to cases 
arising within Louisiana.
Federal Policy in Regard to Public Facilities
Prior to 1954, the United States Supreme Court heard 
few cases dealing with public institutions other than public 
schools. The court appeared to be deliberately evading a 
sensitive issue since it generally denied certiorari 
(declined to hear a case on appeal), reversed, or dismissed 
appeals on a technicality. The two Brown decisions of 1954 
and 1955 displayed a precise and deliberate effort by the 
high court to eliminate de jure segregation from 
tax-supported public facilities. Thereafter, it adopted the 
view that segregation in the operation of public facilities
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by the government or any of its agencies was a violation of 
the United States Constitution.
The two post-Brown decisions that established the 
Supreme Court's subsequent stand on public facilities were 
Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore and Holmes v. Atlanta, both 
decided in 1955. In Dawson, the court affirmed a federal 
appeals court reversal that voided Baltimore's segregated 
public beach and bathhouse policy, while Holmes extended the 
Brown decision to Atlanta's municipal golf courses.1 
Although both of these cases were based fundamentally on de 
jure discrimination, later litigation involved more intri­
cate devices adopted by Southern states and municipalities 
to continue segregation in public facilities. Subsequently, 
the Supreme Court adopted a policy of restraint, opting to 
either deny certiorari or affirm lower court decisions 
without comment, rather than becoming embroiled in court 
challenges arising over the desegregation of public facili­
ties .
Following federal rejection of state and municipal 
legislation mandating segregated public facilities, Southern 
authorities resorted to leasing publicly-owned facilities to 
private lessees, with the understanding that proprietors 
would continue to operate them on a segregated basis or for 
the exclusive use of whites only. Theoretically, this
^Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); 
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
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subterfuge would conceal the state from direct involvement 
in maintaining segregation. However, the federal courts 
remained vigilant and declared this maneuver an unlawful 
attempt to transform private lessees into state agents for 
the purpose of sustaining a prohibited policy.
In 1956 and 1957, the Supreme Court affirmed judgments 
in two cases involving government leasing of public facili­
ties by taking no action on them. Lower federal courts 
extended the Supreme Court ban on racial discrimination by 
the state to that of the lessee. In one case, lower courts 
had held that a private lessee of public property could not 
discriminate on racial grounds. The other case involved a 
privately leased restaurant located in a Texas courthouse, 
which linked publicly-owned facilities with the issue of 
privately-operated public accommodations. By refusing to 
take action on either case, the Supreme Court succeeded in 
securing its intentions without having to become involved.^
Alarmed that the federal courts were becoming increas­
ingly aggressive in ordering the desegregation of public 
facilities, the Louisiana State Legislature of 1956 adopted 
a harsher stand on segregation by proposing a state consti­
tutional amendment which was adopted by the voters in 
November of that year. Using the United States
2
Department of Conservation and Transportation v. Tate 
231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), 352 U.S. 838 (1956); 
Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), 353 
U.S. 924 (1957).
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Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment guarantee of a state from 
suit without its consent, the legislature interposed the 
state's will and immunity by prohibiting suits against state 
agencies that perpetuated racial discrimination. The state 
amendment further required the recall of members of any 
state agency that ordered the integration of any tax- 
supported facility, and removed integrated facilities from 
operating as a function of government.3
In 1961, the Supreme Court broke its self-imposed 
silence on the issue of leasing government property that was 
being used to perpetuate racial segregation. It declared in 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority that leasing 
government-owned facilities to private individuals who 
operated it on a segregated basis, constituted state 
involvement. The court took its final stand on the issue- of 
segregated public faciliites in Hamilton v. Alabama in 1963, 
when it declared that this subject was no longer open to 
debate in federal courts.^ Although the fight continued in 
the lower federal courts, the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 put a Congressional blessing on the actions of 
the federal courts and enabled the Justice Department to 
adopt a more active role in dismantling de facto segregation 
in both privately and publicly operated facilities.
Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 613.
^Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 
(1961); Hamilton v. Alabama (1963).
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Government Buildings
Considering the nature of this type of discrimination, 
it was extremely difficult for a state government agency to 
practice overt segregation within its own buildings after 
1955. When such practices fell quickly after being chal­
lenged in federal court, means were found to subvert federal 
demands, primarily by resorting to the private lease system. 
Since most of the landmark federal cases arose outside of 
Louisiana, federal district and appeals courts simply 
applied these decisions to test cases in the state when they 
arose. By and large, when the test cases failed, government 
agencies dismantled all visible indications of de jure 
segregation and, at least on the surface, appeared to be in 
compliance with federal dictates.
After voiding state laws that established segregation 
in government facilities, the federal courts concentrated 
their efforts on private leasing in the early 1960's. A 
federal district court cited the Burton case of 1961 in 
requiring restaurant, bar and lounge facilities in the New 
Orleans airport to desegregate in 1962, even though they 
were leased by the city to a private corporation. The 
courts also ordered the desegregation of privately leased 
cafeterias that were located in the New Orleans and Baton 
Rouge City Hall buildings in 1964. ^
^Adams v. City of New Orleans, 208 F.Supp. 427 (E.D.
La. 1962); Castle v. Davis, 9 RRLR 884 (1964); New Orleans 
Times Picayune, Feb. 14, 1964.
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Another type of segregation existed within the halls of 
justice themselves. One of the time-honored Southern tradi­
tions was to segregate seating within the state's courtrooms 
and to provide separate restrooms, water fountains and 
lunchroom facilities within the building. During the public 
defamation trial of 6. Elton Cox in 1962, several seats 
designated for the use of whites in an East Baton Rouge 
Parish courtroom were vacant while numerous blacks stood 
outside because their section was filled. Three blacks who 
sat in the white section were arrested when they refused to 
leave the area. The judge responded that the separate 
seating policy was a custom intended "to keep order," and 
that he had already ordered half of the seats in the white 
section to be used by blacks during the trial. He subse­
quently denied a motion by Cox's attorney that the segre­
gated policy in seating and facilities be overturned.® A 
year later, though, the Supreme Court ruled that courtrooms 
were public facilities and overturned segregated seating in 
Virginia state courtrooms.7 Less than a month later, using 
this decision, the high court voided the convictions of the
Q
three blacks who had refused to move during the Cox trial.
6
New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 3 0 ,  1 9 6 2 ;  Baton Rouge 
State Times, Nov 171 2 6 ,  2 7 ,  1 9 6 2 ,  May 8, 1 9 6 3 .
 1-----
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
8
George v. Clemmons, 83 S.Ct. 1296 (1963); Baton Rouge 
State Times, May 14, 1963.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
282
It was not until 1976, that the State of Louisiana went 
on record to protect public access to public meetings held 
in public buildings. Defining a public meeting as "a meet­
ing which is advertised as being open to the public," the 
state legislature enacted a law prohibiting the denial of 
any person access to any public meeting in any public build­
ing used or owned by the state or one of its political sub­
divisions on the grounds of race, color or creed.9
Auditoriums
Where public auditoriums were maintained, the rule of 
"separate but equal" was often applied to prevent the pos­
sibility of federal desegregation orders on the grounds of 
denial of access by blacks to public facilities that were 
accorded to whites. However, where only one auditorium 
existed, blacks were either denied use or compelled to 
submit to prior approval by arbitrary white authorities 
before access would be granted to them.
It was almost inevitable that a test case would arise 
in New Orleans, with its large and active black population, 
over the use of white-designated public auditoriums by 
blacks for black causes. In 1961, the black Longshoreman's 
Better Conditions Club contracted with the city to use its 
municipal auditorium. When city officials learned of the 
nature of the meeting and its list of speakers, which
Q
Acts of Louisiana, 1976, Regular Session, no. 700.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
283
included Martin Luther King, the contract was cancelled.
The black group won a temporary restraining order from a 
local district court, prevailing over the city fathers for 
less than three hours before the city won an appeal.
Two years later, a similar situation arose in New 
Orleans when the NAACP sought an injunction requiring city 
officials to grant black citizens equal access to the audi­
torium. The federal district court noted that the city had 
permitted the notoriously racist White Citizens' Council to 
use the facility, but had denied a similar request by the 
NAACP. The court, therefore, enjoined city officials from 
discriminatory allocation of the auditorium, and prohibited 
segregation and denial of its use to groups that advocated 
desegregation.^
In many smaller municipalities, such as Houma, located 
in the southeastern part of Louisiana, separate facilities 
had been provided for the use of whites and blacks in an 
attempt to avoid federal charges of racial discrimination. 
The Houma Municipal Auditorium was used by whites, while the 
Dumas Auditorium was constructed for the use of blacks.
Only with the passage of the public accommodations section 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did this situation come to an 
end, and Houma, along with other municipalities in the
^Longshoreman’s Better Conditions Club v. New Orleans, 
7 RRLR 194 (1961).
^Bynum v. Schiro, 218 F.Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963),
375 U.S. 395 (1964).
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state, dropped segregated requirements and reluctantly 
adopted a policy of free access to public facilities on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. By that time, most municipalities 
in Louisiana had come to realize that resistance to feder­
ally ordered desegregation was futile, and nearly all of 
them decided to comply voluntarily.
Medical Facilities
Segregation in medical facilities was almost equally 
based on de jure and de facto origins. Blacks who chose to 
enter the medical field were likely to experience discrimi­
nation in education and training programs, employment, and 
medical and professional staff appointments. Individual 
blacks who sought medical attention were most likely to 
encounter such practices as being housed in the older por­
tions of hospitals where they often received treatment with 
antiquated equipment and condescension from the all-white 
staff, in contrast to whites who occupied the more modern 
areas and had access to state-of-the-art facilities. Blacks 
were also subjected to segregation in wards, private and 
semi-private rooms, use of lavatories, eating facilities, 
entranceways, emergency rooms, maternity wards and nurser­
ies, and ambulance services. It was common for blacks to 
encounter poor service, requests for more financial proof 
than from whites for admission, and outright discourtesy 
from hospital personnel. To make matters worse, much of the
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bias applied to blacks until 1964 could be justified by fed­
eral regulations governing hospitals.*2
The Hill-Burton Act of 1946, which governed public 
hospitals under the jurisdiction of the Public Health 
Service, included a nondiscrimination clause which provided 
that state hospital construction plans "shall provide for 
adequate hospital facilities for the people residing in a 
state without discrimination on account of race, creed or 
color." However, the Surgeon General of the United States 
was authorized to establish regulations whereby the anti- 
discrimination clause could be bypassed by the establishment 
of "separate hospital facilities" for "separate population 
groups" as long as "equitable provision" was made for each 
group. Under this rationale, hospitals in the Southern 
states were provided with the means for continuing de jure 
and de facto segregation of medical patients.*3
In the early 1960's, segregation in public and private 
medical facilities in Louisiana was the norm. As early as 
1902, the state legislature had decreed that blacks and 
whites would attend separate mental hospitals, although no 
such public facility for blacks was in existence at that 
time.1  ^ Two years later, the legislature provided for the
12Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 253; 
confidential communications.
13Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 255; Hill-Burton 
Act of 1946, TCHT'"'!:.'75=725, 60 5tat. 1040.
^Acts of Louisiana, 1902, Regular Session, no. 92.
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establishment of a separate "colored asylum," later named 
the Central Louisiana State Hospital and located in Rapides 
Parish.*5 Primarily because of their poor economic status, 
blacks tended to frequent state charitable clinics and hos­
pitals or went without medical care, while private hospitals 
and clinics were primarily attended by whites.
In the racist atmosphere that prevailed during the New 
Orleans school crisis of I960, the state legislature enacted 
two laws that were targeted at the use of state medical 
facilities by blacks. One act provided penalties for fraud 
and misrepresentation by persons applying for or assisting 
others in applying for admission to state hospitals, while 
the other law denied the use of charity hospitals to unwed 
mothers.^
Shortly thereafter, three major breakthroughs were made 
in the effort to destroy resistance to desegregation of 
medical facilities. They included the settlement of the 
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Hospital case, the amending of the 
Hill-Burton Act and the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.
The Simkins case involved a segregated Greensboro,
North Carolina, hospital which used Hill-Burton federal 
funds. A lower federal court ruled in 1962 that the
15Acts of Louisiana, 1904, Regular Session, no. 143.
^ Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 136, 
no. 251, no. 306.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
287
practice of racial discrimination in government owned, 
operated or subsidized hospitals violated due process and 
equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The hospital was ordered to open its facilities to black 
doctors, dentists and patients. In early 1964, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld this decision.*7 About this 
same time, the Surgeon General decided to amend the Hill- 
Burton Act. Under new regulations, all medical facilities 
receiving Hill-Burton funds were required to admit and treat 
black patients and professionals in a nondiscriminatory 
manner. Race, creed, color or national origin could not be 
considered in the admission of patients, in patient access 
to all hospital facilities and services, or in the employ­
ment of doctors, nurses, interns and medical technicians.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 capped the efforts by 
Congress to eliminate discrimination from the nation's 
medical facilities. Various sections of the act not only 
prohibited racial segregation but provided incentives to 
desegregate voluntarily. Title III empowered the United 
States Attorney General to bring suit to enjoin discrimi­
nation at public facilities owned and operated by state 
governments; Title VI required medical facilities to make
1 7 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Hospital, 211 F.Supp. 628 
(N.D.N.C. 1962), 376 U.S. 938 (1964); New Orleans Times 
Picayune, Mar. 3, 1964.
18Hospitals and Medical Facilities Amendments Act of 
1964, Pub. L. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447; Baton Rouse State Times, 
June 25, 1965.
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agreements with the federal government, pledging to operate 
without discrimination as a requirement for receiving addi­
tional federal funds; and Title IX permitted the Attorney 
General to intervene in suits by persons seeking relief from 
being denied equal treatment.*9 With coordinated action 
taken by all three branches of the federal government, 
racially segregated medical facilities soon vanished.
Most of the hospitals in Louisiana used federal funds 
for construction and indigent care, yet practiced racial 
segregation until the mid-1960's. In the New Orleans area, 
Charity Hospital received $1,243,824 for indigent care in 
1962-63, Touro Infirmary received over $1,820,000 to help 
construct a $5,000,000 addition, and DePaul Sanitarium also 
received Hill-Burton funding.
One of the first civil rights cases'involving Louisiana 
hospitals occurred in early 1963. Black activist Arthur 
Jelks asked the federal government to withhold $2,000,000 in 
Hill-Burton matching federal funds from a planned charity 
hospital in Baton Rouge until assurances were given that it 
would be operated on a nonracial basis, including the right 
of black physicians and nurses to be on staff at the pro­
posed medical facility.21 Less than a year later, spokesmen 
for Baton Rouge General and Our Lady of the Lake Hospitals
*^Civil Rights Act of 1964.
20New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 3, 1964.
21Baton Rouge State Times, Mar. 28, 1963.
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announced that two-thirds of the staffs of each facility had 
voted to permit black physicians to practice at each hospi­
tal. However, Dr. C. Grenes Cole, the executive secretary 
of the Louisiana State Medical Society promptly declared his 
opposition to the desegregation of public and private hos­
pital staffs.
In August of 1964, the first major suit in Louisiana 
to desegregate a medical facility was filed by Callie 
Castle, an elderly black woman, to integrate facilities at 
Charity Hospital in New Orleans. She contended that the 
hospital was being run in violation of the Fifth and 
Thirteenth Amendments, and Title III of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Following the filing of her suit, hospital 
administrators desegregated treatment in the emergency room 
and removed all "white" and "colored" signs. In January of 
1965, a hospital spokesman announced that a new system would 
begin to operate for handling persons applying for treatment 
and admission, without regard to race.^3
In February of 1965, state welfare officials declared 
that nursing homes receiving federal funds under the Kerr- 
Mills Medical Vendor Program must be willing to accept 
blacks or lose federal funding. Under the provisions of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, the State Department of Welfare,
22 Ibid., Feb. 25, 1964; New Orleans Times Picayune,
Mar. 4, 1964.
23Pittsburgh Courier, Aug. 1, 1964; New Orleans Times 
Picayune, Jan. 14, i£65.
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which received and supervised the distribution of federal 
funds for old age assistance, was required to receive assur­
ances from nursing homes that they were in compliance with 
federal guidelines. During the past year, the state agency 
had disbursed $6,000,000, and in January of 1965, had 
already paid out $577,675 to licensed nursing homes for the 
care of over four thousand elderly welfare p a t i e n t s . ^ 4
Citing discriminatory practices, the NAACP filed suit 
against several hospitals in the state in April of 1965, 
asking that public funds be cut off until they complied with 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The facilities that 
were charged included Our Lady of the Lake (Baton Rouge) for 
segregating wards and providing inferior facilities for 
blacks, Sara Mayo (New Orleans) for maintaining segregated 
facilities and refusing to allow black physicians to prac­
tice in the hospital, Touro Infirmary (New Orleans) for 
maintaining separate facilities for blacks and whites and 
refusing staff membership to blacks, and St. Patrick's (Lake 
Charles) for segregating patients and keeping separate 
towels and linens for black and white patients.^5
In the summer of 1965, H. Hunter Huckaby, president of 
the Louisiana Hospitals Association, announced that hospi­
tals in the state would have to desegregate if they wished 
to continue receiving federal funding, and that complete
2^Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 17, 1965.
25Ibid., Apr. 15, 1965.
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desegregation was only a matter of time, regardless of 
whether a medical facility received federal allotments. 
Approximately 72 percent of the money appropriated by the 
state to hospitals came from the federal government. In 
order for the state to continue to receive funding, it had 
to show that the money was distributed to institutions that 
were in compliance with the Civil Rights Act, Hill-Burton 
Act and other federal guidelines which prohibited racial 
discrimination in patient care and employment of medical 
personnel. In addition, any hospital with one hundred or 
more employees had to comply with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act, which became effective on July 2, 1965.
This law prohibited the hiring or firing of employees on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex.26
The final blow was struck against segregated medical * 
facilities in Louisiana with the issuance of an injunction 
against the State Department of Hospitals and various hos­
pital officials in December of 1965, for failure to comply 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Defendants were enjoined 
by federal courts from continuing to maintain segregation in 
wards, clinics, diagnostic or treatment areas, or in any 
other hospital facilities.^7 Faced with a determined 
federal government, most of the medical institutions in the
26Ibid., June 25, 1965.
27 Rax v. State Department of Hospitals, 11 RRLR 394 
(1965). ----
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state began at least partial compliance with federal guide­
lines, if for no better reason than to continue receiving 
lucrative federal funding and in order to participate in 
the new Medicare program.
Correctional Facilities
The state's segregated prison system was a more 
difficult problem to solve than other segregated public 
facilities. With the end of the convict-lease system in 
1901, the state purchased the Angola plantation property and 
established a state penal farm near the Mississippi River in 
West Feliciana Parish. In 1900, the state legislature 
enacted laws requiring segregation in the state peniten­
tiary, and required segregated facilities and accommodations 
in parish jails and prisons in 1918.28 The de jure system 
was extended to black male juveniles in 1926 and 1928, with 
the creation of a separate prison farm for black juveniles 
(the State Industrial School for Colored Youths).29 jn 
1938, the state legislature authorized the establishment in 
each parish of industrial schools for black males under 
eighteen years of age who were convicted for juvenile 
offenses. In addition, the legislature authorized judges in 
districts without separate prison farm facilities for blacks
28Acts of Louisiana, 1900, Regular Session, no. 70, 
1918, Regular Session, no. 251.
29Acts of Louisiana, 1926, Regular Session, no. 203, 
1928, Regular Session, no. 150.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
293
to sentence black juveniles to any prison district in the 
state where such facilities were available.30 However, 
while special correctional facilities were established for 
female white juveniles, none were ever created for female 
black juveniles.
It was not until 1968 that the United States Supreme 
Court ruled in Lee v. Washington that the operation of a 
racially segregated prison system in Alabama violated equal 
protection.31 in mid-1968, a federal judge in Louisiana 
commenced the cumbersome task of desegregating the state's 
correctional facilities. Citing Lee v. Washington, the 
court ordered state officials to begin working out an 
orderly desegregation plan for the state's jails, prisons 
and juvenile reformatories.32 About a month later, Orleans 
Parish prison officials began assigning inmates solely on 
the basis of their sex and status (women would be separated 
from men and first offenders would be separated from hard­
ened criminals).33
In 1969, major breakthroughs were made in the deseg­
regation of correctional facilities within Louisiana. Three 
black inmates of Orleans Parish Prison filed a federal suit
30Acts of Louisiana, 1938, Regular Session, no. 226, 
no. 127.
31Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
O O
New Orleans Times Picayune, June 22, 1968.
33Ibid., Aug. 2, 1968.
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against the prison's warden because of his failure to 
include them in a work program that would lead to their 
early release. White inmates were offered the opportunity 
to participate in a work program which offered "double good 
time," in which they could earn two days of sentence for 
each day working in the special program. The warden 
responded that he had already begun to desegregate the 
dining hall and recreation yard, but the federal court did 
not feel that this was sufficient. Therefore, it ordered 
the warden to provide work for all suitable persons regard­
less of race, and ordered the desegregation of all floors, 
cell blocks, cells and work details.34
In the spring of 1969, a federal district judge 
abolished segregation in Louisiana's juvenile correctional 
facilities, after declaring that black reformatories were 
far inferior to those provided for whites. However, the 
court realized the problems inherent in integrating a 
juvenile correctional institution and did not order its 
immediate desegregation.35 jn September, the court became 
dissatisfied with the procrastination of the state director 
of correctional facilities in presenting an adequate deseg­
regation plan, and ordered the desegregation of Louisiana 
Training Institute in Monroe, the State Industrial School
^Pounds v. Theard, 230 So.2d 861 (1970); New Orleans 
Times Picayune, Apr. 16, 1969.
^Major v. Sowers, 297 F.Supp. 664, 298 F.Supp. 1039 
(E.D. La. 1969).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
295
for Girls in Pineville and the State Industrial School for 
Colored Youth in Scotlandville. In the future, juveniles 
would be assigned to a facility on a geographic basis, while 
current inmates would be reassigned later on the same basis. 
All juvenile offenders in North Louisiana would be assigned 
to the Monroe and Pineville facilities by sex, while all 
offenders of both sexes in South Louisiana would be assigned 
to the Scotlandville reformatory. In addition, the court 
ordered the desegregation of faculties and staff at all
facilities.36
Not until the early 1970's were laws concerning segre­
gated juvenile and adult penal facilities corrected by the 
state legislature. In 1972, the legislature repealed laws 
requiring separate detention facilities for black and white 
juveniles, and changed the name of the formerly all-black 
juvenile reformatory to the "Parish Industrial School for 
Youths." Three years later, the legislature deleted the 
portion of the laws which permitted judges to sentence black 
juveniles to any prison district that maintained a special 
section for black juveniles, and deleted all provisions of 
the laws requiring racial segregation in prisons.37
og
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 4, 1969.
q7
Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 372, 
1975, Regular Session, no. 419, noT 4£6.
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Recreational Facilities
New Orleans and Baton Rouge were the major battlefields 
in the fight to desegregate recreational facilities in 
Louisiana. During the 1950's and early 1960's, both cities 
operated public parks, playgrounds, pools, community cen­
ters, amusement parks, tennis courts and golf courses on a 
segregated basis. In order to forestall the federal courts 
from voiding segregation of its recreational facilities, 
many Louisiana parishes and municipalities embarked on a 
building program in the 1950's to make separate and "equal" 
facilities available to blacks, or leased public recrea­
tional facilities to private individuals in order to cir­
cumvent federal court orders to desegregate. However, liti­
gation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought about an end 
to de jure segregation in recreational facilities across the 
state.
The first case challenging the segregated operation of 
recreational facilities in Louisiana was an NAACP suit in 
1949 to desegregate the City Park golf course and Audubon 
Park, both in New Orleans, on the grounds that there were no 
comparable facilities available for blacks. Mayor DeLesseps 
S. Morrison realized the city's error in failing to provide 
these facilities, and the threat it posed to the "white 
only" recreation system in light of recent court decisions 
on higher education declaring against unequal educational 
opportunities for blacks. Therefore, the mayor appealed to
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segregation logic and persuaded the residents of Gentilly, a 
suburb of New Orleans, to agree to the location of a black 
park in their area. He emphasized strongly that their 
refusal would endanger the entire system of segregated 
recreational facilities, and would heighten chances for 
court-ordered desegregation. In 1956, Pontchartrain Park 
and Golf Course opened for the use of blacks, with picnic 
grounds, tennis courts and a baseball field.38 During the 
interim before this park opened, an agreement was reached 
between city officials and black community leaders in 1952 
at the request of United States District Court Judge J. 
Skelly Wright. Blacks would be permitted to use one golf 
course and three tennis courts on Tuesdays and Fridays, and 
they were allowed to frequent the zoo portion of Audubon 
Park but none of the park's other facilities.39
Although New Orleans had been willing to temporarily 
appease black aspirations, many other municipalities in the 
South were not so willing to accommodate them, resulting in 
a flurry of federal desegregation orders. In 1951, federal 
courts voided Houston's policy of denying blacks the use of 
golf courses located within white city parks. The Supreme 
Court voided the policy of Louisville, Kentucky, which 
provided separate facilities for whites and blacks and 
excluded blacks from using an amphitheater located in a
^Haas, Delesseps S. Morrison, 75-76.
*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 8, 1955.
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white city park in 1954. Atlanta was ordered to desegregate 
its municipal golf courses and Baltimore its public beaches 
and bathhouses in 1955. At this time, New Orleans was in 
the process of building Pontchartrain Park and Baton Rouge 
had just completed construction of a separate golf course 
for its black residents. In the following year, the Supreme 
Court affirmed a lower court decision that voided a Virginia 
state park lease and extended the high court's ban on dis­
crimination in leasing public property to include a ban on 
discrimination in selling public property, if negotiations 
included an attempt to continue segregation by the sale or 
lease of such property.^®
In 1956, state and local officials were alarmed at the 
Supteme Court's actions in banning segregation in public 
parks, playgrounds and golf courses outside of Louisiana.
In April, park and recreation officials from New Orleans, 
Monroe, Zachary, Thibodaux, Baton Rouge, Arabi, Lake 
Charles, Lafayette and Shreveport met in Baton Rouge and 
adopted three resolutions designed to maintain segregated 
park facilities. Their proposals revolved around the issue 
of interposition, requesting the state legislature to enact
^Holcombe v. Beal (1951); Muir v. Louisville Park 
Theatrical Association, 347 U.S. 951 (1954); Holmes v. 
Atlanta (1955); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore (1955); 
Department of Conservation and Development v. Tate (1956); 
New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 9, 1955.
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a constitutional amendment withdrawing the state's consent 
to suit over parks and recreation.
When the legislature met in the spring of 1956, it 
proceeded to enact four laws to interpose state authority 
behind the separation of the races in all parishes and 
municipalities. Thus far, the only state segregation law 
dealing with public accommodations was a 1914 act that 
required separate entrances and ticket offices for blacks 
and whites at circuses.^2 Segregation in recreational 
facilities rested largely on custom and on parish or city 
ordinances. Now, the state legislature became determined to 
place its weight behind this form of segregation as part of 
its program of massive resistance to keep the federal courts 
at bay. The state's police powers, as interpreted by state 
authorities under the powers reserved to the states in the 
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, were 
invoked to justify state segregation laws. A state mandate 
was established for the segregated operation of all "public 
parks, recreation centers, play grounds, community centers 
and other facilities at which swimming, dancing, golfing, 
skating or other recreational activities are conducted." 
Although mixed audiences were permitted at such facilities, 
separate seating and sanitary facilities had to be provided. 
With an eye to possible federal intervention in segregated
^*New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 5, 1956.
/ 9
Acts of Louisiana, 1914, Regular Session, no. 235.
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public facilities, the legislature invoked the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution by proposing a state 
constitutional amendment withdrawing the consent of the 
state to suits against state agencies with recreational and 
educational activities. Included within its scope were the 
State Parks Commission, Recreational and Park Commission for 
East Baton Rouge Parish, and all recreational districts of 
the state. Essentially, the state legislature had attempted 
to interpose itself between the federal courts and parish 
and municipal authorities to continue the practice of dis­
criminatory use of public recreational facilities.43
An additional law enacted by the 1956 state legislature 
prohibited interracial participation in "dancing, social 
functions, entertainments, athletic training, games, sports 
or contests and other such activities involving personal and 
social contacts." Sponsors of such programs were required 
to provide separate seating, sanitary, drinking water and 
other facilities, and "to mark such separate accommodation 
and facilities with signs printed in bold letters." Neither 
race was permitted to use the facilities and seating of . 
another r a c e .
The segregated system of parks and recreation of New 
Orleans came under attack once again in 1957» when a federal
L%Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 14, no. 
613; 1 RRLR 73T-32'(1956).
44lbid., no. 579.
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district court voided the state law and city ordinance that 
required the segregated operation of City Park. However, 
city officials declared that they would not stop enforcing 
segregation ordinances until all appeals were exhausted.
In the following year, the Supreme Court upheld the lower 
court's desegregation order.45 However, public parks, 
playgrounds, community centers, amusement parks, swimming 
pools and other public facilities remained segregated for 
several more years.
Beginning in late 1962, a new drive began to desegre­
gate public facilities. In December, one hundred sixteen 
black children and their parents in New Orleans challenged 
the state law which required separate public parks and 
recreational facilities, and asked the federal courts to 
desegregate all of the city's public parks, playgrounds and 
community centers. At the time, the New Orleans Recreation 
Department (NORD) operated one hundred six playgrounds and 
centers (eighty-eight for whites and eighteen for blacks).46
During 1963, the tempo of protest and litigation to 
desegregate public recreational facilities accelerated. In 
June, NORD facilities and a New Orleans amusement park came 
under attack. Faced with possible desegregation of its 
pools because of a pending NAACP suit, NORD announced that
/c
Detiege v. New Orleans City Park Improvement 
Association, 252 F.2d 122 (1958); New Orleans Times 
Picayune, Oct. 21, 1958.
^New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 21, 1962.
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it would not open its seventeen swimming pools (eleven for 
whites and six for blacks) because of budget problems. 
However, its budget was actually $6000 higher than in the 
previous year. When blacks attempted to integrate the all- 
white Pontchartrain Beach midway and beach two weeks later, 
they were denied access on the grounds that the property had 
been leased by the city to a private lessee earlier in the 
day. At the end of July, the federal courts declared that 
New Orleans facilities were segregated by state statute as 
well as by custom, and that facilities provided for black 
residents were far inferior to those for whites. Therefore, 
a preliminary injunction was granted and New Orleans offi­
cials were required to desegregate all public recreational 
and cultural facilities and activities, including all one 
hundred six parks, recreation centers and playgrounds 
administered by NORD. The city ordinance and state "Anti- 
Mixing Statute," upon which the segregation was based, were 
declared void. However, private groups could continue to 
use publicly-owned and operated facilities on a segregated 
basis if the use did not involve city or state action in 
continuing segregation. NORD officials declared that the 
court decision changed nothing, since 99 percent of its 
programs were operated by private groups anyway.^7
^New Orleans Times Picayune, June 11, Aug. 2, 1963; 
Baton Rouge State Times, June 24, July 15, Aug. 2, 1963; 
Barthe v. City of New Orleans, 219 F.Supp. 788 (1963), 376 
U.S. 189 (1964).
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Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish recreational 
facilities became the targets of charges of racial discrim­
ination as early as 1953. At that time, officials admitted 
that they were operating a segregated system, but that the 
separate facilities provided for blacks were equal to those 
provided for whites. The court denied the motion in 1954, 
and no action was taken until plaintiffs requested a judg­
ment on their pleadings in December of 1962. City and 
parish officials sought the right to maintain the dual 
system of recreational facilities on the grounds of possible 
loss of revenue, violence and the likelihood of closures of 
facilities in the event of forced integration. However, in 
1964, the court overruled their actions and ordered the 
parish to immediately desegregate all of its public facil­
ities, In May of 1964, facilities at Baton Rouge public • 
golf courses and tennis courts were desegregated with few 
incidents.^
With the advent of the public accommodations section of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the question of de jure 
segregation and discrimination in the operation of tax- 
supported facilities was definitively settled. Neither the 
courts, Congress nor the executive branch would tolerate 
further delays in desegregating recreational facilities. 
Therefore, most cities of the South quietly removed all
/Q
New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec.21, 1962; Baton Rouge 
State Times, Dec.11, 1963, May 2b, 1964; Lagarde v. 
Recreation and Park Commission, 229 F.Supp. 379 (1964).
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segregation signs and grudgingly admitted all races on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to all such institutions. A new 
issue that arose at this time was the legality of closing 
public facilities in order to prevent having to desegregate 
them, particularly in the case of swimming pools. Many 
areas in the South opted to close public pools rather than 
allow such a "horror" as an integrated swimming facility to 
offend the minds of whites. New Orleans had closed its 
pools in 1963, while Baton Rouge closed its nine pools a 
year later on the grounds of increased operating costs. The 
Recreation and Parks Commission then announced that it would 
look into the feasibility of leasing the pools to private 
operators as the City of Houma had done. When challenged in 
federal court, the commission was informed that a city and 
parish were not required to provide recreational facilities. 
However, if they were provided, they could not be operated 
on a segregated basis.^9
A suit was brought against Jackson, Mississippi, which 
had also closed its swimming pools, and this case reached 
the Supreme Court in 1971. Perhaps reflecting its more 
conservative composition, the high court upheld the right of 
people, for any reason, to choose to operate or to close a 
public pool, as long as no one group was granted benefits 
while others were denied them. Since all pools in Jackson 
had been closed, all groups were denied the use of public
^Baton Rouge State Times, May 7, 9, 20, 26, 28, 1964.
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facilities, so the actions of Jackson officials were consti­
t u t i o n a l . ^  Therefore, similar action taken in Louisiana 
was also legal.
In 1972, the State of Louisiana finally put to rest the 
issue of segregation of all recreational facilities. By act 
of the state legislature, all provisions relating to sepa­
rate seating and sanitary facilities, and prohibitions of 
interracial personal and social contacts between blacks and 
whites at social functions, games, dancing and entertainment 
were deleted from the statute books.51 Although personal 
acts of discrimination still continued, all remaining de 
jure segregation had been outlawed finally by state action.
From the end of Reconstruction until 1956, the State of 
Louisiana had very limited involvement in de jure segrega­
tion of public facilities, with most of the regulations 
being enacted and enforced by local government bodies or 
custom. When it appeared that the federal courts would void 
municipal and parish segregation ordinances, the state leg­
islature of 1956 decided to become actively involved in the 
struggle to retain segregated facilities that were state- 
owned, operated and maintained through interposition of the 
legislature between the federal courts and local government 
agencies. When this maneuver failed, municipal and parish 
officials resorted to leasing public facilities to private
“^ Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
51 Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session ,no. 254.
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lessees. The courts voided this contrivance and demon­
strated their determination in the early 1960's to insure 
that equal protection of the law was practiced and, along 
with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, public 
officials in Louisiana were left with only three options. 
They could defy the courts and continue to provide segre­
gated public facilities, close all or part of the facili­
ties, or desegregate. Except in the case of swimming pools, 
defiance and closure were ruled out. Instead, municipal, 
parish and state officials decided to continue full opera­
tion of public facilities on a desegregated basis, since it 
was no longer possible to practice segregation by law.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter VIII
DESEGREGATION OF TRANSIT AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Introduction
The federal government was the primary agent in the 
desegregation of transit as well as in the area of public 
accommodations. The federal courts initiated the first 
attacks on segregated railway, streetcar, bus and airline 
facilities, and were gradually followed by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and Justice Department in the 1950's. 
However, not until the early 1960's were major strides 
accomplished, following a determined and coordinated federal 
drive to eliminate all remaining vestiges of de jure 
segregation in Southern transit. By 1965, all official 
municipal, parish and state policies requiring separation of 
the races in transportation were either abandoned or 
overturned by federal action, although the more difficult 
problem of de facto segregation remained to be resolved.
Unlike most areas that were desegregated, the source 
for desegregating privately-owned public accommodations in 
Louisiana was not the federal judiciary but Congressional 
legislation. Unquestionably, the courts played a key role 
in bringing down segregation, but, it was the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, supported by the federal courts and the Justice
307
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Department that ended discrimination in hotels, recreational 
facilities, restaurants and theaters. Until 1964, most 
public accommodations in the Southern states were still 
operated in a racially discriminatory manner, sanctioned by 
local custom and quasi-legal maneuvering. White 
Louisianians continued to practice private acts of segrega­
tion and denial in the use of facilities until ordered by 
the courts in the mid-1960's to cease such unlawful prac­
tices.
Segregated Transit Prior to 1940
Segregated transit began during the 1820's in 
Louisiana on New Orleans streetcars as a result of company 
policy rather than by ordinance or statute, and lasted until 
the advent of military Reconstruction in 1867. As early as 
1833, "star cars" were designated for black passengers by 
placing a black star on special cars that were to be used by 
blacks. During the federal occupation of New Orleans 
(1862-65), their use was banned briefly on two separate 
occasions, but "star cars" remained in use on a continuous 
basis until 1867. Federal authorities halted the segregated 
policy on streetcars after blacks attacked white-only cars 
in the spring of 1867. This situation was not characteris­
tic of Louisiana cities during Reconstruction, since most of 
them had no mass transit system similar to that of New 
Orleans, and no other city in the state contained a potent 
federal force to command obedience to an unpopular decree.
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White New Orleanians appeared to have accepted streetcar 
desegregation fairly well, at least outwardly, because they 
were powerless to prevent it.*
During Radical Reconstruction, the new Constitution of 
1868 guaranteed blacks "equal rights and privileges upon any 
conveyance of a public character", while the state legisla­
ture enacted a civil rights law prohibiting racial discrim­
ination on common carriers of passengers for hire in 1869.2 
When political Reconstruction of Louisiana ended in 1877 
with the ousting of Radical Republicans from control of the 
government, no immediate change in the operation of public 
transit was in evidence.
The first sign of impending trouble for black civil 
rights came with the case of Hall v. DeCuir in 1878. The 
United States Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's civi-l
rights act of 1869 as an unconstitutional burden on inter­
state commerce.3 Then, in the Civil Rights Cases (1883), 
the high court overturned the part of the federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 which had provided federal guarantees for 
black equality in public transit. The court determined that 
the Constitution prohibited the states from discrimination, 
but not private individuals.^ This ruling opened the door
^Fischer, The Segregation Struggle, 30-32, 38-39.
^Constitution of 1868, Article 13.
3Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
*Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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wider to segregation, a fact which Louisiana legislators 
recognized and exploited to prevent any further intermingl­
ing of the races in social situations. Their solution to 
the race problem became the doctrine of "separate but 
equal," beginning with railroads in 1890, waiting rooms in 
1894, streetcars in 1902, and buses and taxicabs in 1928.
The first Louisiana statute providing for segregated 
transit was enacted in 1890. The law provided for separate 
but equal accommodations for white and black railroad pas­
sengers either by providing two or more coaches for each 
racial group or by dividing individual passenger coaches 
with a partition. Passengers were prohibited from occupying 
seats of members of the opposite race. Railroad employees 
wete required to assign passengers on the basis of race and 
were authorized to deny service to anyone who refused to 
abide by this law.5 The act became the focus of the 
challenge to the new Southern principle of "separate but 
equal" in the Plessy v. Ferguson case in 1896. The United 
States Supreme Court found nothing unconstitutional in the 
Louisiana act requiring separate but equal railroad facili­
ties for whites and blacks. If "separate" facilities were 
"equal," then the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of "equal 
protection of the laws" would not be violated. Then, the 
court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment only promised 
blacks political equality, not social equality. However,
5
Acts of Louisiana, 1890, Regular Session, no. 111.
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the federal justices assumed erroneously that a state would 
accept the dictum that a segregation law would have to 
assure blacks of truly equal facilities in order to be 
valid. One justice correctly observed that "separate but 
equal" was a "thin disguise" for discrimination.®
Two other transit laws were enacted by the Louisiana 
State Legislature in 1894. One act ordered all railroad 
companies to post the segregation or "Jim Crow" railroad act 
of 1890 in a conspicuous place in each passenger coach and 
ticket office. In addition, it exempted from the transit 
laws black nurses attending to white children, and black 
prisoners in the care of white law enforcement authorities. 
Another act required all railway companies to segregate 
their waiting rooms by January 1, 1896. From that date, no 
person would be permitted to sit or remain in a waiting room 
other than the one assigned to members of his race.?
In 1902, the state legislature extended the policy of 
segregation to streetcars. Streetcar companies were ordered 
to provide two or more cars for blacks or to divide indi­
vidual cars by wooden or wire screen partitions. As with 
railroads, penalties were outlined for noncompliance by 
passengers, employees and companies.®
^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7
Acts of Louisiana, 1894, Regular Session, no. 177, 
no. 98.
Q
Acts of Louisiana, 1902, Regular Session, no. 64.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
312
The legislature required buses and taxicabs to segre­
gate in 1928. Bus companies were to designate separate 
seats or compartments for whites and blacks, and no one 
would be permitted to occupy seats or compartments of per­
sons of another race.9 By now, all mass transportation 
facilities in the state had been brought under segregation 
guidelines by state statute or by local ordinances.
Nationwide, blacks saw little hope in halting, much 
less reversing, the trend toward segregation in transit 
prior to 1940. Between 1890 and 1910, they saw the futility 
of trying to stem the rising tide in the South toward iso­
lation of blacks in society. In 1919, the NAACP failed to 
persuade Congress to outlaw discrimination on interstate 
railroads, and all of its attempts to halt the spread of 
segregation failed. Therefore, the equalization of accom­
modations became the major focus of black organizations 
since segregation could not be overturned at that time.
Federal Transit Policy, 1940-1955
In the 1940's, the federal government took pivotal 
steps toward the eradication of segregation from interstate 
transit. The first major breakthrough in railroad desegre­
gation occurred in the case of Mitchell v. United States in
g
Acts of Louisiana, 1928, Regular Session, no. 209.
^Catherine A. Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow: The
Desegregation of Southern Transit (Mew York: Columbia
University Press, 1983) 16-17.
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1941. The Supreme Court ordered public carriers to assure 
that accommodations provided for all passengers were 
"substantially equal," resulting in the integration of 
dining and pullman cars on interstate lines. However, it 
did not address facilities on intrastate railways.^
Another breakthrough was made in bus desegregation in the 
case of Morgan v. Virginia in 1946, when the high court 
declared Virginia's bus segregation law to be an unconsti­
tutional burden on interstate commerce, as well as an imped­
iment to free interstate travel. However, state officials 
in several Southern states, including those in Louisiana, 
declared that the ruling did not apply to intrastate bus 
laws. To appease Southern officials, bus companies adopted 
their own segregation regulations to replace the voided 
state statutes. Therefore, nothing really changed in the 
Deep South following the Morgan decision.*2
The Truman Administration inaugurated a brief campaign 
in the late 1940's to expand civil rights. Among the 
President's proposals to Congress was a request for a law 
prohibiting discrimination in interstate transportation. 
However, because the timing was too early for such legisla­
tive action, the President was unsuccessful. The federal 
government did triumph, though, in its challenge of the 
Southern Railroad's table-allotment policy on dining cars.
^Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
12Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
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In Henderson v. United States (1950), the Supreme Court 
affirmed the government's assertion that the company had 
breached rules established by the Interstate Commerce Act. 
Although Plessy was not overturned, the court undermined de 
facto segregation in dining cars as well as in other forms 
of segregated transit.*3
Railroad companies across the country immediately began 
complying with the Henderson case, except in the Deep South, 
where segregation on buses and railroads remained the norm 
for another decade. However, many public carriers began 
halting or modifying their segregation laws. In 1951, 
Greyhound Bus Company instructed its drivers to continue 
observing segregation, but not to employ force against or 
seek the arrest of any passenger who refused to take a seat 
in the segregated section of a bus. By the end of 1953, 
only the Deep South states continued to rigorously enforce 
and maintain transit segregation laws.*^
On November 7, 1955, a new force was unleashed in the 
desegregation battle when the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) issued new regulations regarding railroads, buses and 
waiting rooms. The ICC overruled the practice of assigning 
separate accommodations by race in railway coaches, buses 
and waiting rooms "insofar as they pertain to interstate 
travel," because it subjected black passengers to undue and
^Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
^Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 80-84.
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unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. Section 3 (1) of the act made it 
unlawful for a rail carrier "to subject any particular 
persons . . .  to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or 
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." In addition, the 
ICC held that travelers were "entitled to be free of annoy­
ances . . . which inevitably accompany segregation," regard­
less of the intentions of carriers to provide truly separate 
but equal facilities for blacks and whites. Transit compa­
nies were ordered to discontinue segregation of interstate 
passengers on trains and in station waiting rooms, and on 
buses and in bus terminals by January 10, 1956.15
Desegregation of Bus and Rail Facilities in Louisiana
During the 1950's, Louisiana officials adopted a policy 
of massive resistance toward any efforts by the federal 
government to dismantle the de jure system of segregation in 
transportation facilities in the state. In the early 
1 9 6 0 ' s , the federal government (with its vast resources) 
launched a vigorous, coordinated and sustained assault on 
all forms of segregation in transit and brought it to its 
inevitable conclusion.
The ICC ruling of 1955, which established January 9, 
1956, as the deadline for the removal of segregation signs
15United States. Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Interstate Commerce Commission Reports 249 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office) 335, 347-48.
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at railway and bus stations and at airports, injected the 
race issue into the Louisiana gubernatorial election of 
1955-56, prompting each candidate to avow his unwavering 
support for segregation. One candidate, James McLemore, 
requested that Governor Robert Kennon call a special session 
of the state legislature to nullify the ICC regulation. 
Instead, the governor defied the ruling, ordering all state, 
parish and municipal authorities to continue rigid enforce­
ment of segregated transportation facilities.^
When the state legislature of 1956 met, it enacted a 
statute requiring the continuation of segregation in trans­
portation terminals. Transit companies were instructed to 
provide separate waiting room and other facilities (drinking 
fountains and restrooms) for white intrastate travelers and 
another waiting room "for all other passengers." Accommo­
dations were to be equal for all passengers, and new signs 
were to be posted declaring: "Waiting, Interstate
Passengers and Colored Intrastate Passengers," and "White 
Waiting, Intrastate Passengers. In order to meet the new 
ICC regulations, the state had simply changed the name of 
its segregated practices.
An historic moment occurred in November of 1956, when 
the Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision in Gayle v.
*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 22, 1955; Little 
Rock Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 11, 1956.
171 RRLR 741 (1956).
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Browder, which involved the on-going Montgomery bus boycott. 
The high court affirmed the decision to void Alabama's 
intrastate bus segregation laws, yet failed to mention the 
Plessy case, which had originated over the issue of 
segregated transit.1® In her detailed study of the 
desegregation of Southern transit, Catherine Barnes declares 
that the Montgomery bus boycott and Browder decision 
resulted in the gradual elimination of segregation on buses 
in other Southern cities, brought Martin Luther King to 
national prominence, demonstrated to blacks that nonviolent 
resistance and economic power could be employed to negate 
segregation, and became a shining example for other black 
Southerners of what could be accomplished through concerted 
effort.1^
In Louisiana, the general attitude was that the Browder 
decision applied only to Montgomery. White officials had no 
intention of voluntarily altering the segregated transit 
system unless ordered by the courts. However, black leaders 
in Baton Rouge and New Orleans were heartened by the deci­
sion and decided to challenge state and local transit regu­
lations. In late December of 1956, Reverend T. L. Jemison 
headed a black group in forming the Baton Rouge Christian 
Movement, whose aim was to desegregate the city bus system.
*®Gayle v. Browder, 142 F.Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), 
352 U.S. 903 (1956).
19Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 121-22.
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Jemison contended that the state was in violation of a 
Supreme Court mandate in Browder to end segregation in 
intrastate transit, and that a Baton Rouge city ordinance 
requiring segregated loading and seating on buses was also 
unlawful. A brief boycott of city buses by blacks in 1953 
had brought slight improvement, but leaders now demanded an 
end to all segregation in transit, threatening litigation if 
necessary. Officials of the Baton Rouge Bus Company 
responded that they were caught between the Supreme Court 
decision on one hand and state and local regulations on the 
other.20
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (N0PS1), which oper­
ated the city's bus services, responded that Browder only 
affected Montgomery, not other city bus systems. In January 
of 1957, eight black ministers who claimed to represent two 
hundred fifty churches and nearly two hundred thousand 
blacks in the New Orleans area, petitioned NOPSI to deseg­
regate the city's buses and streetcars. They asserted that 
the Browder decision applied to Louisiana transit and that 
blacks were tired of riding behind screens and being treated 
like second-class citizens. Two black organizations, the 
New Orleans Inter-Denominational Ministerial Alliance and 
the New Orleans Improvement League, led by Reverend A. L. 
Davis and Dr. William R. Adams respectively, worked in
20New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 29, 1956.
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harmony to end segregated transit in New Orleans through 
litigation.21
In the face of mounting litigation by black groups, 
federal courts, the ICC and the Justice Department, inter­
state bus lines began to abandon segregation as a policy 
between 1957 and I960. Continental Trailways abandoned 
segregation of local passengers entirely during this period, 
while Greyhound waited until 1961. Most of the segregation 
in Southern transit in the late 1950's occurred in terminals 
rather than on transit i t s e l f . 22
The first suit to end segregation in transit was filed 
in federal court in New Orleans in February of 1957. The 
suit contended that segregated transit in New Orleans caused 
blacks "great injury, inconvenience and humiliation" and 
denied their constitutional rights. In May, United States 
District Judge J. Skelly Wright declared void all state laws 
requiring racial segregation on buses, streetcars, street 
railways and trolley buses operating within New Orleans on 
the grounds that the laws denied blacks equal protection of 
the laws and due process of law as guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.23
New Orleans officials did not end segregation on city 
transit immediately, but decided to await appeals. Judge
21Ibid., Jan. 10, 1957.
22Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 129-31.
2^Davis v. Morrison, 2 RRLR 996-97 (1957).
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Wright delayed further action until the exhaustion of state 
and city appeals of his decision. Within a year, the Fifth 
Circuit Court affirmed the decision and the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari. Four days after the Supreme Court 
action, Judge Wright rejected a request by NOPS1 to delay 
desegregation pending further federal appeals, and ordered 
the end of segregation on New Orleans transit, beginning 
after midnight on May 31, 1958. Early that morning, an 
eight-foot cross was burned on the judge's l a w n . 24
By most accounts, the first day of integrated transit 
in New Orleans was "uneventful." Most black passengers, not 
wanting trouble, continued to sit in the back and whites in 
the front of buses and streetcars. On some buses, whites 
doubled up in seats so that blacks could not sit next to 
them, and shifted seats when whites exited. In most cases, 
passengers minded their own business and went about their 
own affairs. Thus, for the first time in the twentieth 
century, black New Orleanians were free to sit wherever they 
chose on city transit.25
Because of the voiding of the state segregated transit 
law, the Shreveport City Council unanimously approved an 
ordinance that authorized an operator of a vehicle for hire
^Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958); 3 
RRLR 424 (1958); New Orleans Times Picayune, May 31, 1958; 
Atlanta Journal, June 1, 1958.
O C
Atlanta Journal, June 1, 1958; Little Rock Arkansas 
Gazette, June 1, 1958.
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to place passengers wherever he desired "to insure proper 
weight distribution." Earlier in 1957* five black ministers 
rode in the white section on a city bus and read their 
Bibles. Knowing of their intentions in advance, the chief 
of police made no arrests but later commented that anyone 
following their example would be arrested.
During the late 1950's, the federal government did not 
move vigorously enough to take advantage of propitious 
opportunities to deliver a knock-out blow to the entire 
system of segregated transit. The ICC adopted a narrow 
scope of its jurisdiction in intrastate commerce, while the 
Justice Department and its Civil Rights Division were too 
cautious to advance very far. The Eisenhower Administration 
lacked the verve for an all-out attack on segregated tran­
sit, and Congress relied on the other branches of the 
federal government to take action. Therefore, the entire 
intrastate transit issue was delayed until the new, vigorous 
Kennedy Administration was inaugurated.
Following Boynton v. Virginia (I960), which declared 
that segregation of interstate passengers in dining facil­
ities in rail and bus terminals violated the Motor Carrier 
Act, Greyhound announced in 1961 that it would remove all 
segregation signs from its company terminals and restau­
rants, and would abandon segregated seating on its buses.
^Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, Aug. 27, 1958; New 
Orleans Times Picayune, June 16, 1957.
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However, the ruling did not apply to privately owned facil­
ities used by the bus company. 7^
During the late spring and summer of 1961, "Freedom 
Rides" swept over the South. When local law enforcement 
officers failed to protect Freedom Riders from hostile and 
violent treatment, Attorney General Robert Kennedy decided 
to intervene in Southern transit. Utilizing the resources 
of the Justice Department in conjunction with the ICC, he 
enforced desegregation on interstate, buses through pressure 
and threats of litigation. Four blacks who attempted a 
Freedom Ride from Shreveport to Jackson, Mississippi, were 
arrested in a white waiting room of the Continental 
Trailways terminal in Shreveport. In July, five other 
blacks, using interstate bus tickets, rode from Shreveport 
to New Orleans, stopping briefly in Alexandria and Baton 
Rouge. In Baton Rouge, two women in the group were refused 
service in the Continental Trailways restaurant, and were 
also asked to leave the white waiting area. However, in New 
Orleans, all five Freedom Riders were served at the bus 
depot lunch counter without incident.^8
In September of 1961, the ICC unanimously adopted new 
desegregation rules for interstate bus carriers that were to
^Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (I960).
28Baton Rouge State Times, Aug. 4, 1961; New Orleans 
Times Picayune, Aug” 7T, 19bl.
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take effect on November 1, 1961. Under the new guidelines, 
all segregation was banned on buses and in stations used by 
interstate passengers. Bus companies were directed to post 
signs on buses declaring that seating was without regard to 
race, color or national origin, and were prohibited from 
supplying or using stations that were racially segregated. 
The mere presence of a segregation sign was considered 
impermissible segregation, so only stations displaying the 
new ICC rules could be used by bus companies.^9 in order to 
comply with these regulations, bus companies cancelled or 
failed to renew agreements with establishments whose owners 
refused to abide by ICC rules.
Reaction to the new ICC regulations was swift in North 
Louisiana, where state action prevented their enforcement in 
early November of 1961. Police arrested the manager of the 
Continental Trailways terminal in Shreveport when he removed 
segregation signs on November 1. Then, local district 
attorneys in Monroe, Ruston and Alexandria obtained state 
court orders forbidding integration of bus and rail depots. 
The Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company took down the seg­
regation signs in its depots on November 6, then replaced 
them five days later because of the state restraining order. 
The state also obtained a temporary restraining order
29 Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 176-77.
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prohibiting Greyhound and Continental bus companies from 
desegregating terminal waiting rooms and facilities in Baton 
Rouge.30
The Justice Department did not waiver from its stead­
fast course of action, though. It promptly announced in 
mid-November of 1961 that the Justice Department would 
handle any interference by Southern authorities with ICC 
rules, while the ICC would handle noncompliance by bus 
companies. Suits were immediately filed against Monroe, 
Alexandria and Ruston to prevent state courts from enforcing 
segregation in bus and train terminals. In the following 
January, a three-judge federal panel (in United States v. 
Lassiter) voided Louisiana statutes requiring segregation 
of bus and train terminals because they imposed an undue 
burden on interstate commerce and denied equal protection.
In addition, Louisiana officials, Continental Southern 
Lines, and Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company were pro­
hibited from requiring segregation in transit in the three 
cities.31
The Justice Department also sought an enjoinment of the 
state restraining order which prevented Greyhound and
^Washington Post, June 1, 1962; Baton Rouge State 
Times, Nov. 11, 1961; State v. Greyhound Corp., State v. 
Continental Southern Lines, Inc., 7 RRLR 233 (1961).
31Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 179; Baton Rouge State 
Times, Nov. 23, 1961; United States v. Lassiter, 203 F.Supp. 
20 (W.D. La. 1962); New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 26, 
1962.
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Continental bus companies from desegregating waiting rooms 
and facilities in Baton Rouge. In March of 1962, a three- 
judge federal court for Louisiana's eastern district voided 
state statutes requiring segregated transit facilities and 
dissolved the state court restraining o r d e r . 32
Despite the voiding of the state's segregated terminal 
laws in the Lassiter case, Shreveport police continued to 
enforce segregation in terminal facilities and to arrest 
blacks who attempted to cross the color line. Therefore, in 
November of 1962, federal courts enjoined the city and cer­
tain of its officials from enforcing segregation in transit 
because it imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce 
and violated the Motor Vehicle A c t . 33 With this case, the 
last major stronghold of segregation in Louisiana bus ter­
minal facilities succumbed.
Desegregation of Airport Terminals
Perhaps because so few blacks and whites used commer­
cial airlines in Louisiana in the 1940's and 1950's,
Southern states did not adopt as stringent segregation laws 
for airport terminals as they did in bus and rail transit. 
The most commonly practiced form of racial discrimination 
was not on board aircraft, but in terminal dining
32United States v. Pitcher, 7 RRLR 223-24 (1962).
33United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F.Supp. 708 
(W.D. La. 1962).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
326
facilities, restrooms and waiting areas. Since most air­
ports were owned by governmental bodies, they were subject 
to the ban by the United States Constitution on racial 
discrimination, and it was more difficult for states and 
cities to circumvent federal regulations.
The first significant federal case dealing with segre­
gation in an airport terminal was Nash v. Air Terminal 
Services (1949), which involved segregated dining facilities 
in a dining and coffee shop in Washington National Airport. 
Federal courts declared that a privately owned cafe located 
in a federally owned airport was a public facility within 
the meaning of the Constitution, and that Air Terminal 
Services was presently operating dining facilities "in the 
place and stead of the Federal government."34
In 1956, the Civil Aeronautics Administration banned 
the use of federal funds for the construction of segregated 
facilities in air terminals. However, the new rules were 
limited to segregated facilities within airports and to 
future construction using federal appropriations. It was 
possible, though, for a city to circumvent federal regula­
tions by building segregated facilities with its own funds, 
thus remaining eligible for federal grants for other 
construction at the a i r p o r t . 35
^Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F.Supp. 545 (E.D. 
Va. 1949).
35 Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 140.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
327
In 1962, federal courts voided segregated practices at 
airport terminals in New Orleans and Shreveport. Moisant 
International Airport in New Orleans became a target of the 
Justice Department in June of 1961, because of segregated 
practices in its terminal. A suit was filed to bar the city 
and a private concession operator from refusing to serve 
blacks in the airport restaurant and coffee shop. Previ­
ously, airport officials had accepted $1,125,000 for con­
struction of the terminal, agreeing in the funding applica­
tion to "operate the airport for the use and benefit of the 
public, on fair and reasonable terms, and without unjust 
discrimination." However, blacks were required to obtain 
food at a small snack bar without seating facilities in the 
terminal. The Justice Department cited instances of dis­
crimination being practiced against members of the armed 
forces and diplomatic representatives of other nations, and 
food vouchers issued by airlines to black interstate and 
foreign passengers whose flights were delayed, were not 
being honored at the airport. In Adams v. New Orleans, the 
federal courts banned the continued operation of segregated 
facilities within the airport terminal in August of 1962.36
The Justice Department filed a suit against the Greater 
Shreveport Municipal Airport in July of 1962 for practicing 
segregation within its terminal. In November, a federal
o g
New Orleans Times Picayune, June 27, 1961; Adams v. 
New Orleans, 208 F.Supp. 427 (E.D. La. 1962).
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judge ordered the removal of segregation signs from the 
airport terminal and prohibited segregated practices in 
terminal facilities and eating establishments.37
Transit and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought Congressional 
sanction to a fait accompli by the federal executive and 
judicial departments in the desegregation of transit. Under 
its various provisions, de jure segregation in public 
facilities was prohibited (Title II), the Justice Department 
was permitted to initiate litigation against local and state 
government bodies which owned or operated segregated public 
facilities (Title III), discrimination was prohibited in 
programs or activities receiving federal funds (Title VI), 
and the Justice Department was permitted to initate or join 
cases against segregated city carriers (Title IX). The 
threat of possible litigation or loss of needed federal 
funding was usually enough to force remaining transit com­
panies and government agencies to desegregate. However, it 
was still possible to circumvent federal law by de facto 
means, such as by establishing virtually all-black or 
all-white bus routes which were enhanced by residential
segregation.
^United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F.Supp. 36 
(W.D. La. 1962); Shreveport Journal, July 27, Nov. 3, 1962.
^®Civil Rights Act of 1964; Barnes, Journey from Jim 
Crow, 192.
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The last major Louisiana case involving segregated 
transit was settled in 1965. The suit involved a New 
Orleans ordinance that provided for segregation in the use 
of taxicabs. A federal court invalidated the discriminatory 
provisions of the ordinance, but allowed city officials time 
to bring about non-discriminatory compliance by city taxi­
cabs, since New Orleans officials had not insisted on strict 
adherence to or enforcement of the ordinance in recent 
years. Within fifteen days of the court ruling, the 
Department of Public Utilities and the Taxicab Bureau were 
to notify holders of city taxicab permits that they would no 
longer be permitted to discriminate in the operation of 
their vehicles.39
After 1965, all legal barriers to full and equal use of 
transit facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis in the State 
of Louisiana had fallen. De jure segregation was ended on 
all public and private transportation conveyances as well as 
in related facilities such as depot and terminal waiting 
rooms, dining areas, restrooms and ticket counters. Unfor­
tunately, de facto segregation still remained in employment 
and in the use of transit, and numerous incidents of dis­
crimination toward blacks using transportation facilities in 
the state could still be found for the next decade.
Because of allegations of continued racial discrimina­
tion being practiced in New Orleans in 1969, Mayor-elect
^Bergeron v. City of New Orleans, 11 RRLR 945 (1965).
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Maurice Landrieu introduced a public accommodations ordi­
nance in the City Council at the request of the New Orleans 
Human Relations Committee. Under the proposed ordinance, 
city bars and taxicab companies were prohibited from prac­
ticing discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or 
national origin beginning January 1, 1970. Following its 
adoption on December 23, a state district court issued an 
order restraining its enforcement after a suit by bar 
owners. However, on January 15, 1970, a federal judge 
voided the state court order and upheld the public accommo­
dations ordinance.40*
Segregated Public Accommodations in Louisiana
Segregation in public accommodations in Louisiana had 
its origins in the antebellum period. According to 
Louisiana historian Roger Fischer, the presence of large 
numbers of free blacks in New Orleans before the Civil War 
caused a collapse of racial discipline typical in rural 
areas of the state. Blacks residing in New Orleans enjoyed 
the use of segregated facilities to a degree unknown in 
other parts of the South. As early as 1816, theaters and 
public exhibitions were officially segregated by city ordi­
nance, but blacks were denied access to white restaurants,
^Heath v. Schiro, Heath v. City of New Orleans, 2 RRLS 
35; New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 17, 30, 31, 1969,
Jan. 16, 1970.
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hotels, private white schools and "respectable s a l o o n s . "^1 
However, it must be noted that New Orleans was only one part 
of Louisiana, and that these conditions were not the norm in 
smaller towns and remote areas of the state.
On first appearance, Louisiana seemed to have had one 
of the most radical of Reconstruction governments among the 
ex-Confederate States. Its Constitution of 1868 included a 
provision which prohibited "distinction or discrimination on 
account of race or color" in all "places of public business, 
or of public resort" that were licensed by a state, parish 
or municipal authority. An 1869 public accommodations law 
was enacted which prohibited discrimination by race or color 
in admission to or entertainment at any public inn, hotel or 
place of public resort in the state. The act was embodied
in operating licenses, which subjected an operator to for­
feiture of the license, closure of the business and liabil­
ity for civil damages for violations.^2 However, the 
attitudes of pre-Civil War whites remained, and areas that 
were beyond the reach of federal troops adamantly opposed 
all social aspirations of blacks.
Joe Gray Taylor, historian of the Reconstruction period 
in Louisiana, holds that there was no radical change in 
daily relations between whites and blacks during
^Fischer, The Segregation Struggle, 9-11.
^ Constitution of 1868, Article 13; Pauli Murray (ed.), 
States' Laws on Race and Color (1950), 172.
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Reconstruction, irregardless of statutes on the law books. 
Physical segregation that occurred during slavery days 
continued afterward, and no serious thought was ever given 
to allowing blacks the use of public accommodations on a 
basis equal to that of whites. Taylor maintains that 
segregation was not required by law, but "was enforced by 
custom and public opinion just as effectively as by law."43.
After 1877, Louisiana officials gradually legislated 
segregation and denial in the use of public accommodations, 
with their actions increasingly upheld by the federal 
courts. The Constitution of 1879 omitted all references to 
segregation but deleted all sections relating to social 
equality. State leaders were still uncertain about how far 
the federal government would go toward enforcing the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Civil Rights Act of 
1875. After 1879, these two federal documents were the only 
legal impediments to overt segregation in Louisiana.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 made it unlawful to deny 
anyone "full and equal enjoyment of any of the accommoda­
tions, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public 
conveyances on land and water, theaters and other places of 
public amusement" on the basis of race and color. In the 
Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the United States Supreme Court 
held that racial discrimination was not a form of involun­
tary servitude prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment,
/ O
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 434-35.
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and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress 
to prohibit private acts of racial discrimination. A decade 
later, the high court crystallized its efforts to prevent 
the federal government from safeguarding the rights of 
blacks from state infringement in the Plessy decision of 
1896. Racial discrimination by private action was now pro­
tected under the guise of "separate but equal" accommoda­
tions, and the door was opened wider to further acts of 
racial discrimination in Louisiana.44
During the first six decades of the twentieth century, 
blacks were prohibited by law and custom from using most 
public facilities in Louisiana. In 1908, blacks and whites 
were prohibited from drinking in the same saloons, and in 
1914, segregation was extended to circuses, shows and tent 
exhibitions.45 By 1956, most of the segregation practiced 
across the state was due to custom, local ordinances or 
private regulations, rather than through state statute. As 
the national civil rights movement heated up during the 
1940's and early 1950's, white leaders in Louisiana became 
concerned about the future of segregation. Therefore, in 
1956, the state legislature enacted three new segregation
^Robert F. Cushman. Cases in Constitutional Law 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 19?5) 684; Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896).
45 Acts of Louisiana, 1908, Regular Session, no. 235, 
1914, Regular Session, no. 235, 191b, Regular Session, no. 
TW.  -------  ------ -----------
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laws that dealt with public accommodations. One law pro­
vided for the separation of whites and blacks in all recrea­
tional activities; another required employers to furnish 
separate sanitary, eating and drinking facilities for white 
and black employees; and a third law prohibited interracial 
participation in athletic events and social functions.46
The first of these laws to confront federal litigation 
was the one which prohibited interracial participation
between white and black athletes. Prior to its passage, the
Board of Supervisors at Louisiana State University (LSU) 
voted not to ban interracial sporting events, despite pres­
sure from the Baton Rouge City Council and several segrega­
tionist organizations. After the law went into effect on
October 15, 1956, eight schools cancelled games planned with
LSU because of the presence of blacks on their teams. A 
black prizefighter challenged the state statute and a regu­
lation of the Louisiana State Athletic Commission when he 
was denied the right to fight because of his color. In 
1958, federal courts declared that such segregation could 
not be justified under the state's police powers, so the 
commission and the state were restrained from enforcing 
their regulations because of their effect in violating equal 
protection.47
^Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 14,
395, 57T.
^Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission, 168 F.Supp. 149 
(1958), 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
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Sit-in Demonstrations in the Early 1960's
As I960 began, the civil rights movement took a sharp 
turn from litigation to direct action in the form of sit- 
ins, most of which were targeted at lunch counters, restau­
rants, libraries, theaters, hotels, parks and beaches. 
However, they achieved only a modicum of success prior to 
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
During the late summer and early fall of I960, New 
Orleans was the scene of numerous sit-ins and picketing at 
churches, lunch counters and stores that practiced segrega­
tion. In September, small groups of black and white stu­
dents staged sit-ins at three white Protestant churches. At 
one of them, two blacks were denied entrance after being 
informed that the church's board of deacons had a policy not 
to admit blacks at that time. During the previous week, 
several stores in the city's downtown area were picketed and 
black protestors arrested. Mayor DeLesseps S. Morrison 
informed the public that demonstrations hurt "the community 
interest, the public safety and the economic welfare" of New 
Orleans, and that he had instructed the police not to tol­
erate any more sit-ins or pickets. However, the pickets, 
demonstrations and arrests continued into the next year. In 
January of 1962, the president of the Greater New Orleans 
Chamber of Commerce visited Atlanta and Dallas to see how 
they had handled desegregation. Secret meetings were then 
held in February between black leaders, merchants and civic
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leaders in New Orleans. In September, by prearrangement, 
fifteen major drug, department and variety stores desegre­
gated their branches within the city as two hundred blacks 
in small groups of three or four sat down and were served at 
formerly white lunch counters without incident.
Another major victory was scored in Baton Rouge over 
lunch counters in the following year. The city was the 
scene of demonstrations and sit-ins at several lunch coun­
ters in the spring of I960, and of a major confrontation 
between police and demonstrators in December of 1961, which 
led to the Cox case and injunctions against further 
demonstrations, picketing or sit-ins in the city during
1962. When lunch counter sit-ins resumed in the spring of
1963, a coordinated effort was made between merchants and a 
biracial committee to quietly desegregate lunch counters at 
twelve major stores in August.49
Elsewhere in the state, there was intense opposition to 
desegregation of any kind. Not until the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did most of the segregation bar­
riers to equal treatment come down across the state.
Desegregation of Hotels and Motels
The struggle to desegregate hotels and motels did not 
create much controversy. New Orleans was the central focus
^New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 13, 18, 19,
Oct. 6, I960; New York Times, Sept. 13, 1962.
^Baton Rouge State Times, May 30, Aug. 7, 1963.
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of early efforts to desegregate lodgings in the state prior 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Since it was difficult to 
disguise a hotel or motel in order to escape coverage under 
this act, most Louisiana lodging proprietors quietly deseg­
regated without much contention.
Economic pressure and civic pride played major roles in 
the desegregation of New Orleans hotels in the early I960's. 
In May of 1963, a three-judge federal panel voided the state 
law that sanctioned segregated hotels. However, the court 
declared that the state could not compel a proprietor to 
segregate or integrate his establishment. Only the owner 
could decide that question for himself.50
Because New Orleans was one of the few Southern cities 
that still practiced segregated lodging, it was avoided as a 
convention site by many integrated organizations. In 1963, 
the American Legion convention, which was expected to bring 
fifty thousand persons and $7,000,000 to New Orleans, can­
celled its plans to meet in the city because Louisiana 
Legionnaires could not guarantee unsegregated facilities for 
all delegates. It was estimated that approximately 80 per­
cent of large national conventions had black members and 
that all would be integrated within a few years. Therefore, 
in September, four of the most prominent hotels in the city 
(Sheraton-Charles, Jung, Royal Orleans and New Orleans
SOMcCain v. Davis, Bates v. Sheraton Corporation of 
America, 217 F.Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1963); New Orleans Times 
Picayune, May 19, 1963.
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Airport Hilton Inn) decided to admit some blacks rather than 
risk losing big conventions. However, the Roosevelt and 
Monteleone remained segregated for another year. Despite 
the absence of blacks in its delegations, a trade conference 
relocated its convention from the segregated Roosevelt Hotel 
to the integrated Jung in May of 1964, in order to avoid 
losing its key speakers, who opposed segregation. The owner 
of the Roosevelt responded that he would not integrate until 
required to do so under the civil rights bill pending before
Congress.51
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 inflicted a mortal blow on 
segregated public accommodations in Louisiana, by imparting 
to the federal executive and judicial branches the authority 
necessary to crush all remaining vestiges of de jure segre­
gation, and placing an enormous burden of proof for de facto 
segregation on proprietors who engaged in private acts of 
discrimination. Title II of the act, particularly Sections 
201 and 202, became the main instrument used by the federal 
courts in Louisiana to eradicate segregation and discrimina­
tion in public accommodations. Section 201 prohibited 
discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, 
religion or national origin in the denial of anyone "to the 
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
“^ New Orleans Times Picayune, May 21, 1963; Baton Rouge 
State Times, Sept. 10, 19b3, May 13, 1964.
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accommodation." It also established a definition of what 
constituted a "place of accommodation" that "serves the 
public." Section 202 prohibited the use of any statute, 
ordinance or regulation by a government body in requiring a 
proprietor to operate a business on a racially discrimina­
tory basis.52
The first major challenge to Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act occurred before the end of 1964 in the case of 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States. The Supreme Court 
not only held that Congress was within its powers to enact 
this legislation, but expanded its interpretation of the 
interstate commerce power of Congress to include the regula­
tion of local activities that might have a substantial and 
harmful effect on commerce. Section 201 (c) of Title II 
specifically targeted "any inn, hotel, motel, or other 
establishment which provided lodging to transient guests" as
affecting commerce.53
In most cases, lodging proprietors in Louisiana quietly 
desegregated their establishments after 1964, with one noted 
exception: the United States brought action against the
operator of two motels in the state because of their refusal 
to admit, accommodate or provide services or privileges to 
blacks on racial grounds. In 1966, they were restrained by
52Civil Rights Act of 1964.
■^Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964).
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federal courts from such discriminatory practices in the 
future.54 With this test case, it was thereafter 
unnecessary to resort to litigation in order to gain com­
pliance with the Civil Rights Act in Louisiana in regard to 
hotel and motel lodgings.
Desegregation of Restaurants
Restaurants presented a form of close social mixing 
that alarmed many whites because of its implications for the 
future of segregated public accommodations and struck at the 
heart of the doctrines of white supremacy. It was the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 that brought about the actual desegrega­
tion of most dining establishments in Louisiana. Except for 
the earlier desegregation of lunchrooms in transit terminals 
or lunch counters in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
restaurants had remained almost untouched by integration 
prior to 1964. However, the provisions of Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 made de jure and de facto 
segregation in the operation of privately-owned dining 
establishments in the state untenable, despite attempts at 
various ruses to forestall compliance with the law.
Sections 201 and 202 of the Civil Rights Act covered 
restaurants and cafeterias and became the subject of a chal­
lenge in Katzenbach v. McClung. The Supreme Court quickly
■^United States v. Happy Hosts, Inc., 11 RRLR 1503 
(1966). ---
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declared that Title II covered any eating establishment 
which "principally engaged in selling food for consumption 
on the premises . . .  if . . .  it serves or offers to serve 
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food 
which it serves . . . has moved in commerce."55
In July of 1964* there was no immediate influx of 
blacks into formerly all-white restaurants. Within two 
weeks of the passage of the Civil Rights Act, several major 
Shreveport businesses with branches outside the state deseg­
regated their lunch counters, but most of the restaurants 
and clubs in and around the city removed their "white only" 
signs and went "private", in an attempt to bypass the 
requirements of the federal act. Other restaurants in 
northern and western Louisiana took similar action. In the 
Baton Rouge area, a few major restaurants immediately admit­
ted blacks, while others continued to deny their patronage 
or went private. In New Orleans, blacks were told by their 
leaders to use accommodations when they wanted to, not just 
as test cases. While the mayor warned outsiders not to come 
to New Orleans to test the accommodations law, blacks were 
reportedly served at various cafeterias in the city, and 
major restaurants were taking reservations by blacks. Out­
side the city, in Jefferson Parish, blacks were refused 
service at several drive-in and indoor restaurants. In 
Plaquemines Parish, segregation leader Leander Perez, Sr.
55Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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called on all Southerners to refuse to heed the Civil Rights 
Act and to snarl the federal courts with litigation.56
The most noted attempt to circumvent the Civil Rights 
Act was to transform a restaurant into a "private club" that 
was not open to the public, in order to meet an exemption 
provided for in Section 201 (e) of the act. The largest 
such attempt was the formation of the Northwest Louisiana 
Restaurant Club of Shreveport and Bossier City, which was 
joined by nearly one hundred restaurants in the state. The 
organization had a ninety-nine year charter which provided 
that non-voting membership cards would be distributed to 
"acceptable" customers and patrons. It issued 160,000 
membership cards and had plans to issue another 100,000. 
However, the United States brought suit alleging that club 
members were practicing racially discriminatory acts in 
violation of Title II. Federal courts determined that all 
of the restaurants belonging to the club had practiced 
racial segregation prior to the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act, and that the club existed for the sole purpose of 
avoiding compliance with federal law. While professing to 
be a private club, ample evidence was presented that member­
ship cards were issued to any white customer but denied to 
all blacks. Declaring the club to be a sham, the courts 
permanently enjoined club members from denying blacks equal
^Burton, On the Black Side, 108; Baton Rouge State 
Times, July 10, 23, 1964; New Orleans Times Picayune,
July 7, 1964.
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access to and use of their restaurants and other facilities 
on racial grounds.57
Desegregation of Bars, Theaters and Recreation Facilities
The desegregation of bars and lounges was brought about 
gradually under various provisions of Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act, as federal courts expanded its meaning to cover 
any discrimination sanctioned by law, government or law 
enforcement officials. Under the original construction of 
the act, bars were only included for coverage if they were 
located within a covered establishment that was under the 
jurisdiction of Title II. Otherwise, private drinking 
establishments were free to determine their clientele, 
within reason. However, the burden of proof was on the 
proprietor to manifest that the discrimination being prac­
ticed was not illegal.
Because of hazy provisions of Title II in regard to 
bars, several suits were filed in federal courts in the 
latter half of the 1960's alleging racial discrimination.
The courts held in 1965, that Section 202 applied only if 
discrimination by an establishment was required by law, 
rather than because of the private preferences of propri­
etors who practiced discrimination on their own initiative. 
In a 1967 case, the federal courts voided a New Orleans city
■^Baton Rouge State Times, July 3, 1964; United 
States v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F.Supp. 
151 (W.D. La. 1966).
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ordinance that required racial segregation in establishments 
selling drinks for consumption on the premises. The court 
held that this measure was in violation of Section 202 
because it was an attempt by a governmental agency to compel 
segregation in the operation of a business.58
When the New Orleans City Council enacted a public 
accommodations ordinance regarding bars and taxicabs in 
1969• eighty bar owners immediately brought suit on the 
grounds that they would suffer a substantial loss of white 
customers if their establishments were integrated. The 
council had passed the ordinance following the negative 
image portrayed during the summer and fall of 1969. when 
black delegates of conventions in New Orleans were denied 
service in several local bars. In November, delegates to 
the Head Start and Child Development Conference meeting in 
New Orleans adopted several resolutions charging the city 
with racial discrimination and urging a convention boycott 
of the city and relocation of the 1970 Super Bowl (expected 
to gross $4,250,000 for New Orleans) to another city unless 
conditions improved for blacks. Therefore, civic and busi­
ness leaders of the city pressed for reform, resulting in 
the enactment of a new public accommodations ordinance.
“^ Tyson v. Cazes, 238 F.Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1965);
Pania v. City of New Orleans, 262 F.Supp. 651 (E.D. La. 
1967).
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After federal courts negated a state court restraining 
order, the ordinance took effect in January of 1970.59
By 1972, the reasoning of the federal district courts 
had broadened to include almost anything bordering on racial 
discrimination in bars and lounges. In that year, the 
courts held that a bar that provided a juke box and pool 
table for the entertainment of its patrons came under 
Section 201 of Title II as a "place of amusement." The 
court sensed that the Civil Rights Act should be afforded a 
liberal construction to eliminate the inconvenience, unfair­
ness and humiliation of racial discrimination.^
As with other forms of segregation, private acts of 
discrimination in the operation of movie theaters in 
Louisiana were voided by the Civil Rights Act under Section 
201 (b) of Title II, which specifically covered "any motion 
picture house." Following the enactment of the law, most 
theaters in the state decided to comply voluntarily. How­
ever, a suit ensued when the owner of a theater in Mamou, 
Louisiana, continued to restrict blacks to balcony seating 
and whites to the lower section of his movie house. The 
courts held that films customarily shown in the theater 
moved in interstate commerce, making the establishment a 
"place of public accommodations" as defined in Title II.
CO
New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 14, Sept. 24,
Nov 21, Dec. 31, 19F?” Jan. I S " 1970.
^United States v. Vizena, 342 F.Supp. 553 (W.D. La. 
1972).
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Therefore, the proprietor's seating practices constituted 
segregation and was prohibited by federal law.61-
Most of the public recreational facilities such as 
parks, playgrounds, gyms, swimming pools and auditoriums in 
Louisiana were state or locally owned and had already come 
under federal regulations proscribing their segregation as 
"state action." After 1964, Title II was used to desegre­
gate private recreational facilities that offered the sale 
of food or entertainment to the general public and which 
were practicing racial discrimination in violation of 
federal law.
The major case dealing with segregated recreational 
facilities was Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., which 
involved a Baton Rouge amusement park that provided mechani­
cal rides for the entertainment of children, and which 
operated an ice skating rink during the winter. In 1966, 
the federal district court in Baton Rouge decided that the 
park, dance studios and bowling alleys did not fall under 
Title II because they did not offer exhibitions for the 
entertainment of spectators. However, on a rehearing in 
1968 by the Fifth Circuit Court (which had affirmed in 
1967), the appellate court decided that the amusement park 
was covered by Title II as a "place of amusement."62
6lBryant v. Guillory, 11 RRLR 426 (1965).
62Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F.Supp.
523 (E.D. La. 1966), 391 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1967), 394 F.2d 
342 (5th Cir. 1968).
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In 1967i the federal courts achieved the desegregation 
of a bowling alley in the New Orleans suburb of Algiers in a 
roundabout way. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did 
not cover bowling alleys, the establishment contained a 
lunch counter that served bowlers and spectators. The 
courts concluded that the refreshment counter came under 
Section 201 of Title II, which encompassed a business that 
was located on the premises of a covered establishment, 
served interstate patrons and whose food moved in interstate 
commerce. In addition, the snack bar was an adjunct to the 
bowling alley and thus, was not exempt from the act.®3
Title II was also used by the federal courts to prevent 
subterfuges in the realm of sports facilities. The United 
States brought suit against the Slidell Youth Football 
Association, which operated a youth football league and 
owned a sports facility where league teams competed. After 
1964, the organization deleted "white only" from its bylaws 
and added a restrictive membership clause, under which 
applicants were required to obtain a two-thirds vote of 
voting members of the association in order to participate in 
its football program. In 1974, a federal district court 
held that its operations constituted a "pattern and prac­
tice" of racial discrimination, its sports facility was a 
"place of entertainment," its operations affected commerce,
^  Adams v. Fazzio Real Estate Co., Inc., 268 F.Supp.
630 (E.D. La. 1967).
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and that it was not a private club. Therefore, the associ­
ation was subject to provisions of the Civil Rights A c t . 64
By 1974, there were few traces of overt discrimination 
still being practiced in transit or public accommodations 
across the state. Prior to 1964, de jure segregation had 
been voided by the federal courts, and various state ser­
vices were ordered to desegregate and cease discriminatory 
operation, particularly in the cities of New Orleans and 
Baton Rouge. After Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, privately-owned accommodations felt the brunt of fed­
eral determination to end segregation. Most of the proprie­
tors of public accommodations submitted because of mounting 
lawsuits and after realizing that many of the fears expected 
to accompany desegregation had not materialized.
During the late 1960's, Governor John J. McKeithen 
adopted a neutral posture on desegregation outside of the 
field of education. The new administration under Edwin 
Edwards enjoyed a large measure of black support and pro­
ceeded to push for the repeal of segregationist laws in the 
1972 state legislature. Repealed were requirements for 
segregated sports and social events, transit, sanitary 
facilities, drinking fountains, and waiting rooms.65 in 
1973, various civil rights measures to protect equal public
^United States v. Slidell Youth Football Association, 
387 F.Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974).
ge
Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 254, 
no. 262, no. 263, no. 26b.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
349
access to public accommodations were incorporated in the new 
state constitution, which was approved on April 20, 1974, 
and took effect that same year. Under it, special provi­
sions were included prohibiting the denial of equal protec­
tion of the laws or passage of laws which discriminated 
against anyone "because of race or religious ideas, beliefs,
. . . birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or 
political ideas or affiliations." In another provision, 
everyone was granted "access to public areas, accommoda­
tions, and facilities" free from discrimination based on 
race, religion, national ancestry, age, sex or physical 
condition.^
Not only did the executive and legislative branches of 
the state government undergo a change of attitude by 1974. 
The state courts became vigilant and ready to forestall any 
attempt to maintain discrimination in transit and public 
accommodations. Louisianians had come a long way since the 
Brown decision of 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Although traces of discrimination continued to exist in 
scattered areas of the state in the form of de facto 
segregation, these attempts, like dinosaurs, were doomed to 
extinction in light of the changes in both attitudes and law 
within the state by 1974.
^®State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1974, Article I, 
Sec. 3, Sec. 12.
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Chapter IX
DESEGREGATION IN FAMILY RELATIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING
Introduction
Among the most difficult areas to desegregate were 
family relations, employment and housing. All three were 
rooted in both de jure and d£ facto segregation, and pro­
vided the core for separate white and black societies. The 
weight of culture, heritage and personal preferences assured 
that desegregation would be only limited successes in all 
three areas.
De jure regulations had been provided in the area of 
family relations since the end of Reconstruction to maintain 
and to safeguard white heritage, both past and future, from 
black intrusion. In the name of white supremacy, laws were 
adopted in Louisiana restricting blacks from claiming white 
status on legal documents, or from cohabitating with whites. 
In addition, blacks were later threatened with denial of 
state benefits if they chose or encouraged others to defy 
segregat ion.
Discrimination in employment in Louisiana was primarily 
based on custom and tradition, having its origins in the 
antebellum period. Prior to 1964, strides were made mainly 
by federal executive decree, which outlawed the application
350
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of racial discrimination in federally-funded construction 
contracts. However, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
was most effective in eradicating de jure and overt prac­
tices of discrimination, along with sympathetic federal 
court action that established affirmative action programs to 
overcome the influence of past practices of racial discrimi­
nation.
As with employment, housing discrimination was particu­
larly difficult to manage. Both were rooted more in custom 
than in law, making it difficult to distinguish where law 
ended and custom began. Although housing segregation origi­
nated during Reconstruction, it was not until 1968 that 
housing received the full attention of the federal govern­
ment, when both Congress and the Supreme Court decided to 
actively participate in the destruction of racial discrimi­
nation in housing. However, as with employment, much of the 
discrimination was imbedded within the bedrock of society 
and could not be uprooted by normal means of legislation, 
prosecution or litigation. In the final analysis, only time 
could temper personal choices to discriminate in both 
employment and housing.
Desegregation in Family Relations
Among the most serious threats to "racial purity," 
white supremacy and the entire segregated way of life in the 
South was the issue of family relations. Encompassing mar­
riage and divorce laws, birth and death certificates, and
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laws dealing with children and inheritance, the area of fam­
ily relations was steeped in de jure safeguards to prevent 
any possibility of intrusion by blacks into a white world.
One of the primary fears of the Negrophobic South was 
the "pollution" of the blood and heritage of the white race 
by blacks through miscegenous relationships. Although cul­
ture could have accomplished the task fairly well, the 
leaders of Louisiana felt that it was crucial to bestow the 
sanction of law on these social taboos, resulting in the 
enactment of a wide range of statutes before 1900 to outlaw 
interracial sexual contacts in and out of marriage.
By I960, with the acceleraton of the national civil 
rights movement outside of the state, many Louisianians 
sought a way to prevent the collapse of segregation. Legis­
lators hardened the state's position on miscegenation as 
well as on attempts to change the racial designation on 
birth certificates to "white," and employed scare tactics by 
serving notice on needy blacks that their identification 
with the civil rights movement could jeopardize continued 
use of free state institutions or participation in state 
public assistance programs. Not until the 1970's was an 
atmosphere established that was conducive to equal access to 
state benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis, or was it 
possible to expunge discriminatory legislation regarding 
marriage, vital records and children from state law.
The subject of marriage clearly came under state 
action, since society felt the need to place restrictions
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on who could perform marriages and on who could marry. In 
addition to regulations on marital procedure, race was taken 
into consideration for marriage in Louisiana prior to 1967. 
Miscegenation, or intermarriage between people of different 
races, was still prohibited in Louisiana and fifteen other 
states when the United States Supreme Court voided them in 
1967.
Miscegenation laws were plainly state action since they 
prohibited interracial marriages and cohabitation, and 
attached criminal penalties for violation. This was a par­
ticularly difficult subject to broach because of the appre­
hension among whites of the "mongrelization" of the white 
race and the propagation of half-breed outcasts who would be 
unable to fit into either white or black societies. While 
racial mixing was one of the greatest fears of most white 
Southerners, most black Southerners did not view miscegena­
tion as a major concern. Gunnar Myrdal observed in his 
landmark study of black social and psychological conditions 
that whites placed miscegenation at the top of their list of 
priorities for maintaining segregation, while blacks saw it 
with scant significance as a barrier to equal rights.* 
However, blacks were opposed to miscegenation laws because 
of their psychological impact in implying that they were not 
fit to marry whites. A Ford Foundation study conducted
^Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper,' 1944) 60-61.
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among several black families in Chicago in the early 1960's, 
attested that there was very little proclivity within the 
group studied to promote miscegenation.2
Prior to the Civil War, it was not uncommon for wealthy 
white Louisiana men to take black mistresses, many of whom 
were set up in apartments in New Orleans. At that time, it
was relatively easy to keep blacks and whites separated
socially, so there were few fears that blacks would infil­
trate white society through blood lines. However, white
imagination and fears of domination by blacks grew by leaps
and bounds with white perceptions and fantasies acquired 
during Reconstruction. All social contacts between the 
races became circumspect, and blacks became socially ostra­
cized, except on an employer-servant level.
During Reconstruction, conservative whites were unab.le 
to enact or to enforce legislation restricting social con­
tacts between the races. In fact, the Radical legislature 
was able to enact a law in 1870 legitimizing the natural 
children of persons who had been prohibited from marrying 
during slavery.3 Meanwhile, whites awaited the opportunity 
to pass legislation that would prevent the occurrence of 
their greatest fear— racial mixing of the white blood line.
Between 1894 and I960, the Louisiana legislature 
enacted a series of laws to check sexual contact between
2
Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 267-68.
O
Acts of Louisiana, 1870, Regular Session, no. 68.
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whites and blacks. In 1894, "miscegenation" was defined and 
all marriages between whites and blacks were voided. Then, 
in 1900 and in 1902, mixed marriages of Loui*siana tritiz*** • 
who had married outside of the state, then returned to 
Louisiana to live as husband and wife, were nullified. The 
legislature addressed the subject of "concubinage" in 1908 
and 1910, prohibiting such unions between whites and blacks, 
and providing penalties for violations of the laws. In 1920 
and 1942, miscegenous marriages were prohibited again, and a
penalty of imprisonment with or without hard labor for up to
five years was provided for persons found guilty of engaging
in miscegenation.^
The state miscegenation laws came under attack in the 
1950 !s, when a state district court voided the statutes. 
However, the state supreme court overturned the decision in 
1959, upholding the acts as a constitutional use of the 
police powers to maintain "purity of race" and to prevent 
the "propagation of half-breed children."5 Thus far, the 
federal courts had avoided ruling on the issue of interra­
cial marital relationships, but this situation was altered
^Ibid., 1894, Regular Session, no. 54, 1900, Regular 
Session, no. 120, 1902, Regular Session, no. 9, _ffggu~
lar 5e s's ion, no. 87, 19l0,"Regular SesTion, no. 206, 19^5, 
Regular Session, no. 220, 1942, Regular Session, no. 43.
^State v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233 (1959); Robert J.
Sickels, Race, Marriage and the Law (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1972) 97-98.
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during the 1960's by the expansion of the civil rights move­
ment along with more liberal attitudes among federal judges.
In 1963. the United States Supreme Court voided the 
cohabitation law of Florida, but left its miscegenation law 
intact.® The high court did not invalidate a state misce­
genation law until Loving v. Virginia in 1967. It concluded 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of a citi­
zen to freely marry without restrictions "by invidious dis­
crimination," and that "the freedom to marry, or not marry, 
a person of another race resides with the individual and 
cannot be infringed by the State."7
Louisiana did not immediately repeal its miscegenation 
laws, but awaited a federal ruling. As late as 1964, its 
miscegenation laws were still being strictly enforced. In 
that year, a nineteen year old black man and a thirty-two 
year old white woman were arrested in Baton Rouge on one 
count of miscegenation. During the same year, a national 
controversy erupted when the acting warden of the state 
prison at Angola, Louisiana, declared that black inmates 
were not allowed to correspond with whites. At issue was a 
three-year correspondence between a black prisoner on death 
row and a white woman in Sweden. A state official later 
explained that the real reason for denying the correspon­
dence was because of state policy to allow only the
^McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
^Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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immediate family, prison officials, attorneys, ministers and 
spouses to have access to prisoners.&
Two months after the decision in Loving, the Supreme
Court decided the case of Zippert v. Sylvester. A white man 
and a black woman had filed suit asking a federal court to
compel the clerk of court of St. Landry Parish to issue a
marriage license to them. Citing Loving, the court voided 
the state's miscegenation law because it violated the 
couple's rights to equal protection. The local clerk of 
court was then ordered to issue a marriage license, if the 
couple was eligible to marry under other valid state quali­
fications for marriage. A license was granted and they were 
married in Lafayette in August of 1967.^
Despite alterations in marriage laws throughout the 
United States after 1967, changes in thinking did not pro­
gress very far. Two opinion polls taken in 1970 found that 
56 percent of persons surveyed nationwide were opposed to 
laws prohibiting marriages between whites and blacks, but 
that 72 percent of whites were opposed to marriage between a 
white close friend or relative and a black.
In 1972, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted sev­
eral laws to repeal discriminatory marriage laws. Among the
Q
Baton Rouge State Times, Dec. 9, 21, 1964.
^Zippert v. Sylvester, 12 RRLR 1445 (1967).
*^Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 284-85.
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statutes repealed were those prohibiting interracial mar­
riages, making miscegenation a crime, and requiring a parish 
clerk of clerk to list the race of litigants in the docket­
ing of divorce proceedings.^
Another problem that concerned many Louisianians was 
the designation of race on a birth certificate. Racial 
listing on a birth certificate was a determining factor in 
deciding who a person could marry, where his children could 
attend school and whether he could participate in various 
state programs. With the numerous concubinage situations 
existing in Louisiana prior to the Civil War, the issue of 
racial designation became a serious problem once miscegena­
tion laws were enacted and whites became determined to 
preserve purity of the white race from infiltration by 
blacks.
In the absence of sufficient medical, scientific and 
geneological data, it was difficult for the state to deter­
mine blood lines except through birth certificates and court 
testimony from reliable witnesses. Unfortunately, many 
poverty-stricken and isolated rural residents of the state 
had few, if any, documented records of births. Therefore, 
it was necessary to obtain "delayed issuance" of birth 
certificates in order to meet legal requirements for 
entrance to schools, marriage, employment or the like. To
**Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 256, 
no. 397, no. 258.
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be accepted as a member of the white race meant greater 
opportunity and the possibility of a better life for one's 
children. To be classified as black meant the denial of all 
but menial economic opportunities, subjection to a rudimen­
tary education, a stigmatized existence, and few opportuni­
ties for improvement in the lives of succeeding generations.
Without a birth certificate, it often became necessary 
to determine race on the basis of testimony from members of 
the community or from living relatives or friends of the 
petitioner seeking the issuance of a delayed birth certifi­
cate. The major problem encountered was the presentation of 
sufficient proof to substantiate the claim that a person was 
indeed white. The decision about a person's racial classi­
fication was often made arbitrarily by local or state 
records officials, leaving the state courts as the only 
recourse for persons who were dissatisfied with the official 
verdict. Then, it was the responsibility of the state 
judiciary to weigh the evidence and determine whether the 
petitioner was entitled to the coveted racial designation of 
"white" and all of the privileges attendant upon it.
In 1910, the state courts defined "colored persons" as 
"all persons with any appreciable mixture of negro blood," 
and placed the burden of proof on the person challenging 
state r e c o r d s . O n c e  a public document was issued, the
12Lee v. New Orleans Great Northern Rail Co., La., 51 
So. 182 (1910); State v. Treadway, La., 52 So. 500 (1910).
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petitioner assumed the responsibility of proving "beyond any 
doubt at all" that a mistake in race had been made by the 
recorder. In a 1957 case, a woman brought suit after a New 
Orleans official changed the racial designation on her 
father's death certificate from "Negro" to "white" and then 
back again after receiving additional evidence concerning 
his race. Because of the enormous burden of proof necessary 
to change the racial listing, along with ambiguous judicial 
and statutory definitions of race, both district and appel­
late state courts upheld New Orleans records officials.*3 
A similar case arose from a 1956 statute that prohib­
ited interracial participation in sporting events. In order 
to be able to compete with white boxers, a black profes­
sional boxer requested that New Orleans officials issue him 
a delayed birth certificate listing his place of birth as, 
"New Orleans" and his race as "white." After succeeding in 
district court, he lost in the court of appeals, which side­
stepped the racial issue and voided the lower court decision 
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not proved that he had 
been born in New Orleans. Thus he was not entitled to be 
issued a delayed birth certificate.^
In order to prevent blacks from using loopholes in 
state laws to desegregate white facilities, the state
13 State ex rel. Rodi v. City of New Orleans, La., 94 
So.2d 108 (1957).
*^State ex rel. Dupas v. City of New Orleans, 3 RRLR 
510 (1958).
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legislature in I960 tightened laws relating to legal docu­
ments. One statute denied the issuance of delayed birth 
certificates unless the petitioner had a letter from the 
State or New Orleans Bureau of Vital Statistics attesting 
that no previous file existed for him. Another law required 
children applying for admission to a public or private 
school for the first time to present an official copy of 
their birth certificates to school authorities. If race or 
age were not listed, local school boards were empowered to 
require additional proof of both factors.*5
During the 1960's, state courts continued to apply 
strict interpretation procedures to persons seeking changes 
on birth certificates. In 1962, a state appellate court 
ove.rturned a lower court ruling concerning a man who was 
granted the right to have his race changed to "white," 
although he was one-sixteenth black. The court of appeals 
reversed because the evidence presented confirmed that the 
defendant had a "traceable amount" of Negro blood, and that 
he had failed to meet the burden of proof of showing "beyond 
any doubt at all" that he was white, or tracing his geneal­
ogy far enough to satisfy legal r e q u i r e m e n t s . " ^  A s  late as 
1967, state courts continued to require a petitioner to 
establish "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the racial
15Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 410, 
no. 541.
^^State ex rel. Cousin v. Louisiana State Board of 
Health, La., 138 So.2d 829 (1962).
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designation on a birth certificate was incorrect. If traces
of Negro blood could be found, the appellate courts denied
requests for changes by petitioners.
The state legislature did not define "traceable amount"
of Negro blood until 1970. Under the new statute, no one
with "one-thirty-second or less of Negro blood" could be 
designated by any public official in Louisiana to be 
"colored," "mulatto," "black," "negro," "griffe," "Afro- 
American," "quadroon," "mestizo," "colored person" or 
"person of color." In 1973, a state appellate court voided 
the act because it was based on "wholly irrational and 
scientifically insupportable foundations," and "was so vague 
as to be incapable of meaningful application." However, the 
state supreme court reversed this decision in 1974, uphold­
ing the 1970 statute as neither vague nor "invidiously 
discriminatory." Despite judicial support for it, the law 
was later repealed.
Since 1974, state courts have altered their position 
from requiring proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" to a lesser 
standard of "preponderance of the evidence" in proceedings 
regarding the alteration of vital records. They presently
17State ex rel. Encalde v. City of New Orleans, State 
ex rel. Encalde v. Louisiana State Board of Health, La., 188 
So.2d 88 (1967); State ex rel. Pritchard v. Louisiana State 
Board of Health, La., 198 So.2d 490 (1967).
18Acts of Louisiana, 1970, Regular Session, no. 46, 
1983, Regular Session, no. 44l; State ex rel. Plaia v. 
Louisiana State Board of Health, La. App., 275 So.2d 201 
(1973), La., 296 So.2d 809 (1974).
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subscribe to the belief that "race designations are purely 
social and cultural perceptions," and recognize the diffi­
culty in applying a racial label. In addition to birth 
certificates, the courts have admitted into evidence other 
factors such as physical appearance, self-perception, hered­
ity, community recognition and cultural bias before making a 
final determination on racial designation.19
The first mention of children in state legislation on a 
racial basis in Louisiana occurred in 1870, when a law was 
enacted legitimizing the natural children of persons who 
were formerly prohibited from marrying during the antebellum 
period.20 Thereafter, it was unnecessary to single out 
children for discrimination, since segregation applied to 
all residents of the state regardless of their age.
One of the ways in which the state legislature of I960 
sought to discourage blacks from engaging in civil rights 
activities was through threats aimed at their children, by 
targeting illegitimate children and persons on public assis­
tance programs. One act made it a crime to give birth to 
two or more illegitimate children and placed guilt on both 
the mother and father. Another act redefined "dependent 
child" and set new guidelines for state assistance. A home 
situation in which parents or other relatives were living 
together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage was
*^Doe v. State, La. App., 479 So.2d 369 (1985), La. 485 
So.2d 60 (1986).
20Acts of Louisiana, 1870, Regular Session, no. 68.
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declared an unsuitable environment for a dependent child.
In addition, no state assistance would be granted to any 
dependent child living with a mother who had given birth to 
an illegitimate child after having received a welfare pay­
ment. As a follow-up, the legislature prohibited such a 
child from receiving state financial assistance until proof 
was presented that the mother had "ceased her illicit rela­
tionship," and was maintaining a suitable home for the 
child.21 Later, the state attorney general declared that 
this act operated retroactively and applied to any mother 
during the past who had given birth to an illegitimate child 
after having received public assistance.22
The legality of the I960 child dependency and illegiti­
macy laws was open to question. They were intended more as 
a threat to blacks than anything else, and remained on the 
statute books until 1972. At that time, the state legisla­
ture prohibited the use of race, color, religion or national 
origin to deny citizens the right to participate in or 
receive benefits from any state-assisted program or 
activity.2^
Two other areas of concern dealing with children and 
race in Louisiana were adoptions and inheritances. In 1948,
21 Ibid., I960, Regular Session, no. 75, no. 251, 
no. 306.
225 RRLR 906 (I960).
2*1
Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 540.
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the state legislature provided that a single person or any 
married couple jointly could petition to adopt children "of 
his or their race." This law stood until voided by a fed­
eral .district court in 1972, when a white couple petitioned 
to adopt a black child. The court recognized the difficul­
ties inherent in an interracial adoption, and justified 
taking race into consideration in the best interests of the 
child. Because the 1948 state law forbade all interracial 
adoptions and did not serve a legitimate state aim, it 
denied equal protection and was regarded as arbitrary and 
"invidious discrimination."24 jn 1975, the legislature 
deleted the provisions of the 1948 statute restricting adop­
tions on racial grounds, and enabled natural fathers and 
mothers to legitimate their natural children by simply 
stating their intention to do so, and without regard to the 
race of either parents or c h i l d r e n . 5^
In 1966, a state district court handled the issue of 
inheritance and race, when it disinherited the natural 
brothers and sisters of the decedent because they were the 
products of a miscegenous union. The estate then passed to 
the state in the absence of a legitimate h e i r . The Loving
Ibid., 1948, Regular Session, no. 228; Compos v. 
McKeithen, 341 F.Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972).
25Acts of Louisiana, 1975, Regular Session, no. 421, 
no. 422.
26Hibbert v. Mudd, La., 187 So.2d 503 (1966).
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and Zippert cases of 1967 placed this decision in jeopardy 
because of the distinction it made between races. It is now 
illegal in Louisiana to treat illegitimate children differ­
ently from legitimate ones, much less to place discrimina­
tory obstacles in the way of inheritances.
Employment
Prior to 1964, the executive branch of the federal 
government was the principal source of opposition to racial 
discrimination in employment. Largely as a result of pres­
idential executive orders, beginning with Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, race differentials in federal government employ­
ment began slowly to disappear after 1940. During the late 
1940's and early 1950's, President Harry Truman made several 
additional efforts to end racial discrimination in federa.l 
civilian employment and in the armed forces. After a period 
of relative stagnation during the Eisenhower years, efforts 
to desegregate employment increased under the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations. The forces of antidiscrimination 
in employment triumphed with the enactment of Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which brought the federal courts 
into active involvement in ending job discrimination in both 
the public and private sectors.
Employment discrimination in Louisiana prior to 1964 
was primarily de facto rather than de jure, based mainly on 
custom and tradition. Although no state law existed requir­
ing a distinction in employment, discrimination clearly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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existed in practice. After Title VII took effect, several 
unions and companies operating in the state became test 
cases in the federal courts to bring an end to invidious 
means of racial discrimination in the work place. By the 
1970's, affirmative action programs had been established in 
several companies in order to bring an end to the effects of 
previous discriminatory policies.
Prior to the Civil War, most blacks were engaged in 
agricultural pursuits, although a few served on plantations 
as artisans. The free black population in New Orleans was 
employed principally in such non-agricultural vocations as 
day laborers, small shopkeepers and tradesmen. With the end 
of slavery, black artisans outnumbered white artisans in the 
South five-to-one. However, changes in the employment sec­
tor began almost immediately as new caste requirements 
sanctioned a system in which jobs were separated into cer­
tain ones for whites and others for b l a c k s . ^7
A study conducted on the employment situation of blacks 
in Baton Rouge between 1870 and 1880 uncovered a situation 
that was probably typical among blacks across the state 
during and shortly following Reconstruction. With the end 
of slavery, black employment did not undergo radical 
changes, but continued to be based primarily on menial 
positions. However, by 1880, a noticeable decline had 
occurred in the number of blacks in trades such as masonry,
27C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Rress, 1951) 3b0.
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blacksmithing and carpentry. Counterbalancing this trend 
was a sharp increase in the number of blacks serving as 
cooks, servants, and day and farm laborers. Most blacks 
were unable to move into better jobs because of their lack 
of capital, opportunity, training and education. As in most 
areas of the state at this time, Conservative Democrats in 
Baton Rouge used economic pressure to control black votes, 
so that "Democratic" blacks were hired first by Conservative
planters and businessmen.^ 8
In 1889, a racist solution to the problem of black 
employment was offered in the guise of the "Shreveport 
Plan," sponsored by the Daily Caucasian, the most racist 
newspaper in Louisiana. The plan suggested that blacks be 
treated essentially as sub-humans. Perhaps, this attitude 
reflected the mood of the average white Louisianian who 
feared economic competition with the free black laborer. 
Blacks were not to be employed in "easy" jobs such as cooks, 
waiters or porters, but were to be given "the hardest and 
most degrading tasks" for earning a living.^9 However, 
after 1890, "Negro-job" industries in the South expanded to 
include work in sawmills, coal mines and railroad construc­
tion and maintenance. In the meantime, whites forced blacks
28Terry L. Seip, "Municipal Politics and the Negro: 
Baton Rouge, 1865-1880," Readings in Louisiana Politics, 
261-62.
29Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 190-91.
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out of better paying and more attractive occupations, and 
farther down the job ladder.30
After 1910, blacks were excluded from all "white work." 
They were not allowed to work in the manufacturing of tex­
tiles and furniture; electricity, oil and gas, paper and 
pulp, and chemicals; and urban service occupations— buses, 
streetcars, telephone and telegraph, trade, banking, insur­
ance and brokerage. Blacks were still able to work in agri­
culture, tobacco and fertilizer industries and as longshore­
men. While the number of whites employed in agriculture 
decreased, blacks working in non-agricultural pursuits 
declined from 26.7 percent in 1910 to 21.1 percent in 1930. 
To compound problems for blacks in employment, labor unions 
limited the number of blacks who could enter the building 
trades or work for railroads, and secured the passage of 
laws that all but eliminated the possibility of blacks 
becoming plumbers and steamfitters. However, blacks could 
belong to separate unions for bricklayers, plasterers and 
longshoremen.31
Most of the limited progress made by blacks between 
1940 and 1964 in reversing discrimination in employment 
occurred outside of the South and resulted from efforts by 
the executive branch. Congress did not begin to exert
^Woodward, Origins of the New South, 360.
George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1967) 155-64.
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itself in this field until 1964, and only then did the 
federal courts begin to seriously challenge de facto racial 
discrimination in employment throughout the nation. Of all 
types of racial prejudice met by blacks, employment and 
housing were probably the most widespread in all areas of 
the country. Laws and court rulings on employment were not 
designed exclusively with the South in mind, as in the 
fields of education, elections, transportation and public 
accommodations. National prejudice in employment was more 
difficult to eliminate since it was not based on law but on 
custom and usage, and because it was exceedingly difficult 
to persuade white employers, employees and unions to cease 
arbitrary treatment of minorities.
During the 1940's, the Roosevelt Administration took 
the first steps in modifying the employment situation for 
blacks through executive orders. Beginning in 1940, dis­
crimination was ended in the Federal Civil Service by law.
In 1941, the President required the holders of defense 
contracts to refrain from discrimination on the grounds of 
race, creed, color or national origin. Another executive 
order granted broad contract powers to the War and Navy 
Departments and to the Maritime Commission, with a stipula­
tion that contracts include a nondiscrimination clause.
Then, in 1943, President Roosevelt required the addition of
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an antidiscrimination clause to all government contracts, 
not only those for d e f e n s e . 32
The Truman Administration continued the efforts of its 
predecessor, but its major victory was the order to desegre­
gate the military in 1948. By May of 1950, the navy and air 
force were almost entirely integrated, while the army began 
desegregating in the summer of 1950 as the Korean Conflict 
began. To minimize domestic racial incidents, desegregation 
was initially extended to occupation and garrison troops 
overseas. Lastly, it was extended to military posts within 
the United States, including the South, and into civilian 
employment within the armed f o r c e s . 33
It was during this time that the New Orleans police 
force became integrated. No blacks had been employed as 
police officers since 1915. In 1949, black applicant 
Carlton H. Pecot brought suit in state district court when 
he was denied employment after receiving one of the highest 
scores on the police civil service examination. The court 
directed the mayor and the superintendent of police to show 
cause why Pecot should not be employed. After meeting with 
his advisors, the mayor decided in June of 1949 to begin 
hiring blacks on the police force. When Pecot and another
<12
Ramspect Act of 1940; Executive Order Nos. 8802,
9001, 9346.
^Executive Order Nos. 9664, 10210, 10308, 9981;
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: 
Oxford University Press, i974) 136-37•
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black officer were hired in 1950, it became the intention of 
the mayor to limit their use as police officers by posting 
them to black neighborhoods, as undercover police and in 
juvenile cases.34 Despite this limited use of black 
officers, their hiring was a promising start in eradicating 
employment discrimination throughout the state as a whole.
Advances in employment protection for minorities during 
the 1950's languished nationally under the Eisenhower 
Administration. However, the federal contract and employ­
ment policies of Roosevelt and Truman were continued. Dur­
ing this time, the first Louisiana case involving employment 
discrimination arose in the federal courts, which approved a 
consent decree for Celotex Corporation in Marrero, a suburb 
of New Orleans. Under the decree, all parties agreed to 
eliminate racial discrimination in the use of seniority 
lists and for jobs that became available. In addition, the 
courts authorized the continuation of the present employment 
system within the company as long as current employees held 
the same j o b s . 35
Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a vigor­
ous program to attack discrimination in employment was con­
ducted. Shortly after taking office, John F. Kennedy issued 
an executive order creating the President's Committee on 
Equal Employment Opportunity, which had the authority to
Haas, Delesseps S. Morrison, 77-78.
^Butler v. Celotex Corporation, 3 RRLR 508 (1958).
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impose sanctions for violations of nondiscrimination clauses 
in federal government procurement contracts. In addition, 
government contractors were required to take affirmative 
action in order to insure that job applicants and current 
employees were treated without regard to race, creed, color 
or national origin. In mid-1963, President Kennedy amended 
his 1961 order to require the inclusion of nondiscrimination 
clauses in all federally assisted construction contracts.36 
In early 1961, the Civil Rights Commission requested 
state agencies and businessses in Louisiana to complete 
questionnaires concerning their pattern of black employment. 
Most of the forms were submitted to the state attorney gen­
eral for a legal opinion or discarded by those receiving 
them.- J. D. Deblieux, Chairman of the Louisiana Advisory 
Committee to the Civil Rights Committee, declared that a 
five-year study of civil service employees revealed that 
about 20 percent of the total were blacks, who were employed 
in state institutions in professional, educational and 
technical jobs. It was also pointed out that Louisiana had 
been the first Southern State in 1950 to equalize black and 
white teacher pay, basing it on comparable education and 
experience. During the same year, New Orleans Public 
Service, Inc. acceded to threats of a black boycott of buses
Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 803; Executive 
Order Nos. 10925» llll4.
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and streetcars, and agreed to hire qualified blacks when 
additional transit operators were needed.37
A Public Affairs Research Council study was announced 
at the end of 1961, indicating that working age blacks were 
migrating out of Louisiana in large numbers because of a 
lack of equitable employment opportunities with whites. The 
non-white population of the state had declined from 50 per­
cent in 1900 to 32 percent in 1960.38
In early 1963, state officials were required to respond 
to charges of discrimination in the hiring of civil service 
workers in agencies receiving federal assistance. This 
followed the issuance of revised HEW guidelines prohibiting 
discrimination in the "recruitment, examination, appoint­
ment, training, promotion, retention or any other personnel 
action, because of political or religious opinions or affil­
iations or because of race, national origin or other non­
merit factors." State agencies that came under the new HEW 
regulations included welfare, highways, education, employ­
ment security, hospitals, public works, colleges and univer­
sities, civil defense, adjutant general’s office and depart­
ment of health. In March, W. W. McDougall, state civil 
service director, reported that Louisiana was meeting HEW 
standards for nondiscrimination in employment and had banned 
discrimination based on "non-merit factors." However, four
07
New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 22, Aug. 11, 1961. 
38Ibid., Dec. 19, 1961.
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months later, the Labor Department reported that blacks were
not receiving equal employment opportunities at the Michoud
39
Saturn rocket plant outside of New Orleans.
At an open meeting of the Louisiana State Advisory 
Committee in July of 1963, charges were leveled of wide­
spread racial discrimination in employment opportunities and 
in technical training in New Orleans. The committee was 
informed that both New Orleans and Louisiana economies were 
suffering because many blacks who were unable to find suit­
able employment equal to their training were leaving the 
state to use their talents elsewhere. While the population 
of New Orleans in I960 was 37.8 percent non-white, the labor 
force was only 28.8 percent black. Of non-white males, 
about 13 percent had white collar and technical jobs while 
63 percent had unskilled positions. By comparison, 48 per­
cent of whites had white collar and 39 percent had unskilled 
jobs. Speakers before the civil rights committee cited Bell 
Telephone and Telegraph, NOPSI and the Orleans Parish School 
Board as the areas of major concern in New Orleans. Blacks 
were only able to secure employment parking cars, caddying 
on golf courses, working on soft drink trucks or in other 
low-paying menial labor. Because of a lack of training, 
blacks were also unable to secure skilled employment in the 
space industry or at Kaiser Aluminum, both of which claimed
^Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 21, Mar. 23, 1963; New 
Orleans Times Picayune, July 29, 1963.
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to be equal opportunity employers. In New Orleans, blacks 
were allowed to attend only one overcrowded trade school 
that offered only six courses. On racial grounds, they were 
barred from attending Delgado, which offered thirty-five 
different training courses. Compounding black problems was
the failure of the governor to implement the Federal
Manpower Resources Training Act, which provided federal aid 
in technical training on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Louisiana was the only state that did not take advantage of 
this program by 1963.^®
Following a threat of racial strife if no action was
taken on their demands, black leaders of New Orleans
announced in August of 1963 that an agreement had been 
reached with city officials to hire blacks as sanitation 
workers and firemen. In addition, city leaders agreed to 
work with the New Orleans Civil Service Commission to assure 
that blacks would be hired on the basis of their qualifica­
tions. A month later, the city hired ten blacks as garbage 
collectors and confirmed that blacks were being hired under 
civil service as firemen.41
During the first half of 1964, a few government con­
tract industries attempted to hire blacks, but were unable 
to find many who were qualified for available technical 
positions. The Michoud rocket plant hired three blacks as
^New Orleans Times Picayune, July 10, 1963.
41Ibid., Aug. 13, Sept. 10, 1963.
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clerks and one as a documentation specialist, but could not 
find other qualified blacks for technical openings. Among 
its 9200 employees, Chrysler Corporation and Boeing Company 
employed 434 blacks. However, only forty of them were in 
scientific, technical or engineering jobs, while the rest 
were in unskilled or clerical jobs. The primary reason for 
the lack of black applicants was the failure of the educa­
tional system to train them despite the willingness of some 
businesses to hire t h e m . 42
In Baton Rouge, the scene of several demonstrations in 
the early 1960's because of racial discrimination in hiring 
practices, a few stores began hiring blacks as clerks and in 
other positions after meetings between local merchants and a 
biracial committee. By mid-1964, blacks already employed 
who had undergone special training programs several months 
earlier were being upgraded and p r o m o t e d . 43
The enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 brought the legislative and judicial branches of the 
federal government into active protection of the right of 
employment without racial discrimination. Along with the 
weight of an energetic administration, an assault by the 
combined forces of the federal government on employment 
discrimination severely weakened the opposition and
^ New York Times, Apr. 26, 1963.
^Baton Rouge State Times, June 30, 1964.
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established the foundations for equitable employment oppor­
tunities for minorities.
Title VII, officially entitled the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Act, took effect on July 2, 1965. Employers, 
employment agencies and labor organizations were prohibited 
from discriminating in employment or training programs on 
the grounds of race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin. The heart of the act was the creation of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with the power to 
receive individual complaints of discrimination from private 
employers, to investigate and file complaints of discrimina­
tion on behalf of individuals, and to serve as a concilia­
tive body to obtain voluntary compliance with Title VII 
guidelines prior to litigation in federal courts.^
Because the EEOC lacked any mandatory enforcement 
power, Title VII was amended in 1972. The commission 
received enforcement powers; was empowered to file suits 
after the failure of its efforts at conciliation; and had 
its provisions extended to educational institutions, govern­
ment agencies, and employers and unions with fifteen or more 
employees or members as of March 24, 1973.^5
There was no immediate rush by federal courts or by 
individuals in Louisiana to expunge racial prejudice from 
the job market in 1964. Several companies and unions within
^Civil Rights Act of 1964.
45 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
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the state became test cases and were brought under federal 
scrutiny for programs that reflected past policies of 
employment discrimination. When it appeared that lengthy 
and costly federal intervention and litigation were the 
alternatives, most employers terminated overt prejudice in 
hiring, promotions, payment and layoffs.
An early promise of improvement in employment practices 
in the state occurred when the New Orleans City Council 
adopted an ordinance terminating discriminatory employment 
practices in 1966. Because of continued pressure from black 
organizations, the city officially declared that all agen­
cies, boards and departments of the city would fairly con­
sider all qualified applicants for employment regardless of 
race, religion or nationality.^
Beginning in 1967, federal courts began implementing 
affirmative action plans in areas where past discrimination 
had produced a lingering effect on employment. The question 
of inverse discrimination quickly arose to challenge affir­
mative action programs, while the courts became preoccupied 
with company and union policies that had detrimental effects 
on victims of past discrimination in employment.
The first major employment case decided in federal 
courts in Louisiana after Title VII took effect, was a suit 
against Local 53, International Association of Heat and 
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers. After the failure of
469 RRLR 1578 (1966).
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the EEOC to conciliate, two suits were filed in federal 
court accusing the local of refusing to consider blacks for 
union membership or to refer blacks for employment. Combin­
ing the two cases in 1967, the court ordered the union to 
accept the four black plaintiffs for membership and to elim­
inate three discriminatory prerequisites for union member­
ship: kinship to a current member, sponsorship and approval
of a member by a majority of the union, and work experience 
prior to the date of the court injunct ion.47
In 1968, Congress and the Supreme Court strengthened 
federal efforts to assure equal employment with the enact­
ment of Title 1 of a new Civil Rights Act, and in the case 
of Jones v. Mayer. Title I prohibited anyone from injuring, 
intimidating or interfering on the grounds of race, color, 
religion or national origin with the right of a person seek­
ing or holding employment in either private or public sec­
tors. 4® Although the Jones decision dealt primarily with 
housing discrimination, the Supreme Court indicated that the 
right to contract for employment was protected by 42 U.S.C., 
Section 1981, which subjected violators to the same laws and 
penalties as persons who practiced housing discrimination. 
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared 
that Section 1981 created a "cause of action" for racially
^Vogler v. McCarty, United States v. Local 53, 
International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and 
Asbestos Workers, 12 RRLR 2062 (1967).
4818 USCA Sec. 245, Civil Rights Act of 1968.
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discriminatory acts by private employers, and proposed that 
federal district courts encourage the use of EEOC concilia­
tion pending action under Section 1981.^9
Beginning in 1968, litigation in federal courts on
employment suits increased dramatically. Crown-Zellerbach
in Bogalusa was in the forefront of civil actions for past
and present policies of discrimination by the company and
its unions, and became a test case for the judiciary. More
than likely, the company's problems convinced other busi- 
»
nesses operating in Louisiana to comply with federal employ­
ment laws or face similar litigation.
Crown-Zellerbach, as well as many other companies in 
Louisiana, had existing promotion and layoff policies based 
on the time served in a particular job or department rather 
than in the company as a whole. The Bogalusa plant had two 
separate lines of progression for whites and blacks prior to 
1965. White lines were for more desirable and higher paying 
jobs, while black lines were for "left-over," menial and 
poorly paying positions. In 1965, Crown-Zellerbach elimi­
nated the black progression list and placed blacks who had 
worked at the mill prior to 1965 at the bottom of the white 
progression list, along with new employees. When EEOC 
efforts to conciliate failed, the Justice Department brought
^Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 754; Jones v. 
Mayer, 392 U.S. 4^9 (1968); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine 
Contracting Company, 437 F.2d 1011 (5th. Cir. 1971).
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suit against the company and Local 189» United Papermakers 
and Paperworkers. In 1968, federal courts enjoined the 
defendants from discriminating against blacks; required them 
to abolish any seniority system that discriminated against 
blacks hired before 1966 in promotions, demotions, or selec­
tions for training; and ordered them to replace the "job 
seniority" system with a "mill seniority" system. The "job 
seniority" system subjected blacks to past discrimination 
because the existing seniority, transfer and promotion 
policies were rooted in a system that had denied blacks 
access to lucrative and prestigious positions formerly 
reserved for whites. The courts held that Crown-Zellerbach 
and its white union had violated Title VII by insisting on 
policies that had the effect of "carrying forward exclusion 
of a racially-determined class."50
Several weeks later, another suit was settled against 
Crown-Zellerbach. Federal courts ordered the company to 
abandon its practice of awarding promotions on the basis of 
job seniority because it perpetuated the effects of past 
discrimination. Furthermore, the court ordered that black 
union members be admitted to the white local and that the 
separate black local be dissolved,51
“^ United States v. Local 189. United Papermakers and 
Paperworkers, and Crown-Zellerbach Corporation, 1 RRLS 38, 
219 (1968, 1969).
SIHicks v. Crown-Zellerbach Company, 310 F.Supp. 536
(1970).
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In 1970, Crown-Zellerbach's testing procedures for 
employment, promotions and transfer became the target of 
another employment discrimination suit. Federal courts 
determined that the test results led to a large number of 
job openings for whites but excluded nearly all blacks, and 
that the tests were not related to the lower and middle 
level jobs for which they were being used. The courts over­
ruled the use of the tests, the continued existence of dual 
lines of progression, and requirements that blacks take a 
pay reduction in order to enter formerly white lines of pro­
gression. To overcome the effects of past discrimination 
practices, the court ordered the establishment of an affir­
mative action plan in which blacks would be offered vacan­
cies in formerly white-only jobs on a seniority basis and in 
preference to other employees.52 in the following year, the 
Supreme Court upheld the section of Title VII that overruled 
discriminatory testing for employment purposes, because 
Congress had decided that tests "must measure the person for 
the job, not the person in the abstract."53
Following the affirmative action decree, white workers 
appealed the decision on the grounds that the federal dis­
trict court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Title VII to 
provide a remedy that would prevent discrimination in
F2Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 319 F.Supp.
314 (E.D. La. 1970), 321 F.Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971).
“^ Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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employment. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s actions in altering the rights of 
white employees in order to most effectively protect and 
redress the rights of black employees who had been victims
of past discrimination.54
Other suits followed in the early 1970's to bring 
employers in Louisiana into compliance with federal laws 
barring racial discrimination in employment. However, by 
1972, there was a noticeable change in the efforts of the 
executive and judicial branches to vigorously prosecute 
discrimination cases. Beginning in 1972, the Justice 
Department and the federal courts adopted a more conserva­
tive approach toward discrimination suits. By then, most of 
the overt means of racial prejudice had been eliminated 
through court action, threat of litigation or voluntary com­
pliance with federal law. Because the type of bias that 
still existed in the business community was more difficult 
to prove, the burden of proof shifted to the government and 
its agencies, placing them under closer scrutiny by the 
courts and narrowing the scope of Title VII and the EEOC.
By 1974, it appeared that the federal courts in 
Louisiana had completely reversed direction. In 1972, the 
federal district court in New Orleans declared that the 
maintenance of separate local unions for white and black
•^Vogler v. McCarty, United States v. Local 53, 3 RRLS 
189 (1971).
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employees violated Title VII, but that the EEOC lacked the 
power of a d j u d i c a t i o n . 55 Then, federal courts held that a 
litigant could only file a suit under Title VII if he was a 
victim of unfair practices or discrimination based on 
r a c e . 5 5  i n  a case against New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 
the courts held that the power of the EEOC to investigate 
evidence involving an alleged charge of discrimination did 
not give it the right to search through an employer's 
records on a "fishing expedition" in hopes of discovering 
violations of the law. The charge of employment discrimin­
ation did not require detailed evidence of discriminatory 
behavior, but had to be based on facts. The EEOC lacked 
power to allow it to explore "potential" discrimination 
regardless of its connection with the original c h a r g e s . 57
Although racial discrimination remained a major problem 
in employment in Louisiana in the 1970's, the federal courts 
had brought about an end to overt acts of prejudice. With 
orders to unions to abolish separate black unions and to 
admit blacks into formerly white-only unions, some progress 
was made. The courts also ordered the abolition of any 
employment program sanctioned by unions or by businesses 
that projected past policies of discrimination into present
55Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Association, 341 
F.Supp. (E.D. La. 1972).
"^Marshall v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union 60, 
343 F.Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972).
*57New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown, 369 
F.Supp. 702 (E.D. La. 1974).
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or future employment. In addition, federal courts and the 
Justice Department kept vigilance over company and union 
regulations for possible bias, and over such procedures as 
employee testing, hiring practices and layoff policies. As 
an inducement to gain voluntary compliance, the courts 
expressed their willingness to grant back pay and attorney's 
fees to successful litigants, and to order affirmative 
action plans when they were necessary to rectify past prac­
tices of discrimination.
Housing
Residential segregation was not a phenomenon peculiar 
to the South, but was a national problem of major concern 
throughout America. Prior to 1900, it was primarily a de 
facto situation without the sanction of law. Thereafter, 
housing patterns were codified in the South, as well as in 
other parts of the nation. The difficulty in dismantling 
this type of segregation lay in the fact that culture and 
economics were primary factors that dictated where individ­
uals resided.
Prior to I960, the federal courts were largely inactive 
in housing unless evidence of state action existed to sanc­
tion, enforce or encourage racial discrimination. With the 
enactment of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968, housing became one of the few 
areas where Congress took an active stand against private 
discrimination in advance of judicial and executive action.
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Federal courts followed the legislative lead with a deter­
mined stand against private discrimination in housing in 
Jones v. Mayer in 1968. Thereafter, the entire national 
housing industry came under tighter scrutiny by the federal 
courts and the Justice Department for indications of private 
acts of racial discrimination.
In the area of housing discrimination, Louisiana gener­
ally followed the lead of other states and of the federal 
government. Economics and personal preferences played pri­
mary roles in segregated residential patterns in the state. 
Overt de jure segregation was not as influential in the 
development of segregated residential areas as custom or de 
facto patterns. Nearly every Louisiana municipality had its 
enclaves of black residents in little more than overcrowded 
shantytowns, surrounded by a less dense pattern of white 
dwellings. After 1970, residential patterns in Louisiana 
changed very little. Although there were no legal con­
straints on residential location, the continued presence of 
economic facts of life and personal preference dictated an 
individual's choice of area for settlement. By 1974, few 
blacks lived outside of nearly all-black concentrations, 
while white flight decimated central parts of cities, 
leaving them to poorer elements of society. Meanwhile, 
whites followed the national trend and resettled in the 
"lily-white" suburbs.
Before the Civil War, whites and blacks lived in close 
proximity to one another primarily because of the nature of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
388
slavery. New Orleans, with its large free black population, 
had black and white residences within close range throughout 
the city. Even there, though, a de facto pattern of 
residential segregation existed through economic, cultural 
and personal preference. After the Civil War, blacks 
streamed into the cities, primarily as a symbolic act of 
rejection of plantation life and what it represented for 
them.
A study that was conducted on Baton Rouge using the 
censuses of 1870 and 1880, suggests that residential segre­
gation developed during the 1870's. Physical contact 
between whites and blacks in the town decreased as the num­
ber of black domestic servants living in white households 
declined sharply. At the same time, predominantly white and 
black residential concentrations were developing. However, 
de facto segregation in housing did not become a statewide 
phenomenon until much later.58
As early as 1866, the federal government recognized the 
importance of freedom of residence. Part of the Civil 
Rights Act of that year granted all citizens the right to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real prop­
erty, and to have full and equal benefits of all of the laws 
for the security of persons and property as enjoyed by 
whites. These housing provisions were codified later as
■^Seip, "Municipal Politics," 263-64.
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42 U.S.C., Sections 1981 and 1982 and are still in opera­
tion. 59
Unfortunately, the initial enthusiasm and determina­
tion of Congress to protect the rights of the freedmen did 
not endure, and the federal courts failed to share the same 
convictions about safeguarding the personal rights of 
blacks. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 undid much of the 
civil rights legislation of Congress during Reconstruction, 
and it was not long before this case was being used to jus­
tify discriminatory devices such as residential zoning 
ordinances to keep the races apart. When federal courts 
invalidated this artifice in 1917, buyers and sellers across 
America resorted to the use of "racially restrictive housing 
covenants," which prohibited selling or leasing of property 
to blacks or "Mongolians" in perpetuity, and insured the 
continuation of all-white neighborhoods. In 1926, the 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld restrictive covenants, 
declaring that the Fifth Amendment placed limitations only 
on the government, not on the action of individuals."^0
Prior to 1930, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted 
a series of laws to restrict housing and enforce segregation 
in order to codify a de facto situation. In 1912, the 
legislature gave municipalities the power to deny building 
permits to anyone seeking to build a home in an area
59Civil Rights Act of 1866; 42 USCA, Sec. 1981, 1982.
^Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323.
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principally inhabited by members of a different race. This 
law was strengthened by a new statute in 1921 that provided 
penalties for housing blacks and whites in the same dwell­
ing, except for black employees such as maids. The act 
prohibited any person or corporation from renting any part 
of an apartment house or tenement house already inhabited by 
persons of one race to those of another. In 1924, the leg­
islature reserved to the state the power it had entrusted to 
municipalities in its 1912 act, and defined a black or white 
"community" as an area in which all residences for three 
hundred feet on either side of the property in question 
belonged to either blacks or whites. Of course, whites in 
the state found additional ways, legal or otherwise, to keep 
blacks out of their neighborhoods.
During the late 1940's, a few glimmers of change began 
to appear in the nation's housing practices. The Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) responded to pressure from the 
NAACP by eliminating a recommendation from its manual for 
the use of restrictive covenants. Then, President Harry 
Truman's Committee on Civil Rights recommended that states 
outlaw restrictive covenants, that Congress outlaw them in 
the District of Columbia, and that the federal courts refuse 
to enforce them. However, it was still too early for most 
of the committee's recommendations to receive serious
^*Acts of Louisiana, 1912, Regular Session, no. 117, 
1921, Extraordinary Session, no. 106, 1924, Regular Session,
no.' us.  — ------  ------ ----------
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consideration. As late as 1948, the Supreme Court ruled 
that federal lav did not preclude "private restrictive 
agreements so long as the purposes of those agreements are 
achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to the 
terms." Once again, the court had indirectly upheld the 
validity of restrictive covenants by deciding that govern­
ment sanction was illegal, but that private acts of dis­
crimination were not.®2
In 1947, Mayor DeLesseps S. Morrison began a New 
Orleans program that included slum clearance and construc­
tion of public housing for blacks. His biographer, Edvard 
F. Haas, reports that he made limited progress because of 
the tremendous increase in demand for new dwellings, and 
because of fierce opposition by the building industry and 
white property owners who abhorred the idea of locating 
black housing projects near them. These problems seriously 
undermined the progress of the mayor, who was a political 
realist and who strictly operated the city's housing pro­
grams on a segregated basis.
During the 1950's, housing was relegated to a minor 
position as the nation became preoccupied with de jure 
segregation in education, voting and transportation. Only 
the federal courts took any action in 1953, extending the 
ban on judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants to
62Wasby, Desegregation from Brown, 37.
6 ?
Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison, 68-72.
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suits for damages against a co-covenantor who broke such an 
a g r e e m e n t . ^4 In the meantime, minorities were excluded or 
confined by overt discriminatory housing practices, by the 
lack of sufficient housing, and through laws and government 
policies that allowed local governments to exercise arbi­
trary control over public housing within their jurisdiction, 
often in a racially discriminatory manner.
During the mid-1950's, a $15,000,000 subdivision was 
built around Pontchartrain Park in the Gentilly section of 
New Orleans. A thousand homes were constructed and sold for 
$9800 to $25,000 each to minorities in the middle and higher 
income brackets, the first homes being ready in 1955. In 
the same year, Bunche Village opened as a 7000 unit low- 
income housing project near New O r l e a n s . ^5
The 1 9 6 0 ' s  produced a breakthrough in the termination 
of segregated housing through overt private actions. A 
combined assault by Congress with the Civil Rights Acts of 
1964 and 1968, along with the Supreme Court decision in 
Jones v. Mayer in 1968, cracked the foundations of private 
discrimination in housing. The legal effort to obtain 
equality for minorities during the 1960's was directed 
toward the goals of protection against discrimination,
^Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
ge
New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 23, 1954, Apr. 4, 
June 27, 1955.
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creation of additional low-income housing and placement of 
public housing outside of minority and poverty centers.
In 1962, the Kennedy Administration began a shift in 
the course of executive policy on federal housing by mandat­
ing equal opportunity and prohibiting discrimination in 
federally-financed housing. However, because it exempted 
housing financed by FHA or VA loans prior to 1962 and hous­
ing financed through private banks or savings and loan 
associations, only about 18 percent of new construction was 
affected.^®
At this time, the Housing Authority of New Orleans 
(HANO) operated thirteen white and black projects in the 
city on a segregated basis, providing housing for 10,275 
low-income families (15,604 adults and 27,696 children).
HANO operated under congressional act, state law and city 
ordinances. Although receiving federal subsidies, actual 
operation of the projects was left up to HANO, which was 
subject to local authorities. In 1961, HANO received rent 
revenues of $3,890,615 from all thirteen projects and fed­
eral subsidies of $2,700,000. Rent varied from $16.75 to 
$62.75 per month. Occupants had to keep apartments clean, 
be law-abiding and get along well with their neighbors.
The main objective of HANO under Public Housing Authority 
guidelines was "to provide decent, safe and sanitary
^Executive Order No. 11063.
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dwellings and to lessen public expense by lowering the 
incidence of crime and disease attributed to slums.
Lake Charles had the second largest number of low-rent 
public housing units in the state. Begun in 1942, the 
city's housing program now had over six hundred units, with 
plans to build additional ones. Average cost of housing in 
the projects was $32.00. However, organized opposition to 
the building of new units came from realtors and home 
builders who filed suits to halt expansion of the public 
housing program.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first 
major attempt by Congress in the twentieth century to pro­
tect the right to nondiscriminatory housing. It prohibited 
discrimination in programs or activities receiving federal 
financial assistance, and directed all federal departments 
and agencies to use federal funds in a nondiscriminatory 
way. Any activity or program being conducted in violation 
of federal law would have its funds t e r m i n a t e d . ®9
As a direct result of Title VI, New Orleans and Baton 
Rouge housing authorities decided in 1965 to operate all of 
their housing units on a nondiscriminatory basis. In March, 
HANO announced that it had ended its segregated policy and 
would admit all qualified applicants to any housing project
67 Baton Rouge State Times, Jan. 16, 1962.
68Ibid., Mar. 13, 1962.
69Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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regardless of race, creed or color. At the time, nine 
thousand blacks occupied nine housing projects and three 
thousand whites occupied five all-white projects in New 
Orleans. In May, the East Baton Rouge Parish Public Housing 
Authority agreed to operate its one hundred seventy existing 
units and all future units on a nondiscriminatory basis in 
order to clear the way to receive $2,800,000 in federal 
funds for the construction of two hundred new units. Of the 
existing units, one hundred twenty were for blacks and 
seventy were for whites.70
The Department of Housing and Urban Development, in 
1967, required a balance of sites for public housing within 
and outside of ghetto areas, and required federally-funded 
housing authorities to assign tenants on a "first-come, 
first-served" plan that would prevent racial segregation in 
projects.71 In the next year, Congress enacted a new Civil 
Rights Act that included a fair or open housing section, and 
the Housing and Urban Development Act.
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was the 
first federal legislation specifically targeted against 
housing discrimination and expanded federal coverage of the 
housing market from 18 percent in 1962 to 80 percent when
^®New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 2, 1965; Baton Rouge 
State Times, May 14” June 4, 1965.
71Fair Housing and Exclusionary Land Use (Washington: 
Urban Land Institute, 1974) 8u
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
396
the law became fully effective on January 1, 1970. The law 
prohibited discrimination by race, color, religion or 
national origin in the sale, rental or advertisement of the 
sale or rental of a dwelling; prohibited lending institu­
tions from discriminating in loans; forbade "blockbusting;" 
and prohibited discrimination by real estate brokers' organ­
izations. Exempted from coverage were single-family houses 
sold or rented without the services of a real estate agent 
and which did not use discriminatory advertising. Title IX 
of the 1968 act made it a criminal offense to threaten or to 
use force to willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with 
anyone who was complying with or exercising rights under 
Title V I I I .72
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 expanded 
the supply of lower-income federal housing by providing for 
two massive building programs: one for rental housing and
one for opportunities for private homeownership. Under the 
act, Congress intended to establish twenty-six million hous­
ing units over the next ten years, six million of which 
would be designated for low-income f a m i l i e s . 73 of course, 
most cities in the nation would be eager to obtain lucrative 
contracts to provide housing for the urban poor, and would 
have to submit to new federal regulations to operate them on 
a nondiscriminatory basis.
^Civil Rights Act of 1968.
Fair Housing, 9.
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The Supreme Court began to change its view of housing 
discrimination in the private sector in 1967* when it 
affirmed a California State Supreme Court decision that had 
voided a constitutional amendment prohibiting the state from 
interfering in the sale or rental of property in California. 
The federal high court ruled that such an action violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment by expressly authorizing and making 
constitutional the right to discriminate on racial grounds, 
and involving the state in a discriminatory action.
The Jones v. Mayer decision of 1968 provided the 
capstone of efforts by the federal government to bring an 
end to de jure and overt private acts of discrimination in 
housing. The Supreme Court voided government enforcement of 
restrictive covenants that were the result of purely private 
racial discrimination unsupported by legal action. Private 
owners as well as public officials were now prohibited from 
discriminating in the buying and renting of both public and 
private property because of race and color.75
In follow-up cases, the Supreme Court broadened the 
Jones decision to allow recovery of damages in 1969. Thus, 
discrimination was not only illegal but could be fairly 
costly to practice. In addition, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development was required to consider the impact of 
site selections for housing projects on racial integration.
ZfReitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Jones v. Mayer (1968).
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In 1971, federal courts held that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause was violated when a building permit 
was denied by county officials for housing in which low- 
income black families would live. Then, in 1973, the 
Supreme Court broadened the scope of Title VIII of the 1968 
Civil Rights Act by declaring that its purpose was "to 
replace the ghettos by truly integrated and balanced living 
quarters." Thus, the court came to view the role of the 
federal government in guaranteeing equal housing to extend 
beyond mere nondiscrimination to actual integration.
After 1968, despite the combined efforts of the three 
branches of the federal government to equalize housing, 
other barriers still existed to deny blacks access to hous­
ing outside of ghetto areas. Local government bodies often 
enacted exclusive land use ordinances, established zones 
which excluded multi-family housing, adopted lot size and 
square footage regulations that excluded all but expensive 
housing, denied building permits with excuses such as inade­
quate water or sewer facilities, prohibited construction of 
low-income housing without community voter approval, and
76Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); 
Shannon v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 305 
F.Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969), 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970); 
Crow v. Brown, 332 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), 457 F.2d 788 
(5th Cir. 1972); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1973); Otero v. New York City Housing 
Authority, 344 F.Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), 354 F.Supp. 941 
(S.D. N.Y. 1973).
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selected sites and assigned tenants to projects in such a 
way as to insure racial segregation. 77
In Louisiana, similar ploys were used to restrict the 
location of public housing. As in most parts of the nation, 
de jure segregation in housing was a dead issue by 1968, and 
de facto segregation had become a major problem. Although 
the state did not repeal its statute prohibiting renting an 
apartment or room to blacks in buildings occupied by whites 
until 1972, it was a moot question by t h e n . 78 With the 
exception of a few scattered cases heard in federal court, 
housing in Louisiana proceeded much as it did elsewhere. By 
1968, the resistance of most Louisianians had been broken 
irrevocably by other desegregation battles, chiefly by those 
in education. As was the norm, it was easier to move from 
the central city to the "lily-white" suburbs as blacks grav­
itated to the central city. In the suburbs, most white 
children were able to attend predominantly white neighbor­
hood schools that were the product of cultural and economic 
forces rather than by decree. This type of segregation was 
more difficult to handle and baffled the federal courts 
after court-ordered busing had provoked a national outcry.
In the three areas of family relations, employment and 
housing, both de jure and de facto segregation played a
^ Fair Housing, 10.
78Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 255.
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significant role. Culture, heritage and personal prefer­
ences weighed heavily on all three, making desegregation 
particularly limited. It was relatively easy to void laws 
that restricted equal protection and equal access of blacks, 
but it was more difficult to legislate or pronounce upon 
ingrained prejudices in the matter of marriage, adoption, 
employment or housing patterns. In these areas, the federal 
government could only provide legal protection for blacks 
who challenged the status quo, but could do little to 
overcome cultural and economic obstacles met by non-whites 
in seeking employment. Even with affirmative action pro­
grams in place, many blacks were unable to qualify for 
higher paying jobs because of a lack of the skills and 
training necessary for available jobs.
During the 1970's, blacks were often shut out of 
virtually all-white neighborhoods because of economics and 
encountered white flight to the suburbs when they moved into 
better residential areas. Once abandoned by whites, the 
inner cities faced erosion of the tax base, removal of white 
childen from city public schools, and a steady deterioration 
of inner city neighborhoods. Attempts to improve housing 
for low-income groups were besieged by litigation, inflated 
land prices, and interminable delays and excuses by local 
officials. Because of expediency, lower site costs and 
personal preference among many blacks to live near urban 
centers and other blacks, housing projects were often con­
structed near heavily black concentrations. Blacks who
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remained dependent on public housing saw little hope of 
improving their condition, but those who were able to 
receive training and education, were often able to improve 
their economic situation and may eventually be able to 
overcome present housing problems through private home 
ownership in the future.
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Chapter X
SUMMARY
The State of Louisiana was vastly different in 1974 
from what it had been in 1954. In two decades, it had 
progressed from a closed, white-dominated society to an 
open, multi-racial society with legal safeguards in place to 
assure equal protection and equal opportunity for all 
regardless of race or color. Although private acts of 
discrimination continued, de jure or government-sanctioned 
segregation had been removed from all areas of social 
contact in the state. However, the weightier problem of 
custom, or de facto segregation, remained to be resolved.
In 1954, Louisiana had a stratified caste system with 
blacks on the bottom. Under the principle of "separate but 
equal," black citizens were subjected to continued humilia­
tion, ostracism and rejection in every instance where they 
might come into social contact with the white majority. 
Instead of abiding by the Plessy doctrine, white leaders 
chose to exclude blacks from most of the privileges enjoyed 
by white Louisianians. As a result of meager state appro­
priations, the few existing public facilities prior to 1930 
were constructed only for whites, while blacks were gener­
ally excluded from all services. Later, when funds became
402
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available for the construction of separate facilities for 
blacks, they were often inadequate.
Black Louisianians were unable to protest their ill- 
treatment at the hands of state and local officials because 
of their lack of political and economic power. Following 
the disfranchisement movement, few blacks were able to vote 
after 1900. Prior to 1950, the only way blacks could effec­
tively protest their conditions and improve their lives was 
to leave the state and to try their luck outside the South. 
Many blacks who remained in Louisiana were oppressed and 
broken in spirit, benignly submitting to their outcaste 
status. With few defenders within or outside of the South 
before 1954, they had little hope for improving their lives 
or those of their children.
In general, blacks were discriminated against in every 
aspect of life before 1954. They were unable to vote, serve 
on juries, buy homes in decent neighborhoods, use publicly- 
owned facilities, or frequent hotels, restaurants and other 
public accommodations. Separate public parks, playgrounds, 
swimming pools, elementary and secondary schools, colleges, 
waiting areas and correctional institutions were often pro­
vided by the 1950's in hopes of appeasing blacks so that 
they would not seek to desegregate white facilities. Blacks 
were permitted the use of courtrooms and transit facilities 
along with whites, but on a separate seating basis.
White leaders used the state's police powers to subdue 
blacks and to instill a humble and demeaning attitude within
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them. After decades of being denied the vote, few blacks 
bothered attempting to register following the removal of 
some franchise restrictions after 1930. Consequently, few 
were able to qualify for jury duty, which was drawn from the 
list of registered voters. Blacks were also subjugated 
through economic means and by the inadequate educational 
system provided for them. While a network of colleges, 
vocational and trade schools was provided for whites across 
the state, blacks were forced to attend a few meagerly 
funded, overcrowded and far-flung institutions, to leave the 
state for training or to abandon hope for additional educa­
tion and training. Even if businesses in Louisiana wished 
to hire blacks, few were able to qualify for available jobs 
because of insufficient education and training. Thus, only 
menial and low-paying jobs were left for blacks to perform, 
notwithstanding the refusal of many employers to hire them 
even if they had training and education. Therefore, eco­
nomic circumstances required blacks to live in squalor in 
shantytowns and ghettos or to seek public housing.
The Brown decision of 1954 had a profound impact upon 
the system of segregation in Louisiana, although it took 
more than a decade to break the color barrier. The court 
ruling galvanized white racists into action in the mid- 
1950's because of the implications of this judgment for the 
future of the closed, white society of the South. A program 
of massive resistance was adopted as the answer to federal 
intrusion into Southern race relations. By the late 1950's,
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the racists had mobilized, seized control of the consciences 
and emotions of the white populace, and persuaded the state 
legislature to erect a bulwark of segregation laws to 
embroil the federal courts in litigation for decades. The 
state assumed the burden of protecting segregation by 
enacting legislation to prevent cracks in the white line, 
and by interposing the state's authority and immunity from 
suits between the federal courts and state agencies.
During the late 1950's, the civil rights movement grew 
slowly but progressively in Louisiana. Beginning in New 
Orleans and Baton Rouge, blacks organized under the urging 
of the NAACP to redress past grievances. By the end of the 
decade, several former white colleges had been integrated, 
the state had resorted to leasing its publicly-owned facili­
ties, systematic exclusion of blacks from juries was cur­
tailed and the state's segregated transit law was voided.
In early I960, the first nonviolent sit-ins began in 
Baton Rouge and New Orleans under the auspices of CORE to 
bring state and national attention to racial discrimination 
being practiced by local businesses. Although only a few 
college students took part in them, hundreds of thousands of 
black Louisianians watched silently but hopefully, too timid 
to take action themselves because of cultural training and 
possible economic consequences. In the same year, the first 
major confrontation occurred over desegregation with the 
integration of New Orleans public schools. From November 
until February of 1961, national attention was focused on
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the state as white supremacists in the state legislature 
endeavored to prevent the desegregation of any public school 
system. The state's leaders devoted themselves to every 
conceivable effort to use legislation and litigation to 
thwart the intentions of the federal.government but, in the 
end, capitulated to federal court orders.
As 1964 approached, the civil rights movement accel­
erated nationally. Federal courts and the Justice 
Department worked in concert to bring down segregation in 
transit, public facilities, and colleges and universities 
through threats of prosecution and litigation. Congress 
capped federal efforts with the enactment of the sweeping 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Touching upon every aspect of de 
jure segregation— voting rights, public accommodations, 
public facilities, public education and employment— the law 
provided a crushing blow to Southern whites that the current 
desegregation effort could be weathered as it had during 
Reconstruction. However, federal forces, undaunted by 
Southern opposition, forged ahead and swept away futile 
opposition to constitutional requirements of equal protec­
tion of the laws.
Between 1963 and 1965, all public colleges and univer­
sities and vocational and technical schools in Louisiana 
were desegregated, segregated practices in courtrooms were 
ended, medical facilities began operation free of racial 
discrimination, public accommodations were desegregated, and 
most of the public school systems in the state underwent
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limited integration in the form of freedom of choice. The 
impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was phenomenal, par­
ticularly Title VI, which prohibited the discriminatory use 
of federal funds. It was now virtually impossible to escape 
the watchful eyes of federal courts and of the Departments 
of Justice and HEW if racial discrimination was being prac­
ticed in federally funded programs. Following the enactment 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks began to register 
in record numbers and to resume their places within the 
political process.
From 1965 to 1969, most of the remaining institutions 
still under segregated operation were integrated. The major 
desegregation battle occurred over public schools. Local 
school boards were denied the authority to continue opera­
tion under a dual system of white and black schools with 
provisions for transfers under a freedom of choice basis. 
Federal courts left no doubt of their determination to 
establish unitary systems throughout Louisiana, voiding 
freedom of choice in 1968 as a viable alternative. Federal 
efforts also began the desegregation of all correctional 
facilities for adults and juveniles, prohibited racial 
discrimination in the private housing industry, provided 
safeguards for equal employment opportunities and voided 
miscegenation statutes.
As the 1970's approached, a more conservative mood 
swept over the nation. The militant bent of the civil 
rights movement and the court ordered busing issue helped to
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harden national public opinion, as federal courts entered a 
new phase in the elimination of discrimination. Focus was 
shifted from de jure segregation in the South to de facto 
discrimination that was widespread across America. All 
branches of the federal government adopted a slower approach 
toward civil rights, alert to discriminatory laws but less 
concerned with the effects of purely customary practices of 
discrimination.
Within Louisiana, unitary public school systems were 
instituted between 1969 and 1971 through federal court 
orders. Thereafter, desegregated school systems were 
closely monitored to prevent resegregation and to eliminate 
the effects of past racial segregation. A more acute prob­
lem existed in the state's system of higher education, where 
a dual system continued to function. Despite various 
attempts by federal and state authorities, this enigma has 
yet to be resolved.
Another problem encountered in Louisiana was white 
flight from inner cities to the suburbs. In the case of 
large cities, this often meant taking up residence in 
another parish and thus in a different school district.
Inner city schools became predominantly black, while schools 
in outlying areas reflected the community's black-white 
ratio and became virtually all-white. Compounding the 
problem was the tendency of white parents in New Orleans and 
Baton Rouge to enroll their children in available private 
and parochial schools that were primarily white also.
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Attendant upon these problems was continued discrimina­
tion in employment and housing. Admittedly, employment 
conditions and opportunities for blacks improved remarkably 
during the 1970's. However, when many blacks were finally 
able to acquire the education and training necessary for 
more advanced and better paying positions, they often found 
that the types of jobs for which they had prepared were 
still being denied to them by covert racial prejudice or 
were nonexistent in Louisiana. Those who did succeed were 
no longer content to remain confined to poor black neighbor­
hoods and sought housing in lower middle class sections. 
Unfortunately, they quickly discovered that racial discrim­
ination was still rampant, and means were found to deny 
their relocation despite federal protections. However, with 
the dismantling of the de jure system of segregation, the 
passing of time and the weathering of de facto prejudices, 
the promise for a brighter future was held out to the next 
black generation, if not immediately for their parents.
With the return of blacks to the polls and to appoint­
ive and elective public offices in the early 1970's, black 
citizens were able to assume an active role in safeguarding 
their rights in the future. As black electoral strength in 
cities increased in proportion to their numbers, blacks 
acquired municipal offices and were sent to the state legis­
lature, where they took steps to insure that segregation by 
law would never again raise its head. In 1971, Edwin 
Edwards actively solicited and received a majority of black
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votes for governor. Taking office in March of 1972, his 
administration supported the repeal of existing segregation 
statutes, and succeeded in writing a new state constitution 
in 1973 that was free of discrimination and included guar­
antees of equality and equal protection for all citizens of 
the state.
Although many problems remained to be resolved and old 
prejudices still existed, the "second Reconstruction" became 
a permanent feature in the State of Louisiana. The fabric 
of society had been altered to reflect the changes wrought 
by the federal government, and a new attitude of tolerance, 
harmony and cooperation took root. A minority of white 
racists was no longer able to overtly discriminate against 
blacks by law, or to succeed in persuading state authorities 
to support private or public acts of discrimination. Old 
cultural prejudices were at least tempered to the point of 
allowing blacks the opportunity to participate actively in 
state programs and activities on an equal basis with whites. 
They were now free to vote, hold public office, send their 
children to the closest available public schools, seek equal 
opportunities in employment and housing, serve on juries, 
and use public and private facilities and accommodations on 
a nondiscriminatory basis. De jure segregation was dead and 
blacks had the means to assure that its demise was perma­
nent. With its end, there was hope that the thornier issue 
of de facto segregation could be eradicated one day.
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